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Abstract:
This study Is concerned with the Federal National Council (FNC) in
the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) under the 1971 Constitution.
In selecting the U.A.E. as a case study, a historical and socio-
economic perspective is adopted. The thesis analyses the U.A.E.
traditional society and the effect of external factor namely its
relation with Britain, and internal factor, viz, the advent of oil
wealth, on the power structure in the emirates. Both factors
increased the concentration of central power and decreased
popular participation.
The study provides a theoretical appraisal of the role and functions
of the legislature in developing countries. It examines the
constitutional functions namely legislative, political and financial.
The study suggests new roles that the legislatures performs in
Third World countries.
The thesis examines the historical development of the U.A.E.
constitutional system. Such development ended In 1971 when the
emirates adopted a "Provisional Constitution" to the requirements
of the rulers.
The study explores the 1971 constitution with particular emphasis
on the role of the National Council. It analyses the composition,
functions, role and constitutional arrangements of the National
Council In the U.A.E. The study provides an analysis of the major
political and constitutional cases, In which the FNC was a part, in
order to examine the practical working of the constitutional
provisions in reality. Finally, the thesis attempts to explain the
limitations, Imposed on the National Council, present in the
existing constitutional framework and suggests some
improvements to the status quo.
The coimnon ground throughout the thesis is that a constitution
with a democratic tendency does not necessarily establish
democratic institutions and that it would be more acceptable in a
developing country to introduce evolutionary rather than radical
changes to its constitutional system. However, the study clarifies
the difficulties of concentration of central power in developing
countries.
XI
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is a study of the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.)
Constitution (1971) with particular emphasis on the role of the
legislature. The thesis begins with an exploration of the historical
background to the setting up of the state and the influence of the
rulers whose powers and authority may be traced back to earliest
days.
The country and the constitution:
The U.A.E. compromises of seven emirates; Abu Dhabi,
Dubal, Shailah, Ras-al-Khaimah, Ajman, Umm-al-Quwain and
Fujairah. The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) is located on the
western coast of the Arabian Gulf. As part of the Arab world, it is a
member of the Arab League, United Nations and subscribes to a
regional organization, the Gulf Co-Operation Council (GCC) which
was founded in 1981.
The U.A.E. has a number of distinguishing features which
deserve mention. First, most of the indigenous population are of
Arab origin but because of the large number of Immigrants in the
area they have become a minority In their own land. Second, even
today the political system is dominated by centuries-old ruling
families who presided over the emirates under the protection of the
British for almost one hundred and fifty years. A third feature of
this society Is that It Is more like a city-state than a nation-state.
The rate of urbanization among the whole population of the United
1
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Arab Emirates reported as at mid 1980s is 81 per cent (1). As
regards religion, the society is Islamic. AU the major Islamic
schools and sects are represented, both Sunni and Shia, but it is
predominantly a Sunni Muslim nation (the Shia constitute less
than twenty per cent of the nationals (2), while all the dynasties
ruling the emirates adhere to the Sunni sect). Finally, it is a
capital-surplus society, unlike other Third World developing
countries.
The most important social feature of the individual emirates
Is the hierarchy of authority. In a traditional family the head of it Is
"patriarchal", that Is, generally In a venerable position. His
authority is almost absolute and no single individual may take an
important decision in the family circle without consulting him and
getting his permission. This patriarchal power Is also found in the
larger social unit (i.e. tribe ). The head of the tribe has the full
authority to take the decision on setthng or moving away (3).
Individuals come together in these distinctive groups. In the desert
the grouping takes the form of the tribe where the blood relation is
the criterion and as a result the familial connection may cross
political boundaries; a tribe may stretch through two states or
more (e.g. the Sudan tribe can be found In the Emirates, Qatar and
Bahrain). The same applies to the ruling families. The rulers of
Sharjah and Ras-al-Khaimah are cousins (k).
In 1971 the emirates terminated their special treaty relations
with Britain. The U.A.E. adopted a written, provisional, rigid and
quasi federal constitution. The constitution did not only preserve to
a large extent the pre-1971 traditional way of government, but it
legitimated the status quo as well.
2
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The 1971 Constitution, as chapter 5 shows, was modelled
neither on parliamentary nor on presidential system. It may have
some characteristics of both models, yet the U.A.E. Constitution is
considered as a sut generis. It provides a model of its kind- a
modern quasi democratic constitution which governs a traditional
society rooted in its history. The U.A.E. constitutional system may
therefore be considered as an embryonic constitutional experience.
It should be remembered that some Arab Gulf states share
many characteristics with the U.A.E. Three of them, namely,
Kuwait, Bahraln and Qatar have written constitutions. However,
the Kuwaiti Constitution of 1962 is the first model for the other
three constitutions (U.A.E. 1971, Qatar 1972, Bahrain 1973). It is
worth mentioning that Oman and Saudi Arabia have no written
constitutions.
There are some similarities among the above mentioned four
written constitutions. These similarities may be summed up as
follows. 1- The principle of separation of powers is, to a certain
extent, has been embodied in all of them. 2- All four constitutions
consist of fundamentally the same five chapter headings. Yet, the
U.A.E. Constitution has five additional chapters which mostly deal
with the federal system of the country. 3- Generally speaking, the
four constitutions adhere to the capitalist system. 4- They
recognize an independent judicial power. 5- All of the four
constitutions adhere to the concept of predominance of the
constitution. (5)
Throughout the thesis, especially in chapters 5, 6 and 7,
there is an attempt to bring about the major differences among the
3
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four constitutions. However, some of them may be outlined here.
1- The U.A.E. Constitution establishes a federal system while the
others deal with a unitary system. 2- There is no clear distinction
between the legislative and executive powers in Qatar and the
U.A.E. 3- The Kuwait and Bahrainl Constitutions institute a
parliamentary government, although It did not work in both cases.
4- With the exception of Qatar, the termination or resignation of
the Prime Minister brings down the Government. 5- The
Constitutions of Qatar and the U.A.E. are provisional. (6)
Shari'ah and the Constitution:
To start with, Islam does not make a division between
temporal and spiritual functions of the society. It Is important to
set out some fundamental concepts of government in Islam. The
basic principles of the Islamic political system are found in the
Quran and are deeply rooted the actions of the Prophet
Muhammad (peace be upon him) and his successors (i.e. Muslim
Caliphs).
As A. Khallaf rightly notes, the Islamic government can be
considered as a constitutional government (7). First, Shura (I.e.
consultation) Is a basic component of such government. The affairs
of the state cannot be decided by the head of the state, he has to
consult with the representatives of the people, namely ahiul hail
wal-aqd. The way of selecting the members of this institution was
not clearly defined. Allah commands In the Quran:
"Those who answered the call of their Lord, and
establish regular prayer, and whose affairs are a
matter of counsel, and who spend out of what We
bestow on them for sustenance.' (Chapter 42, Verse
38).
4
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Mutual consultation Is one of the excellent characters that the
Muslims have to promote In themselves. Allah has ordained His
Messenger to do so:
and consult them in affairs, then when you
have taken a decision, put your trust In Allah."(Chapter 3, Verse 159).
The Prophet accordingly used to consult his companions before
taking decisions in public matters (8). The Messenger of Allah
warned rulers not to abuse their positions. It is reported that he
said: "If Allah appoints a person In authority over the Muslims,
and he fails to redress their grievances and remove their poverty,
Allah will not fulfil his needs and will not remove his poverty on the
Day of Judgement." (g) In another tradition the Prophet was
reported to say: "There will be seven persons sheltered under the
shade of Allah on the Day of Judgement when there will be no
other shade beside His shade. They are: a just ruler;..." (io)
Second, the seats of government in Islam are not reserved for
ceitain families or groups of people. It Is up to the people to choose
their rulers. The head of the state is, therefore, supposed to be
freely elected (ii). Third, members of the government are
responsible for their actions before the people.
Under Islamic government the legislative power is Invested in
the Muslim jurists (12). Yet, Allah is the supreme legislator.
Furthermore, Islam recognizes the independence of judiciary, and
hence the judge is governed In his decision by the Divine
revelations and his discretion (13).
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It must be realised here that the fundamental aspects of the
Islamic government were not developed In great detail in the Divine
revelations so that Muslims are given room to manoeuvre and may
reconcile them with their state of affairs.
Sharl'ah contains the legal aspects of the religion of Islam. It
was revealed by Allah, the Sovereign, to humanity In the Holy
Quran and the Sunnah (i.e. the saying, actions and conformations)
of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him). Shari'ah has
governed Muslim communities for over thirteen centurIes (14).
However, its dominant position was challenged and then eroded
with the arrival of Western powers and their legal codes in the last
century.
The Arabian Gulf states have been affected by the western
trend of basing their Laws upon French (Civil) principles. Indeed,
in Kuwait for example, the Sharl'ah role in the legal structure of
modern state was limited to the Law of Personal Status. (15)
However, since mid 1970s, a strong current for the "re-
assertion" of Shari'ah has developed in these countries as In many
Muslim states. The advocates of this direction have argued that
instead of Civil and Common Laws, Sharl'ah must become the
main, if not the only, source of legislation. They have justified their
position on the following grounds. (1) Unlike man-made laws,
Sharl'ah has a Divine source, viz. Allah. (2) Sharl'ah is general and
eternal. It is general in the sense that it regulates individual's
relations with his creator, himself and his society. It is eternal
because of its Divine source. (3) The application of Sharl'ah in the
legal sphere ensures a harmony between Individual's belief and
6
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his/her temporal transactIons. (4) Finally, Muslims are instructed
by Allah to rule themselves by Shari'ah (16). Allah says in the Holy
Quran:
Do they then seek after a judgement of (the
Days of) Ignorance? But who for a people whose faith
is assured, can give better judgment than God?"(Chapter 5, Verse 50).
And another verse states:
"And this (He commands): judge there between
them by what God has revealed, and follow not their
vain desires" (Chapter 5, Verse 49).
The U.A.E. followed the aforementioned direction by
adopting Shari'ah in its Constitution and legal structure of the
state. The 1971 Constitution states in Article 7 that "Islam is the
official religion of the Union. The Islamic Shari'ah shall be a main
source of legislation in the Union." Shari'ah is recognized as a
main but not the main or only source of legislation in the country.
The Constitutional stand is therefore flexible.
However, the practice has shown that Shari'ah has
supremacy over other sources of legislation such as Union Laws,
customs and general legal principles. Most of the federal Laws,
such as penal, criminal procedures, labour and personal status,
are based upon Islamic jurisprudence. For example, Law of Civil
Transactions, which has been promulgated on 12-12-1985, derived
most of its provisions from Hanafi and Malki jurisprudence. (17)
In the judicial system of the U.A.E., Shari'ah is considered as
the prime source of Law in the Emirates. Law no. 10 of 1973
setting up the Supreme Court provides in Article 75:
"The Supreme Court shall apply the provisions
of the Islamic Shari'ah, Union Laws, and other Laws in
7
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force in the member Emirates of the Union Conforming
the Shari'ah. Likewise it shall apply these rules of
custom and those principles of natural and
comparative Law which do not conifict with the
principle of that Shari'ah." (18)
Law no. 6 of 1978 setting up the Union courts of First Instance
and Appeal followed the same path.
W.M. Ballantyne rightly noted in his book Commercial Law
in the Arab Middle East: The Gulf States (1986) that:
although we here have a Constitution which
recognized the Sharia as a principal source of Law, we
have a Law setting up the Supreme Court of the land
which appears to be providing that the Sharf a shall be
the principal source, because by its term any
measures which are contrary to the Sharla would
seem by express provision to be Invalid. ... The net
effect of these provisions is to make the Islamic Shari'a
the principal source of Law." (ig)
The Institution of legislature
Some generalisations may come from the U.A.E.
constitutional arrangements. In common with other developing
states by the end of the twentieth century many traditional
systems of government have come under pressure to relinquish
their absolute authority in order to share political power with the
people or at least with a ruling elite. Such participation may be
best applied in legislatures.
Legislatures are not necessarily the most important
institution In the system they serve. Political scientists have,
therefore, paid more attention to electoral systems, political
parties, pressure groups and bureaucracy. However, the present
study is primarily concerned with constitutional law and aims
8
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thoroughly to explore the legislature as a major component of the
constitutional structure of the state.
The system of legislatures may vary in accordance with the
relevant constitutional arrangements. Constitutions vary in the
role they play in formulating legislatures and their powers. In
countries where the constitution is considered as the supreme law,
legislature, executive and judicial bodies emanate from it. The
constitution is therefore the source of power that is claimed by
each one of the three branches.
The fact that legislatures continue to exist under different
kinds of political systems in Third World countries is an indication
that they fulfil a useful and necessary function. As we will see in
general, many western studies of the legislatures of developing
countries and the few who focused on the United Arab Emirates
(U.A.E.) mistakenly concentrate on one aspect of their role.
The legislature is not of the same importance everywhere in
the world. Its status differs from one country to another. So much
of a country's culture and historical development is linked to the
evolution of its legislature that it is difficult if not impossible to
relate the legislative experience of one political system to other
parts of the world. There are general principles with regard to the
role and functions of the legislature, yet the position of legislature
under the U.A.E. constitution is, as we wifi see, distinctive.
9
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Aims of the study:
The aim of the thesis may be shorily stated. The legislature
under the 1971 constitution was a new legal concept Introduced
into the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) constitutional structure.
Traditionally the rulers used to consult their prominent subjects in
their Majlis (i.e. Divan) but not as a consultative body of members
governed by a clear-cut set of rules.
There are very few cases and statutes, which can help
elaborate a constitutional analysis of the U.A.E. system. Moreover,
the constitution of the country may embody many new Ideas such
as federal constitutional court, yet the legal institutions did not
respond positively to such ideas. Due to the scarcity of material on
the legal and constitutional system of the U.A.E. this is the first
study to examine the legislative innovation and its implications on
the U.A.E.
The aim of this thesis is to provide those interested in Third
World legislatures in general but the constitution of the U.A.E. in
particular with an understanding of the role and function of the
Federal National Council (FNC). It seeks to demonstrate how the
U.A.E. legislature fits into the general position of legislature in
developing countries. The thesis also considers improvements in
the existing structure in the U.A.E.
It is intended to explain three major issues: the
constitutional development of the U.A.E., how the constitution was
manipulated for the interests of the rulers, and finally how
democratic ideals may be received and implemented in a
developing country.
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This thesis confirms the general observation that in
developing countries there are two types of constitution: a written
and a living. The written constitution embodies high rhetoric of
legal wordings, whereas the living constitution brings the written
provisions down to earth and modifies them when it matters.
Method of study:
The major problem encountered by the researcher was data
collection because the topic touches upon what is considered in
many developing countries as a politically sensitive institution. The
researcher found therefore that the questionnaire method is
Impractical in dealing with the role and functions of the legislature
in a developing society. The researcher has been advised by the
FNC General Secretariat not to adopt this method because of some
precedents where the FNC members declined to answer written
questions.
The method adopted in the research is supported by
empirical, primary and secondary sources. On the empirical side
the researcher met several members of the FNC during his visits to
the U.A.E. and discussed the set up and the role and functions of
the FNC with members of the General Secretariat Office in Dubal
and Abu Dhabl. In fact, informal meetings proved to be an effective
way of discussing this issue.
The materials used as primary sources in the thesis include
documents on the pre-1971 attempts to establish a constitutional
government, the FNC minutes, lists of Bifis, questions and public
debates in the legislature, federal laws and decrees and Supreme
Court constitutional interpretations.
11
(Introduction)
The researcher used graphs and tables to illustrate different
aspects of the U.A.E. legislature. Some of the graphs were utilized
to present the differences among political views with regard to the
distribution of seats in the legislature. Others were used to clariIr
the actual working of the FNC In the legislative and political fields.
In analysing the position of the FNC under the 1971
Constitution, the researcher combined constitutional provisions
and legal documents with empirical findings, legislative minutes
and classified data. This analytical approach helped in
understanding several points raised through the thesis
Academic writings on the U.A.E.
Apart from some general studies dealing with the political
system (20) and others dedicated to the history of the country (21),
there is very little published on the legal and constitutional
arrangement in the U.A.E. The few studies that exist on the
constitution are of a descriptive nature. (22) Most of the existing
studies set out the theory of constitutional government and
examine the constitution in its light but they do not look at how
the legislature has developed in practice.
A number of the most relevant studies deserve mention. Dr.
Adel Al-Tabtabal's al-Nidam al-Ittihadi Fl al-Imarat al-Arabiah
[1978] (The Federal System in the Arab Emirates) (23) was the first
of three major studies on the U.A.E. Constitution. It is chiefly
concerned with the federal system and the problems it faces in Its
12
(Introduction)
development. The approach to the study of the constitution is from
a soclo-economlc perspective.
The second study is by Dr. Sayyed Ibrahim, the former
constitutional adviser to the FNC. His book published In 1986 Ma'a
al-Majlis al-Watani al-Ittihadi (With the Federal National Council)
(24) is well-documented, dealing as it does with the proceedings of
the legislature between 1972 and 1986. This study is limited to the
legislature viewed from a constitutional and historical perspective.
His study does not cover the pre-1971 legislative experience nor
does he analyse the socio-economic background of the legislators.
The third study Is by Hadif Rashid Al-Owais. His Ph.D.
thesis [19891, The Role of the Supreme Court in the Constitutional
System of the United Arab Emirates, (25) looks at the constitution
in its practical application with emphasis on the judiciary.
The present study is distinctive as it Is the first attempt to
explain the U.A.E. legislature from a constitutional, historical and
socio-political perspective. First, its approach is analytical rather
than a descriptive one. Secondly, although its principal emphasis
is on the post-1971 legislature, it examines the pre-1971 legislative
experience as well In order to relate it with the present one.
Thirdly, the thesis discusses the constitutional provisions and
relates them to the socio-political factors in U.A.E. society.
Fourthly, It covers the activities of the legislature over the period of
1972-1991.
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Organization of the thesis:
The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part explains
the functions of legislature in the general context of the developing
countries. This part also involves an examination of the socio-
economic background of U.A.E. society to provide foundation for
discussions. The second part discusses the moves made before
1971 to institute a "legislature" in the country. The third part
examines the U.A.E.'s constitution and the constitutional position
of the Federal National Council (FNC). This part also discuss the
functions of the U.A.E. legislature and the constitutional
provisions In operation.
Part one of the thesis consists of two chapters. Chapter 1
contains a general overview of legislatures in the world as part of
the context of the development of U.A.E.'s Constitution and its
evolution. Chapter 1 is an introduction which will deal with the
definition, role and function of a legislature in the Third World. The
major constitutional functions of a legislature, that is, legislative,
political and fiscal and all its ramifications, such as legitimization,
political recruitment etc., will be considered. Similarly party and
electoral systems have a significant effect on the composition and
the effectiveness of any legislature and will therefore be touched
up on.
Chapter 2 explains the U.A.E's early developments. In any
polity a constitution both in its norms and operations is affected by
other parts of the political system. Therefore unless one
understands the political, social, economic, historical and cultural
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(introduction)
forces at work in a society, one will not be able to comprehend its
constitutional system. It is beyond the scope of this study to cover
all these backgrounds. However, the main historical and socio-
political background of the U.A.E. constitutes the focus of chapter
2. The chapter is intended to examine the historical background to
the relationship between the emirates and the British and the
constitutional consequences of the advent of oil wealth. This
chapter will be useful In understanding who have been the major
power brokers and decision-makers in the country.
An awareness of the historical evolution of the legislature in
the U.A.E. is too crucial to an understanding of its present
position. Prior to 1971, the country witnessed two major attempts
to create a legislative body. Chapter 3 will discuss the first attempt
at constitution making, which occurred in 1938 in Dubai, and the
reasons for its failure.
Due to historical circumstances, the U.A.E. society suddenly
found itself independent of the British power which had run its
foreign affairs for nearly one hundred and fifty years. Therefore,
the rulers sought advice from constitutional experts and legal
consultants for guidance in drawing up a constitution to regulate
their relations and distribute power in their new state. Chapter 4 is
concerned with the second attempt at constitution making under
1968 nine-member-union. A dispute over the nature of the
proposed legislature became one of the major factors leading to the
collapse of the union. This chapter traces the influences which
eventually shaped the form of the legislature which became the
modern legislature adopted today.
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Chapter 5 contain a brief discussion of the basic features of
the U.A.E.'s Provisional Constitution, the federal system in the
country and the union authorities, and provides a constitutional
context for the analysis of the legislative structure which follows.
In chapter 6 the constitutional framework of the modem
legislature found In the U.A.E. is explained. The composition of the
Federal National Council (FNC) Is examined including, the method
of selecting members and their likely socio-economic backgrounds,
and then explore the rules and procedures followed by the Council.
This chapter seeks to demonstrate that as a new body in a
traditional society a legislature Is invariably modffied in practice to
suite the traditional forces, especially where the membership and
its turnover is concerned.
Chapter 7 sets out the constitutional functions (primarily
legislative, political and fiscal) of the U.A.E. legislature and their
actual operation. The experience of the working of the legislature
points to the fact that however conscientious the FNC may wish to
be in executing Its limited duties, it cannot function effectively
without the co-operation of the executive. This chapter will show
that some provisions of the constitution such as summoning and
dissolution and powers of the legislature have not been taken into
consideration by the traditional rulers.
In the period 1971-1990 a number of political crises and
Judicial disputes have arisen between the FNC and the
government. Chapter 8 deals with these issues. There are four case
studies in this chapter which will demonstrate the fact that it Is
natural In a traditional society such as the U.A.E. that the
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governing authorities will resist any attempt on the part of the
legislature to expand its role without their consent. This chapter
reveals that ambition is not enough on its own to give effect to the
rhetoric of high ideals enshrined in the constitution. It must be
combined with respect for the existing constitution and confined to
diplomatic efforts to introduce improvements to the status quo.
Chapter 9 provIdes the main conclusion of the thesis. It
explains the limitations present in the existing constitutional
framework and the difficulty of reforming the political process
which is, in effect, an autocratic. The conclusion also points out
that a constitution with a democratic inclination does not
necessarily establish democratic institutions because of the
cultural, economic and social backgrounds. Throughout the thesis
there is an attempt to make a comparative analysis drawing out
the experience of the U.A.E. constitution compared to other
developing countries especially that of the Gulf states. This
provides some comparative evaluation of the U.A.E. legislature.
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PART ONE
In part 1 of the thesis we examine from a general perspective
the role and functions of legislature in developing countries. This
part also explains the soclo-economic and political background of
the U.A.E. Part 1 sets up the foundation for discussion and
analysis in the subsequent parts. The chapters of part 1 are as
follows:
Chapter 1 the role of the legislature: a general
perspective
a - definition, legislators, representation.
b - functions.
c - political party and electoral systems.
Chapter 2 The soclo-economic and political aspects of
the U.A.E.
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CHAPTER ONE
THE ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE: A GENERAL
PERSPECTWE
1.1 Introduction:
We have seen In the general introduction to the thesis that
this thesis attempts to fill a gap in our knowledge of Third World
countries by examining the constitution of the U.A.E. from the
perspective of the economic, historical, and cultural characteristics
of the country.
In this chapter, it is intended to set out the distinctive
qualities of legislatures which have been developed throughout the
world as part of a general background to the U.A.E.'s legislature.
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section
will discuss how legislatures in the Third World are examined in
the West and will take a retrospective look at the creation of
legislative bodies under colonial rule and their fate after
independence. An attempt will be made to set out some arguments
as to what its role in developing countries should consist of. There
will be some exploration of legislators themselves, which raises the
principle of representation.
The second section of the chapter examines the traditional
constitutional functions of the legislature, such as law-making and
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overseeing the executive, while taking account of the fact that
Third World legislatures do not exist merely to fuifil these
traditional tasks. Instead they have wider functions as in the West
such as mobilization, integration, political recruitment and
legitimization as subjects for discussion.
The third section wIll concentrate on the political party and
electoral systems which underpin the legislature. The different
types of political systems and how they differ will be examined.
The leIslature and constitution:
By and large, constitutions play a significant role in creating
and formulating legislatures. Constitutions are usually the product
of a particular event such as independence from colonial power,
breaking from an empire, end of a revolution or defeat in war. The
institutions created by the constitution are therefore of prime
importance.
As K.C. Wheare righily stated "Constitutions spring from a
belief In a limited government". (1) They tend to impose limitations
on the powers of legislatures. The extent of these limitations
depends on the aims constitution-makers want to safeguard, the
kind of political system the constitution is modelled after, the type
of state It creates and the type of relationship that the constitution
promotes between the executive and the legislature.
The powers of the legislature may be restricted by the
constitution with regards to basic principles such as certain
individual rights or specific state laws. For instance, the U.S.A.
Constitution forbade ex post facto ( i.e. retroactive) law. (2) Few
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constitutions went to the extreme by restricting to a great extent or
denying the legislative power of legislature such as the
constitutions of Qatar arid U.A.E.
Moreover, the powers of the legislature vary according to the
state system adopted by the constitution. Federal constitutions (
e.g. U.S.A. and India) tend to divide the powers between central
and local authorities. The powers of national legislature under
such a system tend to be limited. However, the constitution of a
unitary state seems to give the national legislature a supreme
status over local institutions. (3)
Under written and rigid constitutions actions of the
legislature are restricted by constitutional provisions. The
constitution has therefore a crucial role in formulating, shaping
and limiting the legislature it creates.
1.1.1 Different definitions and classifications;
One major question in evaluating and classi1ring a
legislature resides is that of definition. One cannot give a
unambiguous definition of this organ of government. An early
definition described a legislature as "a body elected by people at
relatively frequent intervals, and it made laws" (4). Some scholars
have introduced a functional description, arguing that a legislature
is "a functionally adaptable institution that could do a variety of
things In a political system" (5). Legally or constitutionally
speaking, a legislature is "the department, assembly, or body of
men that make the laws for a state or nation" (6). Such a definition,
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based upon a specffic function would lead to describing the
executive, political parties or military institutions as the actual
legislatures, rather than the nominal legislature itself (7).
Michael Mezey has defined a legislature as "a predominantly
elected body of people that acts collegially, and that has at least
formal but not necessarily the exclusive power to enact laws
binding on all members of a specffic geopolitical entity" (8).
Accordingly, he proposes a five-fold typology of legislatures
founded on the importance of a legislature's role in policy making
and the extent of public and elite support it commands (g).
Differences among scholars regarding definitions has led to
different classifications. For instance, Blondel, classifies
legislatures according to their importance in policy making. He
describes the legislatures of the contemporary world under four
broad headings: "nascent or inchoate" legislatures, "truncated"
legislatures, "inhibited" legislatures, and "true" legislatures. Mezey,
on the other hand, classifies legislatures as: active, vulnerable,
reactive, marginal, and minimal (io) while Olson amalgamates the
previous two classification and suggests an eight-fold typology ('1).
We shall see later in chapter 7 of the thesis how the U.A.E.'s
Constitution fits into the views explained above.
However, the researcher's point of view with regard to the
issue of definition is that the U.A.E. legislature, viz, the Federal
National Council, has a distinctive position. The constitutional set
up of the FNC does not fit into any of the above mentioned
definitions. The legislature in the U.A.E., as we will see in chapter
6 and 7, is not elected and does not have the power of drafting
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Bifis. It may be considered as a forum for discussion, deliberation
and sanctioning federal laws presented by the government.
1.1.2 The Western approach to the analysis of Third World
lelslatures:
Legislatures are studied in depth and widely in the west by
constitutional lawyers and historians. The majority of the
constitutional research and scholarship in this field has been
concerned with the western experience, in the light of democratic
western constitutions such as that of the United States. Studies of
legislatures In Third World countries only began at the end of the
1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. (12) Generally these studies
choose to analyze Third World legislatures using the same criteria
as are applied in the study of Western legislatures, focussing on
law-making as the principal function of legislatures in developing
countries (13) and presenting the Westminster model and other
western models as the Ideal for the Third World (14).
In January 1985 there were one hundred and fifty five
countries in the world claiming to possess some type of legislature
and only twenty seven which did not. In 1981 ninety three states
had claimed to have a legislature while thirty three did not (15). The
increase in the number of these bodies, especially among the Third
World countries, is of great significance In that it has occurred
since their independence, contradicting the recent assertion of the
decline of legislatures in Third World states. It marks a shift
from the traditional unelected inherited rulers who reflect the
cultural tradition of the best and to more democratic open
government.
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Historically the studies undertaken into constitutional
institutions adopted two theories. One is modernization theory and
the other is development theory. The modernization theory failed to
distinguish between the western ethnocintricity and modernity
assuming that to become modern, developing nations had to adopt
western democratic institutions. In short most commentators of
this school believe that parliamentary democracy is regarded as an
essential step towards modernization (16). In contrast, development
theory, did not require the adoption of the western models in the
realm of legislature but proposed strengthening the executive
branch of government in Third World countries.
Samuel Huntington, speaking for the modernization Samuel
Huntington, speaking for the modernization school, asserted that
"most legislative institutions in the less developed countries are
dominated by traditional elites" who hamper modernization. (17)
Robert Packenham, a development theorist, stated in an
influential article that:
'What little we do know suggests that
strengthening legislatures in developing countries
would, in most, cases impede the capacity for change
which is often crucial for "modernization" and
economic development. "(18)
He concluded his article by asserting that:
"In societies that need and want change, and
where political development may be defined as the will
and capacity to cope with and generate continuing
transformation, it may not make such sense to
strengthen the decision-making function of an
institution that Is likely to resist change. "(ig)
27
(Chapter one)
It is axiomatic that institutions may both favour change and take
steps to resist changes that do not conform to the Interest of the
institution.
However, Packenham emphasized again in another article
declaring that legislatures have a tendency to greater
conservativism than executives. Paradoxically the more vigorous
the legislative body the more it will resist changes in society (20).
For this reason and others these academic schools claimed
that Third World legislatures have failed to conform to western
expectations. One suggested solution advanced by the
commentators of these schools is to restrict the power of
legislatures or, more drastically, to dissolve them completely. On
the other hand, the same studies recommended enhancing the
powers of local bureaucracies and military and ruling juntas
through providing them with technical assistance and economic
aid (21) on the grounds that a strong executive Is a prerequisite in
nations seeking political and economic development. However
there is no clear evidence that such development is a product of a
powerful executive (22).
1.1.3 Legislature in the colonial era:
The sceptical attitude present in a number of western
studies to Third World legislatures is not a new phenomenon.
During the colonial period this stand-point was dominant.
European powers claimed to colonize Africa and Asia to prepare
the underdeveloped nations for democratic self-rule. This was not
the real core of colonial policy. For example, in Africa, the British
established nominated legislative councils while after 1946 the
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French established local assemblies as well as Increasing native
representation In the French Parliament (23). But these colonial
legislative bodies were not intended to serve as real representative
institutions or to educate nationals in democratic participation.
Rather, they were subordinate to Governors and their executive
councils, not allowed to discuss sensitive issues but limited to
technical matters such as taxes, local budget and mining permits.
(24)
After World War Two, in the period preceding independence,
legislative councils were used to prepare for political participation
not the whole nation but the elites who accepted the western
legislative models (25). Colonial rule did not prepare the mass of the
indigenous population for democracy, but rather the native
executive elites who had tendencies toward authoritarian rule and
some scepticism about the role of the legislature. The colonial
Governors desired to restrict popular participation in the decision-
making process in order to preserve their class supremacy through
"bureaucratic despotism" (26).
This was the usual pattern of government in the post-
Independence period in most Third World countries. In nations
where, exceptionally, colonial legislatures did take as a paramount
duty the defence of the public interest, it is not surprising that the
colonial power regarded such action unfavourably (27).
Nevertheless, in countries such as Sri Lanka and the Philippines
where native legislatures played an important role in the struggle
for independence, they were highly admired as legitimate
institutions and enjoyed mass support (28).
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1.1.4 Legislature after independence:
The western educated elites who took power from the
colonial authorities imitated the Westminster or French model of
legislature in order to "modernize" and "develop" their nations and,
at the same time, to secure their political dominance and grasp of
ultimate power. These elites ignored the social and economic
realities In their societies and Imported an alien institution or
preserved the one they had inherited from the colonial power. Thus
several of the newly independent Francophone states such as
Senegal and Chad modelled their constitutions on that of the
French Fifth Republic (29).
Thus the new order in many developing countries was not
different from the pre-independence era. In some countries the
executive had the power to nominate a certain number of MPs as
an inherited practice from the past (30). In others, the president or
the monarch appointed the representative body (31).
Several legislatures in Third World countries were
subordinate to the executive. In Chile, for instance, the "contraloia"
officials (an administrative body which helped Congress in its law-
making function to determine the constitutionality of bills) were
happy with the dissolution of the legislature in 1973, indicating
that without it, Chile could more effectively achieve development
(32). In Thailand many prominent politicians demanded the
restraint of the national legislature until "the Thai people have
more experience with democracy" (33). These statements can be
explained on the basis of lack of public support for the legislature,
as in the case of Thailand, or the elite and military support as in
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Chile. There might be a conifict between these two kinds of support
where the public support the legislature- because of its good
performance In defending their interests, and where the political
elites do not support the legislature because they regarded it as
lacking expertise and an obstacle to urgently needed developments
(e.g. in Kenya) (34).
The 1975 National Assembly in Kuwait represented a fierce
critical opposition to the Government. The critics accused the
government of mismanagement and failure in its policies. As a
result, the Prime Minister then resigned on 29 August 1976
declaring that the legislature's "lack of cooperation had become
prejudicial to the national interest." (35) The Amir (i.e. Ruler) issued
a decree suspending some Articles in the 1962 Constitution and
temporarily dissolving the National Assembly as well. The
Constitution was to be revised by an ad hoc committee. The
National Assembly was reinstated In August 1980, to be dissolved
yet again for the same reason in 1986. After the Gulf war, the Amir
called for new legislative elections in October 1992.
In Bahrain, the National Assembly, which was elected in
December 1973, survived for only twenty one months. Three
distinctive and opposing groups were elected to the legislature and
as a result of such composition, the legislature was in continuing
dispute with the government. The Assembly interpellated several
ministers and obstructed the legislative process. Finally, the Prime
Minister resigned on 24 August 1975 "in protest of the Assembly's
interference in the running of the government." (36) The National
Assembly was dissolved and Article 65 of the Constitution was
suspended.
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Scepticism towards the legislature has not manifested itself
in most Third World states, by the extreme action of dissolution of
the legislature. In fact, many developing countries have upheld
their national legislatures and maintained their survival. It has
been argued by Allan Kornberg and K4 Pittman that
"Although public support is rooted in symbolic
attachments and not under the immediate control of
political leaders, representative bodies are more or less
under their direct control. This Is one reason they are
incorporated so frequently In the political system of a
new state, or are reestablishing after a system has
been overthrown" (37).
It is not surprising, therefore, that an absolute monarch like
the Shah of Iran continuously supported his feeble Majlis and
characterized it as "the cradle of the constitution" (38) since in an
authoritarian regime, the legislature is conceived as a co-operating
institution which provides the regime with a taste of democracy
and enacts its policy (39).
1.1.5 Composition of the legislature:
Traditionally the composition of newly formed legislative
councils by the colonial power in most Third World nations was
highly selective. Membership was restricted. Only those who
worked as local advisers, who were educated abroad, and the
traditional elite were allowed to be members. The practice of
restricted membership established an unwritten rule that
legislatures are not essentially an open forum where every citizen
can be elected or accepted as a member.
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Legislators for the most part differ from the population In
socio-economic background, tending to be wealthier, better
educated, and politically influential (40).
J. Blonde! asserts that a common characteristic in the
composition of legislatures which owes in many western countries,
and in some developing countries Is that legislatures are
dominated by lawyers. He argues that this was not surprising as
lawyers are presumed to be more aware and capable of dealing
with laws (41). Another element is that the financial means of
candidates which is an important indicator of a candidate's chance
of winning the election. In Thailand, for Instance, businessmen did
not contend for parliamentary seats for decades and the legislature
was dominated by civil servants and the military. However, recent
research has shown that businessmen have started to challenge
this dominance and have won three times as many seats as
bureaucrats (42). Similarly In Zambia forty per cent of
parliamentarians were businessmen or had some business
interests (43).
Education Is another important element in the background
of legislators. In Kenya, for example, educated legislators present
themselves as having a better chance to articulate constituency
needs than their less educated opponents (n). The influence of
Legislators on the decision-making process will also, presumably,
be affected by their level of education. It has been reported that
62.6% of Sri Lankan MPs graduated from elite and middle level
schools. In the period 1970-1984 MPs who graduated from elite
schools presented 90% of Individual bifis In the Sri Lankan
Parliament (45). This enabled them to be actively involved in
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government business and to be nearer to the decision-making
circle. The education factor had a considerable influence in the
1985 Tanzanian general election, where 49.6% of the members of
parliament were university graduates (). The more highly a
candidate is educated the more likely he is able to understand and
deal with political matters and represent his constituency.
Regarding occupations, legislators are seldom a mirror image
of society since many come entirely from professional backgrounds
or are civil servants. Studies of the membership of legislatures in
several Third World countries have indicated the prevalence of
businessmen, party members, state employees and professionals
(47). In one-party states, government employees and party activists
predominate in the legislature. To illustrate this point one can refer
to the Tanzanian experience. It was noted that in 1970 that 69 per
cent of the legislators were mainly from public sector. This
increased, after the 1985 election, to 86 per cent (48). Such a
tendency could lead to an expansion of the executive or of party
power over the legislature and diminish its independence.
Generally speaking, workers, farmers and women are
underrepresented. It seems to be assumed that these groups are
less interested in the political process or their absence from the
national legislative body has echo social bias against them (49).
1.1.6 Representation:
As explained above, legislatures may not reflect a wide
enough if not cross section of society. Their elected status suggests
they should be representatives of society as a whole. Seldom does
reality work out like this. This sense of representation mainly
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distinguishes and characterizes a legislature from the other non-
representative branches of government (i.e. executive and
judiciary) which may be dominated by or their posts allocated to a
certain sector, or class of the community, or group of bureaucrats
while the legislature generally tends to be an open arena in which
the greater part of the population will be represented.
Electoral mechanisms vary and do not always guarantee
representativeness and cannot be taken as given as regards the
legislatures in many Third World countries which are often
dominated by westernized elites, civil servants and party recruits.
In other cases the overrepresentation of particular tribes or
families may go unchallenged. For instance, the Indians in
Guatemala are not represented in the national congress although
they constitute more than 55 per cent of the population. Another
example of misrepresentation can be found in Lebanon, where a
change of representatives in the legislature did not necessarily
reflect a change in social demands and political support, but was
simply the substitution of a younger for an older generation in the
dominant families (50).
There are limits to the influence of an election on the
behaviour of an elected member of the legislature. Traditional
theory of representation suggests three styles of representation:
"delegate", "trustee", and "politico". In the delegate style of
representation, the representative is regarded as a deputy
reflecting demands of his constituents and channelling their
interests without an independent voice of his own. In the trustee
type of representation, the representative Is expected to act on his
own judgment of the best interests of his constituency and of the
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nation. The third type of representation combines the
characteristics of the previous two styles In that the representative
is expected to act neither as a mere reflection of the assumed
wishes of his constituents nor as totally independent of them.
Recent studies have suggested that these distinctions are not rigid
and that representatives act as trustees and as deputies depending
on the circumstances (51).
As the case everywhere, many Third World countries
Legislators are inclined to represent their constituents' interests
where they depend on their support to be re-elected. Constituency
representation may be strong in political systems with a weak
party system but strong level of local communication. In such
systems the representative has to bring the demands of his
constituency to the notice of the legislative assembly and has to try
to solve problems facing his electorate (52). In other political
systems, members of legislatures represent religious, racial, or
business groups whose social and economic interests they
endeavour to promote (53).
Preference towards different or conflicting interests will
depend on the legislator's background and his relation with
constituents. It has been argued that highly educated
parliamentarians including businessmen and intellectuals prefer to
see themselves as independent trustees rather than as delegates
for their constituents. Another study emphasized that MPs
representing traditional constituencies are more likely to see
themselves as spokesmen for the Interests of their electorate than
are the representatives of modern constituencies (54).
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The electorate may affect the style of representation either by
threatening not to re-elect their representative or, in an extreme
case, by calling him off where the constitution provides for a
constituency so to do if the electorate are dissatisfied with his
performance and wish to replace him with a more effective
representative (55).
1.2 Functions of the Legislature:
The functions are many and no one legislature can fulfil all
of them. Moreover, the significance of a particular function does
not only vary from one political system to another, but even within
the same legislature at different junctures as well. Furthermore,
when it is indicated that a specific function is important this does
not mean that it is not also performed by other political elements
(political parties, interest groups, trade unions, the executive etc.)
or that the legislature executes this function better than the others
(56).
The kind of government system the constitution adopts
affects to a certain extent the role and functions of the legislature.
The effect of the voting system in the legislature, for instance,
varies depending on whether It is conducted under a parliamentary
or a presidential system. In a traditional parliamentary system,
such as Westminster system, there is great emphasis on the role of
the legislature in forming and dismissing the cabinet. The voting
on governmental Bifis therefore has good effect on the tenure of the
government. In a presidential system, such as the U.S. system,
voting may not have the same consequence; and the president
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continues as the chief executive regardless of the opposition in the
legislature. (57)
The fusion of the functions of the two branches in the
parliamentary system provides a coordination between the
legislature and the executive. Yet, the legislature may play the role
of the lesser partner in the decision-making process. On the other
hand, the separation of powers in the presidential system grants
the two branches of government a role in making and
administering laws. However, a strong opposition from the
legislature under this system may hinder the implementation of
the executive programme. (58)
Another example of the effect of the government system on
the role and functions of the legislature Is political recruitment. In
the great majority of countries operating under the presidential
system, the head of the state and the members of the executive are
not necessarily recruited among members of the legislatures. On
the contrary, long parliamentary experience in most of
parliamentary systems is a pre-condition for being nominated as a
member of the cabinet. (59)
In the course of this thesis many of the above mentioned
functions will be considered In more detail, but it is useful to
clarify and identify the major functions at an early stage.
1.2.1 Law-making:
Even in Western liberal democracies, Parliament was not
originally an exclusively law-making body. It was established in
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order to discuss and deliberate important questions. In its early
history, the legislative function was not the Parliament's main
task. As K.C. Wheare stated, the term, "legislatur& is misleading,
because, generally speaking, this institution did not dedicate a
considerable time to acting out this function (60). It was not until
the writings of the seventeenth and eighteenth century theorists
(e.g. Locke and Montesquieu) and liberal democratic thinkers (e.g.
Mill) that legislatures came to be considered primarily as law-
making bodies (61).
Such notion was challenged under the Common law system
at the turn of the twentieth century when it had become clear that
the law-making power Is no longer the prerogative of a legislature.
Many new agencies and political structures are interfering with
and participating in the legislative process as we will see.
Constitutional limitations on legislative sovereignty:
The powers of the legislative body have been restricted. In
many cases a new constitution Is seen as a legitimate tool to
achieve this end. It reduces in reality the law-making function
performed by the legislature directly or indirectly, that is to say, it
lays down provisions which give the executive a say in the law-
making area, either by allocating or reserving some matters to the
administration alone or by giving the executive the power to initiate
and enact laws in an emergency without referring them to the
legislature. In some constitutions, the executive has the right to
veto decisions of the legislature or, less drastically, the right to
demand a review of decisions made. A constitution can also limit
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the power of the legislature by empowering the head of the state to
use a referendum In disputed or important matters (62).
There are some practical restraints on the involvement of the
legislative body In the law-making function. Time is a significant
constraint in the field of legislation. Whether legislatures meet for
only a few weeks In a year at one extreme or for most months of
the year, at the other, there are limitation of time in their ability to
cope with new developments and urgent matters. A second
practical restraint on the legislature is exercised by the executive
which has the advantage of technical information and expertise in
the field of making laws. The executive, moreover, has time to
initiate legislation and advantage of procedural rules which, in
many cases, gives its bifis priority over individual bills.
Furthermore, It determines, as is the case in Latin America, the
important bills which cannot be postponed (63).
Another practical limitation on the legislature is the practice
of delegation of power. It is not surprising that delegated legislative
powers are a well-known feature of contemporary political systems.
Many legislatures are accustomed to delegate part of their
legislative power to ministers or government agencies (64).
Delegated legislation can be justified on a practical basis. In some
countries, this practice is used to deal with politically controversial
matters, where the Assembly cannot or will not interfere. In such
circumstances, the executive is likely to abuse Its legal power and
enact decrees which suppress or limit constitutional rights (65).
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The experience In the Third World:
In Third World countries the significance of the legislative
function fluctuates from important (e.g. in the Philippines and
Chile prior to 1973) to negligible. In the first category there are
several reasons which make the legislatures in these countries
relatively influential in the law-making and decision-making
process. These include the long historical experience of the
legislature, a good infra-structure which helps legislators in
carrying out their duties and a strong opposition to executive
dominance (66). In the second category, which includes most
developing countries, legislators do not consider the law-making
function as their most important duty and are satisfied with the
little time they or the legislative body collectively dedicate to this
function. This is true of Malaysia, Kenya, Tanzania and most West
African countries (67).
The law-making function can be swayed by a few members of
the political system in several Third World states; by western-
oriented MPs (e.g. in Sri Lanka) or by a few men having the
support of business groups or owning the press (e.g. in Uruguay)
or the foreign agencies like the representatives of different
international and multinational agencies (e.g. in Colombia) (68). In
such legislatures, private-members' bills are hardly ever presented
and, if introduced, have little chance of becoming law. This is not
strictly a Third World phenomenon, but is known In many western
legislatures (69) where most bifis are initiated and presented by the
government.
I
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1.2.2 The legislature as checks and balances over the
executive:
Legislatures have at their disposal different techniques to
oversee the executive. They can simply use a direct, written or oral
question or general debates to secure clarification from a
concerned minister. Legislators can propose bills relating to the
budget or other financial matters (70). Many legislatures set up
investigating committees or permanent committees to scrutinize or
interpellate ministers and government departments. In some
countries, a vote of no-confidence may be used. As practised in
Pacific island states, the use of this vote is more or less related to
the probability of the dissolution of the legislature. In other
countries, the vote of no-confidence is not used because the
assembly is not the proper place for changing the government ( i).
In many developing states, the survival of the legislature is of
importance as being the main or only organ of criticism in the
political system. In such states, a legislature that challenges the
executive or takes its overseeing function seriously will be
confronted with the deep hostility of the government. In 1975 the
Kenyan government was defeated for the first time in parliament
for its failure to censor a select committee report about a political
assassination. The government reaction was harsh. Several MPs
were dismissed or arrested. The legislature later confirmed its
subordination to the president (72). Government reaction, in other
countries, goes beyond these measures. In Thailand, for example,
the government was seldom defeated but when this did occur the
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parliament was dissolved by a military coup since army and the
government refused to tolerate any legislative rebuff (73).
Criticizing the government has not, in many cases, been an
option on whose outcome a legislator can depend. Studies of the
Tanzanian elections and Singapore's •
 legislative performance have
shown that the public are likely not to prefer MPs who
continuously criticize the government and that legislators
themselves usually start a speech of criticism with praise of the
government or minister's record (). Some writers have argued
that ministers do not like to be publicly criticized, yet, they may
use the overseeing function in order to underscore the openness of
the regime. Consequently, this might be a good source of support if
played correctly (75).
One major duty of a legislature is the control of public
spending and the national budget. Historically, the British
parliament evolved as a body which helped the king by authorizing
taxation. Government had to ask for the legislature's approval for
its annual budget. This function has declined in the sense that no
individual MP, generally speaking, has the proper ability or
capabffity of dealing with fmanclal matters. The government
usually secures its position in these Issues through assembly's
standing orders and its majority in the legislature. Budgets,
therefore, are passed in the assembly with little argument.
Restrictions on legislature activities:
The colonial experience in many Third World countries has
led to ministers and officers not being accountable to the legislative
councils but to the chief executive (76). This lesson has been
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taught, learned, and well practised in post-independence states in
different developing nations.
The political facts of life are that legislatures are likely to be
subordinate to the executive in many political systems. Such
subordination may reflect the role of a political leader or leaders in
a national struggle and personal charisma conferring political
legitimacy independent of the legislature. The weakness of the
opposition in a political system may be a second reason for the
dominance of the executive. Thirdly Internal splits and factions in
the legislative body may minimize its abifity to scrutinize the
executive.
A fourth reason for the subordination of the legislature may
be executive intervention in the elections to restrict the numbers of
opposition members in the assembly. Fifthly, constitutions may
shift the power between the two branches of government in favour
of the executive. Finally, the function of overseeing the executive
may be constrained by time, legislatures that meet occasionally are
restricted In their capacity to supervise (77).
1.2.3 Legislatures as mobilizing agents:
Generally, a legislator in many Third World legislatures is
placed centrally between two parts: on the one hand you have the
people whom he presumably represents, on the other hand the
government. In the first part the legislator is mandated to
introduce local demands to the government whereas in the second
part, if he is from the ruling party, he acts as an agent for the
government in his constituency. So In this way he represents the
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interests of his local constituents as well as serve as a mobilising
agent for the government.
Legislator's constituents expect him to represent their
problems and ideas to the executive, seek a solution and acquire
more funds for local projects while the government expects the
legislator to generate support for its policies in the constituency
(78).Although mobilization can be conducted through several
governmental bodies, the legislature plays a particularly important
role in this function. Having a good image in the public eye puts
elected deputies in a favourable position to mobilize public support
for the actions of the administration. At the same time they play an
important role in making the government aware of public demands
(79).This is the situation in such countries as Tanzania, Zambia,
Kenya and Singapore (80).
As bodies where local demands are articulated and taken
into account legislatures, can be used to enhance a regime's
legitimacy and to secure public consent to government policies. If
the legislators' collectively perform their function well and
government Is responsive to public needs, then, as it has been
argued, popular support for the institution will remain stable and
indeed increase (81).
The degree of articulation and responsiveness of the
legislature to popular demands will depend on its strength and on
the willingness of government to comply. In some instances, by
making known local needs legislators may effect government plans
and therefore modify them. For instance, in Korea and Thailand
personal efforts and collective demands in the legislature have
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almost certainly led to alteration in the allocations to development
projects in rural areas. Conversely government can use its power
to provide local services to enhance its own legislators' popular
support among the citizens, thereby diminishing opposition
chances (82).
As Blonde! has stated (83), legislators "enjoy an access to the
central government departments and to members of the
government that is unquestionably greater than that of most
citizens." These means of access both formal and informal enable
the legislator to make known to the executive his constituency's
interests. Thus In the legislature itself, he can use public debates,
question times, drafting bills, and committee meetings for this
purpose, in addition to informal contacts with ministers and heads
of government departments with whom he has established
personal relations. On the other side of the coin, members of
legislative bodies can use local party branches and probably other
unofficial groups to encourage and mobilize his constituents'
support in favour of the executive.
1.2.4 Political Recruitment in General:
Generally, political recruitment has been defined as that
function of a political system which "recruits members of the
particular subcultures- religious communities, status, classes,
ethnic communities, and the like, and inducts them into the
specialized roles of the political system" (84). In other words
political recruitment aims at identifying and engaging persons
deemed suitable to fill legislature's posts and who will, at the same
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time, be loyal to the ruling elite. We will see In chapter 6 how this
general proposition applies in the U.A.E.
Those occupying legislative seats provide the political system
with a number of important services some of which have already
been mentioned, notably with reference to the role of the
legislature as a platform to reflect, represent, and protect interest
groups. In personal terms, membership of the legislature will
almost certainly carry with it a relatively high income and social
status. In Costa Rica, for instance, the overwhelming majority of
legislators' incomes were found to have increased after they
entered Congress (85). Some aspirants run for election just for the
prestige of being deputies or senators or as a step-stone to a higher
position In government (86).
In some countries the legislature is regarded as a training
ground for future leaders or executive members. At the same time
legislators seem to benefit from their occupation by attracting the
attention of the government. In Kuwait, for Instance, the National
Assembly is considered as a pathway to cabinet posts. In their
study on "Kuwait's Political Elite: The Cabinet", A. AssIrl and K. Al-
MonouiI found that in the period between 1962 and 1986 the
Kuwait! legislature represented a significant area of recruitment for
the cabinet. Almost a quarter of the total number of ministers were
parliamentarIans. (87)
In the Philippines and Argentina being employed in congress
is a pre-condition for a higher post up to and Including the
presidency (88). In other countries, membership of legislature is
given as a reward to loyal and active supporters of a regime or as a
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second-rank field of activity for supporters with political ambitions
but who have not been accepted as members of the dominant
organs (I.e. the executive and the military). Tordoff argues that the
national assembly In Tanzania and Zambia has provided the
political system with a large number of posts used in recruiting
persons who would otherwise not be included In the political
process (89).
In order to determine and control recruitment to the
legislature, some governments impose certain educational and
financial restrictions. For example, Kenya use to stipulate passing
an English language test as a necessary qualification for
membership, whilst financial status is also a well-known
requirement. These requirements for memberships, if they are
insisted upon may result In the legislature serving as the forcing-
house of a political class over a period of time ( go). In deed, it has
been said that:
.. the legislature recruits, socializes, and trains[its membersi to and for other roles in the political
system In which they may wield more power than they
do as national legislators ... They learn the norms of
the elites, they learn political skills, and they acquire
visibifity and prestige resources which are useful to
them in acquiring, maintaining, and utilizing these
other roles." (gi)
This definition of the legislature's role is not, of course, an axiom.
Its applicability will depend on the level of party discipline, the
inaccessibility or openness of the political system, and the
readiness of members of the legislature and of the public to accept
this. role. Of course, where governments recruit their executive
members from outside the arena of the legislature the definition
will not apply.
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1.2.5 Legislatures as integration mechanism:
In societies which are divided on the basis of race, religion,
language or economy the legislature may be able to play a central
role in the integration process. Grossholtz, in his article on the
integrative role of legislatures in Malaysia and the Phffippines,
defmed integration as "a process leading to a political cohesion and
sentiment of loyalty toward central political institutions" (92). An
alternative definition is proposed by Weston Agor who described
the integrative role of the legislature In terms of "the capacity to
minimize conflict among component roles and subgroups by
heading off or resolving the conificts that arise." (93)
The legislature is likely to be the only Institution in many
political systems within which different racial, territorial, religious,
and linguistic groups can articulate their interests and deliberate
with the others and, If possible, reach a compromise. Integration in
the legislature might be acquired symbolically or practically.
Symbolic integration derives from the representation of distinct
groups in the legislature whose posts can be distributed among
them. In many countries the legislature is regarded as an open
foram. This increases the possibility of most social groups being
represented (94). In practical terms, every group has its legitimate
interest which may be satisfied where they do not conflict with the
interests of others or of the nation as whole, following a process of
agreement and compromise in the legislature (95)
However, this function has been refuted by some writers (96).
They have argued that the meeting of several dissimilar groups
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under one umbrella can contribute to the disintegration of the
nation. They illustrate this assertion with reference to Kenya where
competing parties, representing distinct sectional Interests, served
as an instrument for delaying national integration. The outlawing
of these parties was the necessary preliminary to achieving the
political stability of the country. It is argued, therefore, that
achieving national integration has priority over party competition
and factional criticism (97).
Of course, the legislative body can only exercise an
integrative role when the wider political context allows. It has been
stated quite correctly that:
when it is the only integrative agent in a
society subject to strong disintegrative forces, the
legislature is quite unlikely to maintain stability. (98)
Its integrative capabifity will depend upon the willingness of
political parties to cooperate in the legislature. In addition,
constitutional sittings may enhance the possibifity of performing
this function. In cases where representation strongly reflects
religious or racial differences, the integrative role of the assembly
will probably be minimal. In Lebanon, for example, it was difficult
to arrange mutual concessions among different sectarian groups,
for every deputy considered himself as a defender of his
community's Interests before anything else (ag).
1.2.6 Legislatures as agents for legitimating:
The legislature may fulfil a legitimating function in:
"maintaining or Increasing the level of diffuse support for the
regime or increasing the support that occurs for the regime apart
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from the extent to which its specific policies are supported." (ioo)
The aim of the legitimating function has also been described as the
"production of acquiescence in and/or support for the moral right
to rule of the government by the members of the political system."
(ioi)
Three patterns of operation have been described in the
legitimization function of the legislature. (1) Through its
continuous meetings and sessions, the legislature may promote,
intentionally or unintentionally, the illusion that the existing
regime is legItimate. (102) (2) By approving/acquiescing In decisions
taken by the ruling elites or party, the assembly may consciously
legitimatize government policies. (3) The legislature may act as a
safety-valve controffing conflicts arising In the political system by
diminishing tension and achieving a degree of consent among
different interest groups to the government's actions. Thus the
function of the Brazilian Congress has been described as "a safety
valve or way of letting off steam In a political system where no body
got what he wanted and/or where the government was not willing
to let every body have what he wanted." (103)
The significance of an elected legislative body for legitimating
government acts has not been ignored In authoritarian states
whose leaders regard the legislature as an important component of
the political system, though its real power is minimal. In Iran, for
instance, the Shah and political elites made frequent references to
the importance of participation by the MajUs (the legislative body)
in the formulation and enactment of government policy. In fact, the
Majils was not more than a useful tool for convincing the citizens
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and the western world that the system was a constitutional
monarchy (104).
It can be seen therefore that the maintenance of the costly
Institution of a legislature in a political system is widely regarded
as worthwhile since as a political process legislature is likely to pay
for itself in conferring legitimacy upon the actions of civil or
military rulers and secure public acquiescence at less cost than
more coercive methods (105). The extent to, which the legislature
can perform the legitimation function depends upon its mode of
election, its representativeness, and public expectations of its
members. It has been suggested that in newly independent
countries the legislature may be in need of regime support for its
survival and, on that account, be seeking legitimacy from the elite
and not vice versa. Such a situation is observable both in countries
without legislative bodies in the pre-independence period, and in
states where a legislature was a colonial inheritance (106).
Although the dissolution of a legislature in a newly
independent state may not seem to affect the legitimacy of the
regime yet it leaves the government alone in the political arena to
justilr its policies to the people without the cooperation of a
compliant assembly. As has been noted in many developing
countries failure in the area of legitimacy, means the failure of the
political system or the end of the regime itself (e.g. in Iran and the
Philippines) (107). It has been well said that 'Government policies
can be always imposed by force but it is generally agreed that
policies are more likely to be successful If people obey them not
simply because they have to but because they think they are
right. " ( 108)
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1.3.1 The relationship between legislatures and political party
system:
In many developing countries, legislative bodies were
established under the supervision of colonial power, while the
political parties, established as national movements against the
occupying power or as local organizations, became much stronger
and more influential than the colonial legislatures. In such cases,
their priority in the political life of the country will give political
parties greater authority in society after independence than the
legislatures (109).
Strong or weak parties:
The extent to which political parties are national rather than
regional in their support will clearly be significant in determining
their power and the extent of their influence on the legislature. The
more united and more national the parties are, the more strength
they will have over the assembly. If the parties are weak, the
legislator will probably have greater freedom as the representative
of his constituents, especially when he has been elected by a small
majority (no). It is worth noting that the failure of legislatures in
some developing countries to perform their functions and their
ultimate abolition has been the result of a weak party system. It
has been suggested that the consequence of a weak party system
is less support for the legislature. The support may also depend on
the political awareness of the electorate. On this view, the party
system Is an important element in preserving legislature (iii).
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However, it can equally be argued that a powerful political
party may result In weakening the role of the legislature to a
greater extent than under a monarchical system (112). In a system
where a dominant party is in power, the legislature may become a
purely secondary organ on which the executive depends not at all
to remain in power. The degree of party dominance may be
observed In the assembly's reactions to the executive (i 13). On the
other hand, a strong party system may serve the community and
benefit the whole political process. It has been suggested that
powerful and organized parties are essential, In that they act as
checks on the executive and as links between the legislature and
the people and articulate public interests. It appears therefore,
that the effects of strong parties may be dual in that they may
either contribute to or take from the relative importance of
legislature in a political system (114).
Single or multi party system:
The effect of a party system on a legislature varies depending
on whether it Is a one-party or multi-party state (115). In a one-
party state the legislature is likely to be subordinate to the ruling
party. In Tanzania, for example, the CCM (previously known as
TANTJ and Mro-Shlrasi parties) makes national policy and the
National Assembly approves it. Candidates for legislative seats
must seek a post in the government or in the party apparatus and
have good relations with party factions In order to be nominated as
one of the two candidates who stand for election in each
constituency (116).
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A multi-party system may face problems in new states where
the emerging parties tend to be loose coalitions of factions which
lead to their ineffectiveness in the legislature. Where the executive
is confronted with a multi-party legislature with no single party
having a majority, it will deal cautiously with the parties and try to
reach compromises so that it can guarantee legislative support for
its programmes. Such situations can lead, in some cases, to the
collapse of the political system arid the abolition of the legislature
as happened In Chile in 1973 (117).
Party influence on the legislature:
Political parties not only influence the relationship between
the executive and the legislature, but shape the relationship
between individual legislator on one hand and the constituents on
the other. Thus, In countries with political parties, the electorate
votes for candidates chosen and introduced by a party. This Is
most obvious in single-party states or in systems which stipulate
registration in a political party as a pre-condition for running as a
candidate In general election. Even in an open system where,
allegedly, anyone can stand for election, it is likely that a candidate
supported by a party will have a greater chance of winning a seat
than a non-party candidate (118).
If the party is strong, then the relationship between the
representative and the represented will be correspondingly weak. It
has been found that the public interest will be identified and
interpreted in systems with strong party affiliation not by
individual deputies but by the party organs. Such firm party
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control may lead to a decline in public support for the legislature
as has been recorded in Argentina and Venezuela (i 19).
Some theorists have argued that party discipline is more
important than representing local interest, in enabling the party to
carry out its national programme.(12o) At the other extreme, there
are those who say that the representative must fulifi his promises
to the constituents before any other consideration.
There are many ways in which a government or political
party can enhance its influence over legislators. The first
mechanism is through adopting a constitution which introduces a
one-party state or limits the number of political parties that may
operate in the system. The government can also issue legislation
disqualifying representatives who change parties (e.g. Vanuatu)
(121); it may oblige members of the legislature to swear an oath of
loyalty to the governing party, or restrict opposition actions (e.g.
Singapore) (122). In some multi-party systems the ruling party
enlarges its organization to include most of the social strata which
perpetuate its position in power (e.g. Mexico), or try to bribe
legislators by allocating development funds to members of the
government party and those who join it from the opposition (123).
1.3.2 Relationship between legislatures and the Electoral
System:
Elections may be preferred as a positive sign of popular
participation and bring credit to the political elite. Moreover, the
electoral system, as has been suggested, can be used to facilitate
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controlled public involvement In the ruling process. The general
election held by the military Baathist regime In Syria in 1973 after
It seized power is an example of the electoral process legitimating
the political system and was welcomed as such by the
international community, clearly illustrating the fact that elections
in one-party states legitimate the ruling party and the dominant
ideology (124).
Choice of suitable arrangements:
Every electoral system has a tendency to lead to some
distortion of votes. However, the difference among distinct electoral
systems is on the basis of the extent to which this distortion can
be realized. Electoral systems are not rigid frameworks and may
produce different consequences in different societies. Thus a
particular kind of proportional representation may work well In one
country but result In an unbearable situation in another (125).
In its choice of electoral system a regime may refer to its
political and social traditions. An important factor In selection will
be the consequences of a particular system of election on the
distribution of power in society and on the balance of power
between government organs, especially as regards the relationship
between the executive and the legislature. The government of a
new state will tend to choose an electoral system which will
enhance its power or which will satisIr social change without
decreasing the power of the executive. In countries with organized
parties, the latter wifi seek to preserve theIr domination of power in
the legislature through their choice of electoral system (126).
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The most popular electoral systems are plurality, majority,
and proportional representation. (1) Proportional representation is
a system where legislative seats are distributed among the
competing parties on the basis of votes each one of them has
received in the election (127).
A rigid pattern of proportional representation is likely to
strengthen the hand of the main party over its candidates
especially under a list system in which the party control the order
of names on its lists so as to place the most loyal candidates at the
top regardless of their popularity compared to other candidates
listed lower down because deemed less reliable (128). Proportional
representation of this kind represents the wishes of the party
rather than of the people. In some states the list system exists in a
modified form so that voters have the right to choose the
candidates they prefer either from the same list or from different
lists regardless of the order of names. This is known as the Single
Transferable Vote (129).
It has been argued that the system of proportional
representation favours small parties and guarantees them a voice
in the national legislature, since they only need to secure the
support of a relatively small number of voters (130). However, it may
lead to no single party having a sufficient majority to form a
government, thus resulting in the formation of an unstable
coalition. Nonetheless, this cannot be assumed since proportional
representation may equally well prevent the emergence of a united
opposition (131).
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(2) The plurality or First-Past-The-Post system, In which the
candidate with the larger number of votes wins the seat, is likely to
produce different results to proportional representation. If there
aie no well organised parties it will probably be hard for one
candidate to get a majority of votes and so the system is less fair
than proportional representation in that it does not accurately
reflect the political views of the electorate. This distortion increases
if combined with single-member constituencies (132).
The experience in the Third World:
The electoral systems of many developing countries are
designed to pack the legislature with members acceptable to the
regime. There are a number of devices employed to this end. A
literacy qualification is a well-known condition for voting in Latin
America. Combined with the over valuing the vote in rural
constituencies, this secures the domination of the national
legislature by the upper class elites (133). Another condition
imposed by governments to control legislatures is the allocation of
certain percentage of seats to sectors of society under the control
of government. This practice was well established in Syria and
Egypt (under Nassir) where 50 per cent of the seats were assigned
for the peasants and wage-earners. The unions representing these
two sectors were controlled by the ruling party, hence, the
government was guararitied half the seats in the assembly (134).
Other means employed by government to control the
membership of legislatures include preferring certain political
parties, prohibiting independent candidates from standing for
legislative election, and ouflawing ideological or ethnic parties (135).
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Electoral system may also be used by parties to change the
composition of the legislature where the practice of alternates is
employed so as to replace, for example, an elderly popular member
who retires soon after election by his alternate, a young party
activist (136). Bogdanor has noted the effects of the type of electoral
system on the composition of the legislature. He argues that
proportional representation rather than the plurality system
favours the representation of women and of ethnic minorities (137).
Effect of electoral systems on the legislature:
The effects of the electoral system on the legislature and the
political system as a whole are likely to be predictable in countries
with ethnic or religious minorities where these groups are
represented on different grounds than the majority. Minorities can
be represented in the legislature by reserving specific seats for
their candidates. This has been done in Zimbabwe and Cyprus.
One problem which may arise under such a system is determining
which groups are entitled to be called a minority. Another pattern
of minority representation In Third World has been introduced in
Lebanon where there were two kinds of electoral districts. In the
first kind, only candidates of the dominant sect must contend the
seat. In the second kind of districts the college system was
introduced in accordance with which candidates of all the sects
represented in the district formed lists which were proportionally
distributed among them, each list seeking the support of all voters
in the district (138).
The relationship between the legislator and his constituents
will also be Influenced by the electoral system which determines
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electoral districts. Such districts are determined either under the
Constitution, the legislature, the executive, or by an Independent
boundary commission acting alone or In concert. In single-member
or small multi-member constituencies where candidates are better
known to the electorate the relationship is likely to be more
effective and closer than in large multi-member constituencies in
which the candidates may be no more than names to the vast
majority of constituents. The relationship in a large multi-member
constituency will probably be weakest under the list system (139).
The purpose of the electoral system as it operates in some
developing countries is to prevent the emergence of a political class
or of a legislative career. The Mexican electoral norm of no-
reelection of legislators appears to be justified on these grounds,
although such a principle may weaken the legislature itself (140). In
Tanzania the process of election to the legislature tends to block
the ambition of many legislators to be re-elected. Over half of the
successful candidates in the 1985 election were new comers (141).
Finally, abstention of voters in legislative elections has been
interpreted by academic analysts as opposition to the process or to
the regime itself. If the voters stay away from the election on large
scale or in a specific region, this phenomenon cannot be
interpreted as lack of interest in political participation but rather it
as a sign of public disapproval. The abstention phenomenon has
been observed in a number of Third World states where the
government has banned the opposition or used electoral system to
manipulate legislative elections (e.g. Syria, Ghana, Senegal) (142).
An increasing degree of abstention might result in the legitimacy of
the status quo being challenged in other ways.
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1.4 Conclusion:
For the most part it will be Inappropriate to generalize the
findings relating to one political system or geopolitical area to other
parts of the world since it is hard to verify empirically the extent to
which functions are actually performed by a certain legislature.
Third world legislatures were analysed in the Western
studies by using the same guide-lines as are utilised in the study
of Western legislatures. Their focus on the Law-making function
led them to the conclusion that legislatures In developing countries
are unsuccessful or aggravate development.
It has become now clear that the new order in many of the
newly independent countries was not that different from rule
under the colonial power, since the executive and judiciary
continued to be more important than the legislative assembly
which, far from being the dominant Influence in the political arena,
was treated by the ruling elites who controlled the executive in
much the same way as it has been treated in the pre-independence
period.
A survey of world legislatures reveals that most legislatures
of the world are not truly representative. In other words, not every
social, political, racial, religious, economic and territorial group is
represented in the legislature according to their percentage in
society. One variation among contemporary legislatures is in the
extent of misrepresentation between legislators and electorates.
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The key question to be considered, is what Is the role of the
legislature In developing countries and how that role is capable of
adaptation or change. Constitutional scholars thus have identified
a number of functions which include law-making, the promotion of
national Integration, the representation of local and national
interests, the mobilization of public support for the political
leadership, and the legitimization of political actions. In addition,
legislatures can act as forms for political recruitment, contribute to
the political indoctrination of the masses and, in some cases, they
may scrutinize the actions of the executive.
We have seen with regard to the relationship between the
legislature and political parties that the emergence of political
parties on the political scene of many developing countries has a
great effect on the relationship between the legislature, the
executive, and society at large. Parties become intermediate bodies
between the legislature and executive on the one side and the
legislature and the people on the other.
Moreover, we have seen that the election of the legislature
benefits the existing order by providing at least token
representation of existing social forces whilst generating the
ifiusion of popular support for the government. In some
authoritarian regimes, elections are sometimes used merely as a
means of relieving of social tension while In other instances they
are regarded as the appropriate means of redistributing legislative
seats among those peripheral to the political power structure.
The main question of the role and function of the legislature
is an important theme in the thesis. In this chapter the experience
of Third world has been contrasted to that of the Western
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countries. We turn to examine how the U.A.E. Constitution and
legislature developed. However, it Is useful to understand the
socio-economlc and political background of the U.A.E. Chapter 2
explains the U.A.E.'s early historical, political and legal
developments.
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London 1987, p. 258. See Chazan, op. cit., pp. 149-50,
and see Picard, op. cit., p. 137.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE HISTORICAL, SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
ASPECTS OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (U.A.E.1
2.1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to highlight the soclo-economic
background of the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.) in order to
analyse how the U.A.E. legislature has functioned over the years.
We turn to examine the U.A.E. first In the context of its social,
economical and political background.
Before the discovery of oil in the 1960s, economic activities
were dictated by the geographical location and climate of these
littoral states. The main activities of the people were diving for
pearls, fishing and seafaring. Agriculture was a secondary
occupation because of the weather, soil and scarcity of water. After
the discovery of oil in certain regions of the United Arab Emirates,
the whole economic structure was changed. The affluence of oil
had drastic consequences for the traditional way of life.
However, to approach an economic analysis of the U.A.E.
society on a pre-oil and post-oil basis would be misleading. Such
perspectives would be very narrow and would not take account of
the many facts of social life (1). A similar point might be made that
class analysis would be equally unhelpful, especially in the case of
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Emirates population figures. 1980, 1985. 1990.
Emirate	 1980a	 1985a	 1990b
Abu Dhabi
Dubal
SharJah
RA.K.
Fujairah
U.A.Q.
Ajman
451,848
276,311
159,317
73,882
33,331
12,426
36,100
670,125
419,104
268,723
116,470
54,425
29,299
64,318
889,518
559,771
377,851
159,061
76,659
46,168
92,535
Total	 1,043,215	 1,622,464	 2,201,563
a = Census figures. b = Ministry of Planning forecasts.
Source: Sarah Searight, The United Arab Emirates through the
1990g. The Economist Inteffigence Unit, May 1990.
U.A.E. traditional society for several reasons. The most important
is that prior to the oil era, for most of the population specialization
in one form of economy was rare arid impractical (2) and the basis
of social stratification was political rather than economic.
Economic status did not play a significant role in the
differentiation between groups and the demarcation of social
strata. Kinship was the common factor. An impecunious individual
might easily identify with a group consisting of much richer
citizens. It has been said that "... instead of horizontal classes
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stretching across the societies, there were parallel vertical groups
maintaining their distance from each other" (s).
Detailed analysis of the history of the Emirates concludes
that two factors affected the socio-economic structure of their
societies. One was their relation with Britain, the second was the
outflow of "black gold" (i.e. oil). In this chapter the relationship of
the Emirates with Britain will be discussed and the traditional
social structure explained. The implications of oil wealth for the old
order will be explored and the legitimacy of the ruling families'
claim to power will be examined.
2.2 Emirates Relations With Britain (1820-197 1)
British influence was first in evidence in the Gulf with the
coming of the East India Company to the region in the early
eighteenth century (4). The company was responsible for extending
Britain's commercial links and protecting its economic interests.
The first connection between the East India Company and the Gulf
states was with Kuwait. After Persia occupied the port of Basra at
the mouth of the Gulf in 1776, the company established a factory
in Kuwait, regarding it as a new port from which to deal with the
heart of the Arabian Peninsula (5). It was an informal relationship,
not to be cemented in a legal form until one century later.
In fact, the British connection with individual emirates was
much stronger and may be traced back to the nineteenth century.
It started with the attack on Ras-al-Khalmah, the capital of Arab
marine power in the Gulf at that time, and its destruction in 1820.
In the same year the East India Company concluded a peace treaty
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with ten of the tribal chiefs (known as shaikhs). It has been
suggested by some British historians that the treaty was intended
merely to ban piracy and slavery. As one of the officials stated in
recent years:
"The suppression of piracy was an obvious way
to secure sea routes while the suppression of slavery
was no more than an English liberal fashion at that
moment in the nineteenth century." (6)
However, the real intention was not so enlightened. Self
interest was the dominant consideration. It was in fact a step
toward enhancing Britain's commercial interests in this new area
and securing the sea routes to India.
In 1853, after a series of short-term treaties, Britain imposed
on the local shaikhs a treaty that has come to be known as the
"Perpetual Maritime Truce". Ever since then the signing emirates
have been called the "Trucial States". Britain institutionalized its
power In the Gulf by preventing the signatories from retaliating
against each other. In the case of a dispute, the aggrieved party
had to raise his claim with the British authority which was the
only eligible power to deal with such incIdents (7). This treaty, like
the 1820 treaty, was concerned with peace at sea not on land. It
had a special effect on the balance of power among the Trucial
States. The power of the Qawasim tribal confederation in Sharjah
and Ras-al-Khaimah, which was mainly a marine power, was
decreased while its rival, the Ban! Yas confederation in Abu Dhabi,
which was mainly a land power, gained ground(8).
The final step in the British plan to control the Trucial States
was taken in 1892 when the so-called "Exclusive Agreement" was
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signed by the shalkhs of these states. They agreed on behalf of
themselves and their heirs
"not to enter Into any agreement or correspondence
with any power other than Britain; not to consent to
the residence within their territories of any agent of
another government and on no account to cede, sell,
mortgage or otherwise give occupation of any part of
their territory to anybody but the British Government."(g)
By this agreement the shaikhs surrendered all their external
affairs to the British Government and approved the minimum of
British interference in internal affairs.
Certain conclusions may be drawn from a study of the major
treaties that the shaikhs were involved in. First of all, these
treaties did not explicitly define what was meant by "protected
states". They did not even determine the parameters of the
impending jurisdiction nor define clearly the territory it was
supposed to be applied to. In addition, in no place did these
treaties indicate that these states had surrendered their
international representation to Britain. Nonetheless, Britain was
always justifying Its presence and domination in the area on the
basis of these treaties (io). It used to describe its fellow signatories
in a vague phrase, as "independent states in special treaty
relations with His Majesty's Government." (ii)
It was not only the political systems of these societies which
were subject to British Influence, but such Influence extended to
the legal systems. The British extra-territorial jurisdiction was
introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century. British
influence came through treaties and arrangements concluded with
the rulers, and on the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts of 1890-1913
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which enabled the crown to establish courts In foreign lands.
Actually the British extra-territorial jurisdiction was Imposed in
the emirates in 1946 under the Trucial States Order in Council.
The practice and extent of extra-territorial jurisdiction differed
from one state to another. It was extended in the Trucial States to
cover all non-national subjects, while in Bahrain and Kuwait it was
less widely applied (12).
As W. Ballantyne notes, the introduction of the British
jurisdiction to the area created two systems of courts. First, local
courts exercising their jurisdiction over subjects of the states
concerned. These courts applied Shariah and customary laws.
Second, British courts applying extra-territorial jurisdiction over
non-national subjects. The body of law exercised in these courts
was based on Common law principles (13). The hierarchy order of
the British courts in the Truclal States was as follows. 1- Court for
the Trucial States, 2- Chief Court for the Persian Gull as an appeal
court, and 3- Full Court of the Persian Gulf as the higher appeal
court. (14)
However, many changes were made during 1950s and 1960s
with regard to the persons and matters under foreign jurisdiction
in the emirates. Provisions were introduced for the transfer of
jurisdiction over certain non-national groups and matters to the
Individual emirate's jurisdiction. The emirates were encouraged to
formulate their own institutions and legislation. Frauke Heard-Bey
rightly noticed that "compared to most countries which had been
former British colonies, the influence of British legal thinking (in
the Trucial States) was nevertheless only skin deep." (15)
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It is important to point out that the British Government of
India was responsible for the administration of British relations
with the Trucial States. However, after the independence of India
in 1947, the conduct of these relations was transferred for one year
to India Office in London. The Colonial Office was not responsible
for the emirates' external affairs, because they were never former
colonies. In 1948 the Foreign Office took the responsibility from
India Office. (16)
With regard to internal affairs of the emirates, the British
were not of the habit of interfering unless there was danger to
British interests in the area. Such policy became more obvious in
the 1950s and 1960s. A writer wrote that "the Political Agents did
not as a rule force the views of the British Government upon the
shaikhs. In spite of this, they did expect that their advice would be
heeded by the Rulers." (17)
In practical terms; the British institutions (i.e. Political
Resident and Political Agents) were very important in shaping
these states' policies. To continue in power a shaikh had to have
the support of his people and the British authorities. In some
cases the latter was much more important than the former. The
Political Resident's decision might affect a shaikh's political future.
His refusal to recognize a shaikh's claim to power was a significant
obstacle to the latter's ambitions. Such a situation arose in Dubal
in 1929 (see chapter 3), and in 1965 in Sharjah and Abu Dhabi
where the two shaikhs did not fully cooperate with the British
authority (18).
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An important feature of the British rule was the power of a
British official. In personal Influence, if an official was in favour of
a certain shaikh, this became valuable so that it could increase the
authority of the ruling family In society. This power was inherent
In the official's status and the influence at his disposal. It became
a personal matter for the official to develop his own style.
Rosemarie Zahian gave a clear picture of this situation in Bahrain,
which was similar to that in the Emirates, as follows:
"The Political Agent controlled Bahrain's foreign
relations; he had jurisdiction over all foreigners in
Bahrain; he sat as a judge in the Joint Court along
with the ruler's representative there; he controlled the
entry of all foreigners to Bahrain; and he was the only
link between the government of Bahrain and BAPCO."
(1 g)
Britain's presence and its treaty arrangements changed the
existing order of things. It divided the existing political units into
new smaller units. Although Donald Hawely, in his book Ii
Truclal States (1970), tried to give the impression that there were
already seven emirates and Britain merely preserved that position
through its treaties with them (20), the reality was different. Prior to
the British involvement in the area only two political units were in
existence; the Qawasim and the Bani Yas confederations. The
British power split the Qawasim area into five small emirates, and
encouraged the separation of Dubal from the Bani Yas
confederation. The final result of this policy was a new and weak
political mosaic with seven emirates having emerged by the end of
1952 (21).
At the same time, Britain was intent on preserving the
underlying socio-political structure of the societies. Local affairs
were left li-i. the hands of the shaikhs themselves. Indeed, Britain
82
(Chapter two)
positively enhanced the power of the heads of the emirates as long
as they entered into its treaty system and co-operated with It. The
authority of other shaikhs, especially those in the hinterland, was
diminished or restricted In favour of the coastal shaikhs (22).
Finally, the long-term relationship between these states and
Britain, especially in the case of Trucial States, isolated them from
the outside world. On the eve of 1971 most of these states lacked
the machinery for good domestic administration and International
relations and were without well-trained armies (23). Britain was not
willing to provide such institutions during its domination period.
Its basic concern was, in fact, to fossilize the status quo In order to
preserve Its Interests.
2.3 The Socio-economic Structure of the Traditional Society:
prior to the advent of oil
One must pay attention to two factors which have affected
the social structure of the emirates, namely tribal values and
Islam. The former was established with the arrival of waves of
migrants from south-eastern Arabia in the second century AD. (24)
Islam has been accepted in the area since early days of its
emergence.
Tribal values which are based on kinship led to division of
the society into small groups. These divisions are based on tribal
and not class system. The individual therefore identifies himself
with a group (I.e. tribe) rather than with a geographical location.
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Islam, on the other hand, introduced the concept of equality
among all humankind. The only division that Islam recognizes is
based on religion. Islam, in addition, acknowledges the importance
of leadership and therefore did not abolish the tribal hierarchy In
the society. Islam also provided the traditional society with a legal
code, viz. Shari'ah, which everyone has to refer to.
To sum up, the roots of social structure of the U.A.E.
traditional society fall within the tribal values, while the legal
framework of the society and personal behaviour is found in the
Islamic traditions.
2.3.1 The Ruling Families
The Gulf region has the highest concentration of monarches
and dynasties in the world. Outside this area in the Middle East
there are only two monarchies (Morocco and Jordan). In fact there
are six monarchical states in this tiny geographical area. The
United Arab Emirates alone has seven ruling families, one for each
emirate. The existence of these families can be traced back, in the
majority of cases, to the end of the eighteenth century (e.g. Kuwait,
Bahraln, Ahu Dahabi, Sharjah) while one ruling family (Fujairah)
emerged in 1952.
In the Trucial States, tribal politics have played a significant
role in determining which were to be the ruling families. As has
been stated above, there were two tribal confederations. Each was
divided into tribes, clans and families. Each tribe had Its own
chief. The paramount chief was designated as the head of the
emirate. The seven ruling dynasties are the prominent families in
the leading tribe in their area. This supremacy might be gained by
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power or allegiance. The families are; the AI-Bu-Falah of Abu
Dhabl, the Al-Maktoom of Dubal, the Al-Qasimi of Sharjah and
Ras-al-Khalmah, the Al-Nuaimi of Ajman, the A1-Muala of Umm-al-
Quwain, and the AI-Sharql of Fujairah (25).
There were not many differences between the shailch and his
subjects. In his dress and everyday living he had the same kind of
lifestyle as the rest of the population. He could be easily reached
by his people. He knew almost every member of his society and
their problems. He was supposed to hold the authority of rulership
in order to guarantee his followers' interests, defend their rights
and protect their properties. The shaikh was the final arbiter. All
disputes were referred to him. His ruling, after consulting his tribal
elders, was final. Some ruling families were supreme in their
societies because of their role in settling tribal disputes (e.g. Al-Bu
Falah in Abu Dhabi) (26).
The ruling families used several subtle techniques to
consolidate their leadership. These included forming alliances with
Important tribes in their territories to secure their loyalty and
support and arranging marriages to the daughters of important
figures In society. By choosing for themselves or their sons wives
from the community's leading famffies, they cemented their
relations with the people and secured their support peacefully (27).
Rulership was hereditary in a ruling family; however, the
question of succession was not clearly defined. This is an historical
phenomenon in Arab polities. The most eligible candidate was the
one who had the strength, wealth and ability to fill the power
vacuum. The non-existence of the law of primogeniture led to a
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severe power struggle among the ambitious candidates. The ruling
family was not a united group or a cohesive institution (28). It is not
surprising therefore that in Abu Dhabi three shaikh brothers were
assassinated in the period between 1912 to 1928.
The economic resources of the shaikh were limited. He was
dependant on taxes, levies and customs duties imposed on the
economic activities of the local community. Taxes on the pearling
industry provided the shaikh with most of his income. Yet, not
every member in the society was obliged to pay taxes. The shaikh
could exempt his family members and some of the leading families
in the community. There was a kind of economic interdependence
between the ruler and the ruled. The right to levy taxes was
something that distinguished city shaikhs from desert shaikhs.
The shaikh's rule was not absolute. There were certain
checks and balances on his authority. Retention of his power
depended on the support of his family and the various sections of
his community. He had to prove his competence as a ruler, provide
his family members with financial support and consult them
regularly. If he failed to do so, then his life could be threatened by
his ambitious kinsmen. He could be deported or killed. At the
same time, if a group of his subjects were not satisfied with his
treatment or way of ruling they could easily withdraw their families
and take refuge in the territory of another shaikh. This kind of
check was a serious threat to the shaikh both on an economic and
on a military level (29).
Another form of checks and balances over the shaikh's rule
was the traditional Majils. The shaikh has to consult the
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prominent members of his emirate before taking any decision.
Moreover, he had to secure an acceptable system of wealth
distribution to his subjects. It is noteworthy, that most of these
forms of traditional pressures are still remain in the present U.A.E.
As we have seen earlier on, the treaty signed with Britain in
1820 marked a shift in the location of powers further away from
the people while at the same time strengthening the position of the
shaikhs. In effect the treaties reversed the prior limited form of
acceptability to the people and made the shaikhs rather
accountable to the British. For this reason they became stronger in
relation to the people having been given a free hand in
administering local affairs but in relation to the British they were
subordinate.
R.S. Zahlan describing the role that the British power played
in the political order in the traditional societies wrote:
"The rulers received moral and political support from Britain,
and were allowed a free hand in the conduct of local affairs. They
therefore gained much in stature during the British period.....The
treaty system strengthened [their] position and assured the
continuity of [their] influence. With time, it became a guarantee.
Most important it contributed to the institutionalization of [their]
position." (30) British support transformed the position of some of
the rulers in their emirates from equal among equals into
autocratic rulers.
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2.3.2 The Influence of the Merchants
Prior to the discovery of oil, the merchant group provided the
main economic leadership in U.A.E. society. The merchants
represented the beginning of a capitalist class but failed to form a
truly cohesive group. In general, their economic position was
derived from their organization of the major economic and
production activities of the community in which they lived.
Most merchants were pearl merchants. They provided the
main finance to pearl-fishing boats. In return they were eligible for
a certain percentage of the production and had first option in
buying the rest of the harvest. The other major marine activity in
which the merchants were engaged was trade with the Indian
subcontinent coast, Persia and the East Africa coast, with whom
they had good relations.(31)
The influence of the mercantile group was not the same in
the other shaikhdoms. There were many wealthy families but they
were in a weaker position vis-a-vis the ruling families. From
outward appearances only the ruling family of Dubal could be seen
to be wealthy. The merchants, nevertheless, were in a better
position in the political hierarchy than the rest of the society.
The position of the old-established merchant families was
affected by two major developments. Regionally, the introduction of
British steam cruisers in the Gulf led to decline in trade by
traditional seafaring methods, and the introduction into the
international market in the 1930s of the Japanese cultivated pearl
led to the rapid collapse of the major source of wealth in the Gulf
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area. The crash was so severe that by the end of the 1 930s most of
the merchants were heavily In debt. Only big families managed to
survive the crash.
2.3.3 The Indigenous non-elite groups
The remainder of the population of the Emirates fell into two
categories : first, the sedentary inhabitants, known as the hoclar,
and second, the nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes, known as the
badu or bedouins. The two groups were recognized as being
culturally different but economically interdependent (32). The
bedouins spent most of the year in their oases In the desert, but in
the summer season a great number of them joined the work force
in the pearling industry as divers. The hiidar, on the other hand,
settled in towns near the coast, although some of them had
gardens or cattle in the hinterland.
Bedouins who generally, are semi-nomadic, owe allegiances
to their tribes and shaikhs. The tribe was the basic political unit in
the Gulf region. Its most important feature was the hierarchical
system of power. The shaikh controlled the tribe; his decisions
were &ial. He was responsible for securing his fellow tribesmen's
interests. Everything depended upon kinship. To the Bedouins, a
political ideology based on the Western idea of "sovereignty" over a
piece of land was a wholly foreign concept. They spent the major
portion of their lives traveffing around in the desert seeking
benefits from the land, but not owning it (33).
As has been mentioned above, the ruling dynasties in the
Emirates sprang from the tribes. Having provided the political
89
(Chapter two)
system with a ruling family from among its members, the tribe
gave that family Its unstinting loyalty and support. Tribes were the
pool of power that the ruling families relied upon. The loyalty and
friendship of the tribal shaikhs, therefore, was of great value to the
coastal rulers (34).
In the Trucial States, and especially in Abu Dhabi, the tribes
played a significant role in society. From among them were
recrriited the rulers' bodyguards and the urban militia. The most
important tribes were the Bani Yas, the Manasir, the Dhowahir,
the Awamir, the Qawasim, the Naim, the Sharqi, the Al All, the
Tanaij and the Naqbi(35).
The hadar or sedentary Inhabitants had their origins In the
tribes but presented economic activities unconnected with the
tribe. Some of the hadar, especially in Ras-al-Khalmah, were
peasant farmers but many more engaged in fishing and seafaring.
The most important profession was pearl diving. This industry
provided work for most of the national work-force and supplied the
local economy with its greatest amount of revenue In the pre-oil
era (36).
The pearl-fishing industry was a circumscribed occupation
because its season lasted for only three to four months during the
summer. After the season ended the workers could be redundant
for the rest of the year unless they found work elsewhere. Practices
within the profession were unjust and created a kind of social
division among the population. The merchants and boat owners
were at one end of the social scale and the rest of the society at the
other.
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The workers on board the ships did not work for a fixed
salary but were paid on a share basis. The season's pearl harvest
was divided among the merchants who financed the ship, the
shipowner or leader and the crew. The major share went to the
first two groups and with what remained the diver could not even
afford to repay the debts he had prior to the start of the season. It
was not a profitable profession (37). The industry has been
described In these words:
the pearl trade must be judged, even in its
best years, as disappointing ; the vast majority of
those who follow it live and die in debt, its proceeds
fall into few hands, and enriched chiefly the foreign
buyers and, locally, a limited circle in a limited area"
(38)
2.4 The Oil Era (1960s - to date)
We have seen earlier that, the British were only interested in
the peace in the sea, yet this position changed with the advent of
oil at the turn of this century. The importance of oil became
apparent with industrialists of the West.
By the beginning of the twentieth century Britain had
obtained undertakings from the rulers of Gulf states "to reserve oil
exploitation rights to those appointed by the British Government"
(39). The first undertaking was in Kuwait in 1913, then Bahrain in
1914, and Trucial States and Oman In 1922 and 1923 respectively.
However, such undertakings did not mean a monopoly of the
British oil companies In the area. For instance, the miMtinational
company Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), which through its
subsidiary Petroleum Concession Limited (PCL) secured
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concessions from the Trucial States, was in fact a consortium of
British, French, Dutch, American and other interests. (40) Dubal
was the first emirate to sign an agreement with PCL In 1937,
followed by Sharjah (1937), Kalba (1938) and Abu Dhabi (1939).
The most prominent common features of these agreements
were: they were to last for a long period of time; the undertaking
covered large areas; oil companies were given almost absolute
authority In those areas, and the British political resident or agent
had an important role in the process (41). Local rulers and the
British power were keen to control the new wealth and direct it
toward their own Interests.
The discovery of oil had both advantages and disadvantages.
First, It created boundary problems among neighbouring countries.
As will have been gathered, political borders were not a well-known
phenomenon in the Gulf region. With the advent of oil every Inch of
land became important. The British authorities, after dominating
the political scene in the area for more than one century, suddenly
set out to define the borders of every state. This was in order to
make it easier for the oil companies to explore and drill In their
concession areas. However, the definition of boundaries took a long
time and is still not altogether settled. It has been suggested that
the advent of oil forced a solution to many a long-standing
territorial dispute. In addition it renewed old jealousies between
those states which had oil and those which did not. Indeed, it was
jealousy, that prevented Ras-al-Khaimah from joining the newly
federated state of the United Arab Emirates, and the hope that
commercial quantities of oil might be discovered in its territories.
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Three months later It joined the union after its hopes had been
dashed (42).
The oil industry was incompatible with the traditional
economy of the Gulf region. It was an enclave industry. It did not
integrate into the local economy, instead it built itself outside the
boundaries of this economy. The industry was dependent on
foreign technology, companies and even work-force. It benefited
directly the foreign power. Nationals were excluded to a great
extent from joining it and gaining technical skills (43). The local
societies did benefit indirectly from oil wealth, however, and for
this reason some writers have called these states "Rentier States",
because they got royalties in return for renting their lands to
foreign oil companies. Their national income was not a product of
their national economy (44).
Oil wealth created jobs and became a welcome source of
income for local governments. The new wealth was distributed in
different ways. For Instance, land was purchased for development,
especially in Abu Dhabi, at artificially inflated prices. This was
justified on the grounds that it would distribute the oil income to
the greatest number of people, although in effect it did not. Rich
families benefited hugely from such programmes (45). Another way
of distributing the oil prosperity was through creating a large civil
service. In the new government departments, nationals were
employed on a large scale. The government became the largest
employer in the country and by now it Is estimated that more than
half the population depend on government salaries.
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The economic dependence of these states on oil income
became and remains very high. On the one hand It has enhanced
the power and role of the modern state In society. On the other
hand, it has increased the need for foreign labourers and
expatriates to service the new economy and its infrastructures. The
most serious consequences of this dependency still lies in the
future. These states are dangerously vulnerable to threats to the
international oil market and the debts they have borrowed (46).
2.5 The Effect of Oil on the Traditional Socio-economic
Structure
Oil prosperity challenged and continues to challenge the old
stratification in the Gulf states. It has enhanced the power and the
authority of certain groups, while at the same time reducing or
limiting the role of other groups in running society's affairs. In
short, it has been responsible for the emergence of a new social
order. Exactly what this meant for the ruling families, merchants
and the indigenous population will be addressed in this section.
2.5.1 The Ruling families
The authority of the ruling families was fully endorsed and
recognized because oil companies dealt only with the ruler or their
agents. The payments were made directly into the rulers funds. He
was the only institution in the society to receive oil royalties
directly. This development effectively reinforced his position and
increased his importance. In relation to the population, he had
gained economic as well as political power. However, the ruler no
longer depended on his traditional sources of income, that is
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taxation and customs duty. This resulted in a breakdown in the
interdependence between ruler and community. It also marked a
shift in the production of wealth. The shaikWs extremely large
income of petro-dollars could be used to pay his people generously
and relieve them of taxation (47).
Internally, oil wealth has increased the cohesiveness of the
ruling families. Each ruler needs the help of his family in running
his expanding state apparatus. The family provides him with loyal
henchmen. This had an important constitutional dimension. On
the legal side, the law of primogeniture has not been adopted in
each of the Emirates, as has been the case in the neighbouring
states of Kuwait and Bahrain (48).
Concession agreements have reinforced the political system
created in the nineteenth century by the British power when they
divided the Trucial coast into seven entities. The oil companies
have perpetuated this somewhat eccentric state of affairs. Every
ruler is now entirely independent. This means that the traditional
popular agreement with the people has been to a certain extent
weakened. Indeed, the emirate of Fujairah was given formal
independence from Sharjah in 1952 by the British specifically to
enable oil companies to get concession agreements from its ruler.
On the administrative side the ruler has been able to
establish for himself the apparatus of a modern state and appoint
personal advisers and directors. Thus he has increased his power
and extended his authority over his traditional rivals such as
family members, merchants and tribal chiefs. However, Tim
Niblock contends, that the oil economy has strengthened the
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position of the rulers at the expense of radical change (49) and
popular support for government.
2.5.2 The Merchants
Alter the economic decline of the pearl market, the oil
economy became the new means of survival and a major source of
income for most of the wealthy families. The rulers in most of the
Gull states were pleased to be in a position of control as they did
not want this group to be weakened nor did they want them to be
strong again. Accordingly, they favoured the merchants in the
wealth distribution programme and increased their participation in
development plans, while maintaining the upper hand (50). It is the
writer's belief that they would not marginalize the merchants
because they are the only group with resources to challenge the
position of the rulers In the event of a contest.
Merchants abandoned their traditional economic activities
and involved themselves in enterprises connected with the oil
industry. Banks, construction companies, travel and shipping
agencies and insurance companies sprang up. They were either
national ventures or were run on behalf of international groups.
Merchants became agents for Western manufactured goods,
especially those from the United Kingdom and the United States.
They Imported and distributed cosmetic commodities (51). Their ties
with the West were enhanced by the investment of their surplus
capital in shares, bonds, estates and stocks in the Western
markets. In this way they became heavily influenced by Western
capitalism.
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In the United Arab Emirates, wealthy families are
represented in and dominate the Chamber of Commerce. It is the
platform from which they defend their interests and demand a
bigger role in the national economy. Local merchants have taken
legal steps to cut down competition from foreign rivals. Commercial
laws and national laws restrict the ownership of industrial and
business activities to nationals. However, In some cases it allows
foreigners to operate in the country if they have native partners
whose shares are not less than fifty-one per cent (52). Ruling
families, in some of these states, abdicate to the merchants their
involvement in the local economy. They invest their money abroad
and appoint certain leading families to be their agents in the local
market. This has tightened the relationship between the two
groups, bringing them together in defence of their common
interests (53).
2.5.3 The Indigenous non-elite groups:
With the advent of oil the balance of power has turned in
favour of the emerging state system and the tribe is no longer the
basic element In the political structure of the society. The power of
tribal shaikhs has been weakened and their role marginalized (54).
In the United Arab Emirates, central government and the
individual emirates have encouraged tribesmen to settle since
1971. Where they have done so, notably in Ahu Dhabi, they have
come to play a significant role in the army, the police, the security
forces and the palace guard. They have been provided with
generous subsidies and modern houses. This process has enlarged
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the basis of support for each emirat&s shaikh and increased the
number Indigenous Inhabitants among the settled population (55).
On the economic front, the traditional occupations of the
Indigenous peoples have been hard hit by international events arid
the advent of oil. Consequently these traditional activities have
been abandoned by the locals and replaced with much more
lucrative occupations in the state departments or the tiny private
sector. The effect of it has been to remove them from previously
largely autonomous situation and become integrated in the
political economy through serving the state.
The advent of oil has had the following profound effects. First
it has consolidated the ruling class but undermined the previous
partially autonomous structure (I.e. the Majlis) where the people
participated. Secondly, at domestic level it has led to a great deal of
integration in the political economy while at the same time
bringing it into the fold of western international capitalism. Finally
it has thrown up new groups in the political economy.
2.5.4 New Groups in the Modern State
Oil prosperity has led to an expansion in the education
system and governmental service departments. This In turn has
affected the native population and changed their soclo-economic
situation. Expansion has also meant more reliance on foreign
expatriates and labourers because of the lack of expertise among
the nationals. Three new groups consequently have emerged. They
are the "middle class" and the "lower class" and inimigrants. The
term classes may not fit the category of group exactly but it is the
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best English translation of it. Here each group will be briefly
examined.
The "Middle Class"
The enormous oil wealth has inevitably developed and
expanded this group. Its social position is derived from the
expertise and technical skills its members have acquired through
education. Education has been expanding rapidly since the 1950s.
New schools and universities have supplied the group with a
constant steam of new recruits, keen to participate In the day-to-
day administration of the country's affairs.
Because there is no clear distinction between social strata in
the Gulf states, the composition of middle class is ifi-defined.
Scholars have provided their own various definitions of the "middle
class", suggesting that its members were to be found among
educated citizens, experts, state and private sector employers,
journalists and petty merchants (56). They have in common a single
principle which is that the members of the middle class were likely
to occupy their professions and posts through merit and
achievement rather than their familial ascription (nepotism).
Another distinctive feature of the group is that most of its
members seek to serve the existing socio-political structure rather
than to alter or revolt against it. This may be attributed to the
social tradition of power centralization and a lack of economic
independence. This group is distinctive from the model of the
European bourgeoisie, it did not emerge independently of the
existing structure and did not build its own economic base. It
relies heavily on the state for Its income. Another reason for its
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subordinate position is that it did not present itself as a cohesive
class defending its interests (57). Yet, there Is a small part of this
group which Is not happy with the status quo and has aspirations
unfuffilled until now.
The "Lower Class"
In the pre-oil economy the lower class was the class in which
most of the native nationals belonged. Now, however, it represents
a very small proportion of the native population. The policies of
successive governments have raised the economic standards of
their citizens and as a result most of them have become well off
financially. What is left of the native "lower class" is largely made
up of divers, fishermen and peasants who either did not abandon
their traditional occupations or did not benefit much from
government services. The majority of "lower class" workers in
contemporary societies are non-nationals (58).
By and large, class consciousness did not develop among
low-paid workers for several reasons. First, because of traditional
loyalty to family rather than class. Second, trade unions were
banned everywhere except in Kuwait and Bahrain. Third, cheap
foreign work-force challenged the effect of local workers. Fourth, it
was difficult to unite labourers divided by nationality, language,
religion and tradition. Finally, the modern native work-force had
no history to fall back on (59).
Expatriates
The termination of the special treaty relations with the
British government in 1971 left the rulers with a dilemma. The
Gulf rulers found that they lacked the trained personnel to run the
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administration of their new states. Britain had done nothing to
prepare them for that day. Consequently the newly independent
and affluent countries turned to their Arab neighbours for help. An
influx of Arab expatriates started to fIll the newly created
ministries. They were largely responsible for the legal and political
structures that came into being after 1971. Legal experts provided
the states with their constitutions and formed their legislation. By
and large, the Arab expatriates have benefited their hosts countries
(60).
At the same time, however, there has been a growth in
population that could never have been predicted. Because of the
small numbers of Indigenous in these countries and the need for a
rapid development process, hundreds of thousands of foreign semi-
skilled and unskffled labourers were imported. They came from
different parts of the world. The majority of the immigrants were
from India, Pakistan, South East Asia, and Iran. Their numbers
surpassed these of the nationals. Recent statistics reveal that the
nationals in the United Arab Emirates are now a minority in their
own land. Nationals comprise not more than twenty per cent of the
population. (61)
Expatriates dominate the work-force especially in the private
sector (62). In recent years, the Emirates have imported Asian
labourers rather than Arabs on the grounds that they constitute a
cheaper work-force and can come alone leaving their dependents
at home. Another alleged advantage is that the exporting agencies
guarantee their return by the end of the contract they have been
engaged to work on (63). They are also expected to have less contact
with the Indigenous Arabs. However, this Influx of Asian labourers,
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who differ ethnically and linguistically from the locals, in
uncontrolled numbers has engendered fear among the indigenous
population. The planners demanded restrictions on their numbers
but there is no support for this from the commercial sector.
Policies have been laid down to rationalize immigration but have
failed because of the powerful commercial interests involved (64).
The large numbers of expatriates have overburdened the
local economy but seen when this became most evident, after the
drop in oil prices in the 1980s, the local governments did not
renounce their labour policies; they still depend heavily on foreign
labour. It seems that government officials are not worried by the
size of the expatriate community for several reasons. They argue
that the foreign workers are in the country for jobs, not for
permanent settlement and that they have no political ambitions.
Furthermore, they are convinced that the policy of diversifying the
work-force has in effect improved national security (65).
The government has introduced certain legal measures to
guarantee the privileged position of nationals over expatriates and
thus to ease local fears. These safeguards have been embodied in
naturalization law as well as civil and commercial laws. It has
become very difficult to obtain the state's nationality. In the civil
service field, laws and decrees governing recruitment have given
nationals priority over non-nationals by demanding fewer
qualifications from them. A third concession has been the banning
of non-nationals from property and business ownership.
We have seen that there is a continuity in the structure of
ruling groups notwithstanding the fact that new social classes have
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emerged but there has been a shift in the means of legitimating
power.
2.6 Shifts in Power and Influence in the U.A.E.
We now turn to consider how the changes introduced on the
social, political and economic background of the U.A.E. has led to
significant constitutional and legal developments. In general terms
the authority of a particular ruler may be perceived to be legitimate
if the overall majority of the ruled consent to be governed by that
ruler. Acceptance may emanate from traditional sources that have
been inherited through generations, religious considerations,
personal qualities of the leader ( i.e. charisma) or a process by
which the leader is chosen by the people to rule for a specific
period of time (66).
The United Arab Emirates emerged from a typical process of
evolution. At first, groups of tribes settled in an area which they
related to later. The need to organize their internal affairs obliged
them, in each case, to surrender some of their rights to a specific
leader, who was to become the paramount shaikh. Later, with the
arrival of the British, the power of the shailch and his family was
substantiated. The treaty system gave the shaikh and his territory
legal status. In the final step, with the discovery of oil, most of the
boundaries were delineated and the statehood process was
completed in 1971. It has been argued that the Britain did not
create these states because they were in existence when it came,
but it did divide some parts of them and shaped their political
borders (67).
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This political entity in which the emirates are combined has
been described as an example of a "traditional secular" state, on
the ground that tribal tradition, not religion, has played the
significant role In the ruling families' acquisition of power. None of
the ruling families claims to be descendants of a religious ancestor
(68). Dr. Rumaihi has suggested that society in the Gulf states
implicitly accepts the authority of the ruling families in looking to
them to defend its interests and secure its territory (69). The
rulership of most of the dynasties has been uninterrupted for two
centuries and is part of a continuous process.
Political opposition could take a positive or a negative form.
On the positive side, if the ruler was not able to prove his
efficiency, he could be killed or overthrown. Assassination,
however, did not threaten the power of the ruling family. This was
because allegiance was given to the family as a whole and not to
the person of the ruler. A change in leadership by force did not
necessarily decrease the ruling family's right to rule. The negative
weapon was presented in the act of exit. When members of the
population were not satisfied with the ruler's policies, they simply
renounced their allegiance and migrated to another place (70).
These forms of traditional opposition were controlled later.
The law of primogeniture settled the question of succession in
some states and the delineation of political boundaries limited the
use of the exit sanction. Nonetheless, it is important to remember
that In a traditional society like the U.A.E. it is unlikely that
traditional forms of pressure such as the Majlis and the role of the
prominent members in the society, can be easily diminished. One
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must be aware of the fact that these forms of pressure do prevail in
the U.A.E. politics.
It was a combination of historical and social factors in these
emirates which underpined the legitimacy of the ruling families.
Tribal traditions played an enormous role and kinship was the
basis of hereditary rule. Once In power, personal reputation was
important to the ruler's survival. (71)
With the coming of the oil economy, changes in the social
and economic situation meant that the old criteria were no longer
enough to keep the dynasties in power. Ruling families, therefore,
played the cards of affluence and efficiency as further legitimating
factors. They used oil-income to create new administrative
Institutions, which enabled them to tighten their grasp on state
affairs and meet development needs, and they were efficient in
establishing a welfare system while preserving a largely unchanged
social structure. It has been said that the Gulf states were
"pursuing a legitimacy strategy of accommodation rather than
trying to assimilate traditional groups into a new national Identity"
(72).
Apart from these soclo-economic devices the U.A.E.
Constitution, see chapter 5, played an important part in the
legitimating process. This may be explained as follows. The U.A.E.
constitution brought together into a federal system the previously
disparate emirates with the various heads of emirates constituting
themselves Into a constitutionalized ruling class. That is
constitutionalising what obtained before and during the period of
relationship with Britain.	 So the U.A.E. Constitution largely
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became the factor that legitimated their rule against the
background of the traditional set up.
2.7 Conclusion
The old socio-economic structure allowed a wide section of
society to participate in making decisions and running state
affairs. The fact that the shaikhs depended on the merchants for a
major part of their income gave them a say in the policy-making
process. In addition, the support of the tribal chiefs was important
for the regime's stability and legitimacy, therefore, they were
consulted in local affairs. Consultation was and still is a basic
component of social values in the Arab society.
The system of administration in the traditional society
necessitated a kind of grass-root democracy. The ruler nominates a
wall (i.e. deputy or representative) for the populated centres in his
emirate. The wall must be acceptable to the local tribes in order to
perform his duty as an intermediate between the ruler and the
ruled. Such institution, however, did not inhibit the tribesmen
from discussing and consulting their affairs directly with the ruler
in his Majlis. The Majlis was and still is a vely potent force in local
politics.
Another important feature of the traditional administration
is wealth distribution. The relationship between the ruler and his
subjects has always embodied the rule of give and take. The ruler
has to secure an adequate system of wealth distribution to his
family and subjects In order to last in his position. He has to
depend on favours and subsidies especially when dealing with
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beduin tribes. The ruler was eventually expected to generous and
not greedy.
The advent of oil has strengthened the power of the ruling
families and polarized the decision-making process. The oil
economy has made them independent of these two groups for
whom there is no role in the oil production. Far from discounting
the old social groups, however, the rulers have been at pains to
include them in their policies (73). It is now the foreign oil
companies the rulers are dependent upon.
Socio-economic change In the emirates has been much more
rapid than political change. Indeed the position of the ruler has
been reinforced by the expanding bureaucracy. The fact that tribal
structure is in decline in contemporary society, but tribal values
are not, has further benefited the ruling families. The weakness of
tribal ties has strengthened their centralized rule, and the tribal
values have provided them with a traditional source of legitimacy.
Socio-economic changes in U.A.E. society have profoundly
affected the constitutional position of the ruler and traditional
"legislature" i.e. the MajIis, alike. The tribal shaikh has been
elevated from primus inter pares to a ruler supported by
institutionalised administrative and military power. He has become
legally responsible for his subjects and territory, having entered
into the treaty system with the British.
On the other hand, the traditional legislature with its
egalitarian basis has to a certain extent lost its power. F. Heard-
Bey describes this dilemma when writing in the conclusion of her
book that:
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'The tribal communities of the Trucial States
have traditionally practised grass-roots democracy.
People could discuss their needs with familiar figures
in authority and express their opinion, but if they were
suddenly required to transfer their loyalties fro the
Ruler to seemingly anonymous civil servants, less and
less of the effective type of democratic response would
survive." (74)
However, when the population settled on the coast and the nature
of the economy changed, power had to be concentrated in the
hands of a single leader inevitably the shaikh of the most powerful
tribe. Dealings with the British could not be left to the traditional
"legislature"; agreements had to be made with one person (i.e. the
shailth) and the people were set aside In the process.
The traditional Majils became less and less relevant in
towns. Gargash (75) summarises Its Inadequacies under the new
socio-economic situation when he points out that matters in a
settled and developing economy are more complex than in a tribal
one. The Majils had neither the time nor the experience to deal
with the sort of Issues that began to arise. In addition, urban
populations were much larger and heterogeneous than the
traditional "legislature" could represent and accommodate their
interest.
There was a need for change in the constitutional structure
of the traditional Majils especially in the more advanced and
complex populations in the Trucial States. The traditional way of
consultation had to be modified to keep pace with the new socio-
economic situation. A typical attempt occurred in Dubal in 1938.
This will be the focus of chapter 3.
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PART TWO
In a thesis which examines the working of the present
legislature, it would be desirable to examine its historical
background. Part 2 of the thesis examines the historical
development of the U.A.E. Constitution and discusses the pre-
1971 movements made to institute a legislature. The chapters of
this part are as follows:
Chapter 3 The reform movement In Dubal: 1938.
Chapter 4 The development of the legislature under
the nine-member-union (1968-1971)
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CHAPTER THREE
THE REFORM MOVEMENT IN DUBAI: 1938
3.1 Introduction
It is first necessary to examine the historical evolution of the
legislature in the U.A.E., especially during the pre-1971 era, so
that one may understand the constitutional arrangements of the
present legislature (I.e. FNC). The thesis could be incomplete if the
two early legislative attempts are not discussed.
As noted In chapter 2, the traditional Majlis was incapable of
dealing with the fresh demands of the newly settled society. The
result was that its influence was by-passed by the rulers.
Furthermore, the British influence over the area resulted in a
change in the composition of the local elite. This was evident in the
reduction in the power base to a single ruling family. Such
developments created tension in society and inevitable resistance
to the newly emerged autocracy. The influence spread to the
Trucial States in the form of a "reform movement' in Dubai.
Similar patterns seem to be evident in the neighbouring states of
Kuwait and Bahrain.
This chapter will examine and discuss the characteristics of
Dubat, the background to the reform movement (so named by
academic writers) and the reforms it proposed. The agreement
117
(Chapter three)
reached between the ruler and his subjects in 1938 will be
examined and the reason for the ultimate failure of the reform
movement to create a democratic and powerful legislature will be
identified.
3.2 The significance of Dubai
Dubal is one of the Trucial States on the Gulf coast. It has
been established as an independent emirate since 1833 (1). Dubal
has certain distinctive features which distinguish it from the other
emirates. First, it is geographically divided into two parts by a
small creek and this has led, as we will see, to a division of power
within the ruling clan. Second, Dubai Is a cosmopolitan town with
inhabitants of many races (e.g. Arabs, Persians, Indians). Third,
Dubal has strong commercial links with the Indian subcontinent,
Persia and East Africa.
Since 1902 Dubal has flourished economically especially
following the decline of Lingah, a port which had been of some
importance on the Persian side of the Gulf. The high customs dues
imposed by the Persian authorities on that port encouraged
merchants to transfer their activities to the more liberal town of
Dubal (2). Dubal became the centre for many prosperous
entrepreneurs and as a result the population rose sharply at the
beginning of the twentieth century.
Viewed in the context of the political, economic, and social
conditions prevailing on the Trucial Coast at the turn of the
century, Dubal was far more advanced than any of the other
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emirates. To a large extent this was because of the Al-Bu-Falasah,
the ruling tribe in Dubal, was unique among the Trucial Coast
tribes in that no ruler had ever ascended to power by overthrowing
his predecessor. Dubai's political leadership was always keen to
preserve its thriving economy, and this was particularly true
during the nile of Shaikh Maktum (1894-1906) and his son Shaikh
Sa'id (1912-1958). The latter has thus been described by the
historian R. Zahian:
Of all the rulers on the Trucial Coast, Sa'id bin
Maktum was by far the best judge in this respect. A
master of the art of compromise......The difference
between him and them (I.e. his fellow rulers) in the
way they conducted their respective affairs was
striking .... When he felt that he had lost the
confidence and support of his Majils, in 1929, he
decided that, rather than fight, as his fellow rulers
would surely have done, he should resign. He
obviously did not think that the total disruption of the
economy was a fair price to pay merely to save his
position .... He was unique among the rulers on the
Coast In having never had a clash with a British
representative, and the British generally liked and
respected him" (3).
However, this calm and prosperous state of affairs could not
last for ever. With the passage of time, change was inevitable. As
noted in chapter 2, by the end of the nineteenth century, the effect
of the British presence had been to shift local political power from
the ruling tribe as a whole to a single ruling family within the
ruling tribe.
3.3 The origins of the 1938 "reform movement"
We now turn to explain the development of the 1938 "reform
movement". The term "reform movement" in this context is used
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because It represented a pressure group which never crystalised
into a political party because of lack of a unifying ideology and
political awareness among its founders.
The causes of the 1938 reform movement in Dubal fall into
two categories; internal factors and external factors. The main
internal factors were dynastic disputes and the decline of the
traditional economy. The main external factors were the reform
movement gathering momentum in Kuwait and the attitude of the
British towards reform in Duba!.
The first internal factor, i.e. the dynastic disputes, can be
traced back to 15 April 1929 when Dubal notables met under the
chairmanship of Ahmad bin Dalinuk, a prominent pearl merchant
who was anti-British and a victim of the decline of the pearl
industry. The Majits decided to accept the resignation offered by
the ruler Shaikh Sa'id and appoint Shaikh Mani' bin Rashid,
Sa'id's cousin and Ahmad's son-in-law, as the new ruler of Dubal.
Three days later, however, upon the refusal of the British Political
Resident to accept such a change, Shaikh Said was reinstated as
the ruler of the emirate. The cousins did not accept Said as the
legitimate ruler and tried to assassinate him in November 1934 (a).
Subsequently, the sons of Rashid, having formed an anti-
Maktum faction within the ruling clan, tried to challenge the
legitimacy of the leadership by mobilizing all the Al-Bu-Falasah
tribe against Said. This was the first time that the position of the
ruler in Dubal had been threatened by an important element in the
society. The opposing camp attempted to take advantage of the
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geographical location of Dubal by concentrating its supporters and
allies in a strategic position on one side of the town.
The second internal factor, that led to the demand for reform
was the economic condition of the town. After the collapse of the
pearl industry, many of the merchants were bankrupted, especially
those on the cousins side. They faced a hard time because of their
debts to foreign merchants and the ruler did nothing to ease the
situation. On the other hand, Shaikh Sa'ld's own fmancial position
was considerably strengthened when he signed oil concessions and
air route agreements with British companies in 1937. All royalties
were to be paid directly into his private purse. In contrast to the
situation during the first two decades of the twentieth century, the
ruler was now financially better off than any of the members of his
tribe or, indeed, any of the inhabitants of Dubai (5).
In spite of the fact that the local economy was already in•
decline, in 1937 the ruler introduced, with British support, two
new economic policies calculated to jeopardize those forms of
income still remaining to the local notables, namely slavery and
arms traffic. The notables rejected the ban imposed on these
activities and demanded it be lifted at once. They were especially
determined to resist emancipation of the slaves (6).
The first major external factor was the 1938 reform
movement in Kuwait. It was greatly admired by the Dubat elite
upon whom it made a deep impression. The reform movement
reflected the opposition of the enlightened members of Kuwaiti
society to the monopolistic maladministeration of the ruling family.
The movement succeeded in establishing an elected legislative
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assembly on 2 July 1938 for reasons beyond the scope of this
work. (7) It introduced the first written constitution for the State of
Kuwait. The assembly members were elected from among the
leading families in Kuwait. Unlike Dubai, in Kuwait there was no
dissension within the ruling family, although the President of the
assembly was the heir apparent. Opposition came mainly from the
merchants.
A second Important external factor was the British attitude
in support of the reform movements in the Gulf area. The early
reaction was at first auspicious. The British Political Resident and
his Agents advised the rulers of Dubal, Bahrain and Kuwait to
meet the demands of their subjects by adopting some measures of
reform. The British authorities were aware of the local people's
desire for greater participation in the field of political and economic
decision-making. In a letter to the Foreign Office, the Political
Resident, T.C. Fowle, summarized his feelings towards the
emerging demands:
Such movements will doubtless arise elsewhere on
the Arab Coast, and it is obvious that as the chief
exponents of democracy His Majesty's Government can
not ally themselves with the Shailchs to stamp these
movements out, even if this were practicable. What we
can, and what in my opinion we should do, is to try by
exercise of judicious influence, to ensure that such
movements come to fruition by a process of 'peaceful
change', as in Kuwait, rather than by violence, and
that they should, also as in Kuwait, be well disposed
towards us" (8).
He continued, in his letter to acknowledge the importance of these
movements:
"I would like to stress the fact, which both the shaikhs
of the Persian Gulf and ourselves must realize, that
the idea of popular movements, ..., has now permeated
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the Arab state, and must be taken account of. Even on
the backward Trucial Coast, at Dubai, the opposition
party to the Shaikh [has] asked for certain popular
reforms" (g).
However, the British reaffirmed the niler's authority and
made it clear that they would not have any contact with the reform
movement except through the ruler himself. The ruler, in return,
maintained his role as an advocate of the British presence in the
area (io). A convention had thus been established which endured.
3.4 The establishment of the 1938 Majlis
There was a certain inevitabffity about the limited initial
success of the reform movement given local feelings. In Dubai in
mid 1938 economic and political changes had become essential. In
particular, the ruling tribe, i.e. the Al-Bu-Falasah, together with
Dubal notables, were dissatisfied with the way that the ruler was
conducting Dubais affairs. They, therefore, congregated in the
traditional Majlis and presented a list of demands to the ruler (ii).
These were as follows: an official budget for the emirate, public
health facilities, a police force to guard the market, reorganization
of the customs department, a fixed aflowance to the ruler and his
family, and the abrogation of the monopolies held by the ruling
family (12). Shaikh Said did not respond to these demands, and
therefore his opponents occupied one side of the town. During the
lengthy negotiations between the two sides, the opposition parties
demanded the establishment of a representative council on the
model of the Kuwait! Assembly which was elected on the 2nd July
1938.
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Finally, a compromise was reached on the 20th October
1938, under the supervision of the Political Agent, W. Welghtman
who stressed, however, that the British Political Resident could not
guarantee the agreement because the new Majlis had not been
ratified by the British Government representatives in the area. The
1938 Agreement may be examined in more detail.
3.5 The 1938 PolitIcal Agreement ('31
The term "agreement" has been defined by lawyers as " a
concord of understanding and intention between two or more
parties with respect to the effect upon their relative rights and
duties, of certain past or future facts or performance." (14) An
agreement differs from a contract in that the contract is "a formal
legal arrangement supported by consideration", while the
agreement refers either to such a sense or to an "informal
arrangement with no consideration." (is)
The 1938 agreement, from the evidence collected by the
researcher, was political rather than legal. It had no guarantees
and was not supported by power of enforcement. Moreover, no
court cases arose out of this agreement due to its short existence.
The major points of the agreement may be summarised as follows:
1 - The establishment of a Majlis (known as the Grand Council), to
be presided over by the Ruler of Dubal, Shaikh Said bin Maktum.
The Majlis would consist of fifteen members selected by the
"principal people" of Dubal (16).
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2 - The Majlis would meet from time to time In order to discuss the
internal and external affairs of the state (17).
3 - The Ruler would carry out all the orders passed by the majority
of the Majlis members.
4 - The Ruler of Dubal would bring to the Majlis all the matters
relating to the affairs of the emirate. He could not take any
decision unless it was approved by the majority of the Majlis
members (18).
5 - Any decision would be taken on a majority vote (ig).
6 - The income and expenditure of the State would be controlled in
the name of the State with the approval of the majority of the
Majlis members (20).
7 - The Majlis could not discuss the Ruler's private property (21).
8 - The Majlis would have the right to issue orders in the absence
of the Ruler and those orders would be directly put into effect (22).
9 - An allowance of one-eighth of the total revenue of Dubal would
be allocated to the Ruler (23).
It is interesting to note that the agreement was the first
written constitution on the Trucial Coast between a ruler and his
subjects designed to regulate the running of local affairs. In effect
it became the first document with constitutional status. The
assembly was the first institutionalized body in the political
structure of the area. In analysing the agreement one can make
some important deductions against the background of
correspondence between the ruler and the Majlis.
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In making an evaluation it is to be noted that the process of
the election has not been discussed in detail In any of the few
writings that have dealt with this subject. These writings argued
that fifteen members were appointed but are vague as to the actual
identity of the members of the Majlis (24). On the basis of an
examination of the correspondence between the ruler and the
Majlis, however, some general conclusions may be made. First, the
Majils members were elected to their posts and not appointed by
the ruler. This was clear from the first letter issued by the Majlis.
This election may be interpreted as having been a departure from
the traditional paternalistic norm. Second, from correspondence
between the ruler and the Majlis, it Is possible to trace the names
of the fifteen members of the Majlis and confirm that they were
leading members of the ruling clan or tribe (25). Third, the voters
were drawn from a limited circle of society. The total number was
around thirty-four members of those who attended the election.
Fourth, the voters and candidates seem to have been qualified on
the grounds of their social standing rather than their suitability
and capability for such a task. They were members of the ruling
family or prominent merchants. It seems that elections served as
the mechanism for resolving feuds in the niling family.
The local elite feared alienation from the political and
economic arena and were therefore willing for overthrow the ruler
peacefully by replacing him with a much more acceptable member
of the ruling clan. Had it not been for the British intervention this
would been done because the ruler was very much opposed to any
form of legal framework which might reduce or limit his power. The
British intervened to protect his and their own interests, and
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advised the ruler to accept the new form of political participation.
The agreement was constructed with safeguards on both sides. The
elite would have a say in the running of the emirate through the
Majlis, while the ruler would preside over it to ensure his position.
The Majlis was to symbolize a new mod us viverzdL
The leading families guaranteed their supremacy above the
rest of the society by insisting on the role of the "principal people"
of Dubai (an acronym for Arab tribal citizens). They became the
only eligible electorate in the state. The agreement recognized the
social reality in Dubal at that time. A large number of Dubal's
inhabitants in 1938 were new migrants who were not deeply rooted
in the society, and not used to the Arab customs of government. In
the circumstances, therefore, it would be naive to devalue the
Mails because it did not represent all sections of the society.
However, the agreement was the first step towards a distinction
between nationals and foreigners. The election of the Majlis
members, who were all Arab males, was a breakthrough in itself
for the Truclal Coast Emirates.
The Majlis established its power through scrutinizing every
decision taken by the ruler and it was more or less implicit in the
agreement that the Majlis would have a dominant influence in
emirate affairs. In contrast to the previous tradition where the
ruler could implement any measure with only the restraining
Influence of non-binding consultation with the prominent members
of the society, the ruler of Dubai under this agreement had to get
the approval of the majority of the Majlis members prior to passing
any decision. The ruler still held decision-making power but it was
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finnly circumscribed by the Majlis. Clearly, the new body had been
granted a large slice of the decision-making process.
The agreement made a distinction between the public and
the private purse. It first recognized the existence of public
expenditure as well as public income and the need for a state
budget within which the state would have the power to spend
rather than a single person (I.e. the ruler). The word "state" itself
was an innovation introduced to the national legal framework. At
the same time, the Majlis had been given the monetary authority to
control the revenue of the emirate and this enhanced the power of
the legislative body in Dubal over the executive branch represented
by the ruler. Their insistence upon this clause reflected the elite's
concern to avoid the economic dominance of the ruling family and
the need for financial reform in Dubal.
Although the opposition party was in favour of abolishing the
prerogatives that the ruler and his family enjoyed, the agreement
did not go as far as to adopt all their arguments. The reality was
that the ruler had exclusive monetary power and unlimited
financial resources. The agreement, therefore, sought to limit the
financial resources of the ruler, but not to the extent that it
became unacceptable to him. The ruler was allocated one-eighth of
the total revenue. This step was comparable to that taken by
Kuwait earlier in that year (1938) when the Law of the Budget gave
the Legislative Council the power to control all the state's income
and expenditure but allowed a certain amount of personal income
to the ruling family (26).
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The law-making function had been surrendered to the Majlis
whereby, in making decisions, the ruler had to consult with the
Majlls. The Majlis' legislative function was not subject to the rulers
approval. The legislative body could pass any measure with no
prior consultation with the ruler. It can be appreciated that the
1938 Majlis differed radically from the traditional Majlis. Prior to
the agreement, the traditional Majlis could advise but could not
pass a measure of any kind. The ruler's consent was essential to
Implementation of the council's advice. Under the 1938 agreement
such consent was not stipulated and, therefore, the Majlis had full
law-making process.
Generally speaking, the 1938 agreement was designed to be
a turning point In the relationship between the ruler and the ruled,
to end the unlimited power of the ruler, and to give to certain
members of the community the opportunity to participate in the
running of their society's affairs. It is worth mentioning that the
agreement did not define clearly what the Majlis' term of office
would be or what its members' privileges would consist of, but
nevertheless, the Majlis had become, in real terms, the government
of the state. However, as will be shown, such fact was not
perceived by the ruler to be true.
3.6 The Reforms of the 1938 Majlis
Documents of the Majlis examined from Rosemarie's work,
(27) show that the reforms proposed by the Majlis were not only
concerned with economic questions but also were intended to
develop and reform the social and political aspects of the society.
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As a matter of courtesy the Majlis made a point of asking the ruler
to give his consent on every matter. The Majlis tried to be very
informative about its actions. It sent regular letters to the ruler
and simultaneously to the British representative in Sharjah.
It seems that because of their social background, the Majlis
members were particularly concerned with the economic situation
in Dubal. At the first meeting of the Majlis, fourteen porters were
appointed to guard the market. At the second and third meetings,
the customs issue was discussed. People were designated to
reorganize and run the customs department, and a list of twenty-
two new jobs in this department was agreed upon (28).
Furthermore, a two per cent tax was to be imposed on all imported
goods, and all exported merchandise was to be relieved of duty.
On the social and welfare front, the Majlis established the
first municipal council on the Truclal Coast and appointed a
director to run its affairs. The municipality was responsible for the
cleanliness of the town, the beauty of the creek and the expansion
of the port. Customs revenue was utilized to establish the first
three public schools in Dubal. The Majlis recruited a director and
seventeen teachers and porters for the education department (29).
In addition, the Majlis found a suitable doctor to run the health
service. Finally, the Majlis allocated a sum of three hundred rupees
to be distributed to the disabled and elderly as social security
payment (30).
The Majlis' attempts to reorganize the judiciary met with less
success. As a first step it appointed a member of the ruling clan as
a judge in one part of Dubai but the ruler refused to recognize his
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authority and would not accept any interference in his own judicial
jurIsdiction (31). He himself formed a judicial council consisting of
his brother and his son but the members of the Majlis rejected this
arrangement which it considered a violation of the agreement. They
pointed out that the ruler had not sought their approval in this
matter (32). In the end the Majlis ordered the establishment of a
court in the ruler's section of Dubai under his presidency, and a
lower court in the other section under the presidency of a learned
judge (33).
In all matters, the Majlis conscientiously cited the terms of
the agreement, and quoted any relevant Clauses in all
correspondence with the ruler. The ruler, on the other hand, did
not show much Inclination to adhere to the agreement. It is
obvious that the agreement was the Majlis' raison d'etre and,
therefore, was respected by the members of the Majlis much more
than by the ruler who more or less ignored the Majlis and attended
only few sessions. He also made efforts to block the reforms or at
least to minimize their effects.
The Majlis was ready to use all the revenue of the emirate in
order to finance reforms but the ruler would not agree to hand over
management of the oil concession royalties to the Majlis. Naturally,
control of economy Is a veritable ground for contest between the
main powers In the society. The Majlis therefore discussed with the
ruler matters relating to local employees' salaries, ships' revenue,
shops' revenue and teachers' allowances, stressing its anxiety to be
independent of his financial support. However, the ruler insisted
that he was the only one eligible to pay salaries and to receive
royalties. Forty days alter its establishment, the Majlis asked the
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ruler to discuss with them the question of the oil company and the
revenue of the air station In Dubal. Finally on 3rd March 1939,
after the continued refusal of the ruler to respond to the Majlis'
appeals, the Majlis passed a motion which allocated ten thousand
rupees as an annual allowance for the ruler. It also made a list of
the ruling family members and the fixed salaries they were to be
allowed (34). Shaikh Sa'id rejected this decision and demanded a
guaranteed percentage of the total revenue.
The financial issue was the last straw which brought the
activities of the Majlis to an abrupt end on 29th March 1939 when,
on the occasion of the wedding of Sa'id's son, troops loyal to Sa'id
invaded the Majlis quarters and killed some of its members. The
head of the movement, I.e. Man!' bin Rashid, escaped with some of
his followers to the emirate of Sharjah. Three days later, the
Political Agent arrived in Dubai and advised the ruler to create a
new advisory council. The new council consisted of fifteen
members, ten of whom were new. It was destined to survive for a
very short term.
3.7 Considerations which led to the Failure of the 1938
Reform Movement
The reform movement In Dubal was much more of an
evolutionary kind rather than a revolutionary one. It did not
become a clash with the British authorities nor did it displease
them. Indeed, one of the Important factors in the reform
movement's survival for almost six months was its alliance with an
important faction in the ruling clan. At the root of its ultimate
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failure, however, were such Internal factors as the old dispute
between the two parties involved in the agreement, the legal
framework of the Majlis, the financial problems and the lack of
grass-root support in the community. The major external factors
were the fate of the Kuwaiti reform movement and the British
position.
Internal elements
There is quite compelling evidence that the old rivalry
between the ruler and his cousins was a major factor in the failure
of the reform experiment. The relationship between the two parties
was clouded by suspicion and stubbornness. The suspicion was on
the ruler's part. Any reform was seen as a threat to his own powers
and to the benefit of his opponents (35). The same stubbornness on
the part of the cousins may be detected. They tried to take all the
powers from the ruler and his family, even to prevent his brother
from building new shops. The two parties were not cooperating
partners, rather they were competing against each other.
The legal framework of the agreement participated in its own
destruction. There was no separation of powers prior to the
agreement, all the powers were concentrated in the hands of one
person, i.e. the ruler. By the terms of the agreement, all legislative
and executive powers were transferred to the newly-created body,
I.e. the Majlis. Furthermore, the Majlis intended to have a say in
the third branch of the government, i.e. the judiciary, as well.
There was no sharing of power, rather it was a new form of power
concentration. This reflects that the elite and the ruler were of one
political mind, but of different Interests. The failure of the
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agreement was a sign of the failure to limit the unlimited power of
the ruler.
The Majlis' ambitions were much higher than its financial
capacity. The notables were eager for a share in the new affluence
but the ruler was not ready to accept this. The agreement did give
the Majlis financial power but because he would not allow the
terms to be fully implemented, the running of state affairs
remained in the hands of the ruler. It was because of the financial
implications that the ruler so reacted harshly against the Majlis.
There is ample evidence that the Majlis movement was
especially concerned to protect the Interests of the ruling tribe (i.e.
the Al-Bu-Falasah) and the local notables. First, the Majils
allocated large monthly salaries to its members. Second, the funds
of the social security programme were allotted to the ruling clan
elders and members' relatives. Third, the new departments were
run by some of the Majlis members and their patrons (36).
In addition to these minor abuses of power there is an
important issue involving the Majlis that has rarely been
discussed. It was the case that debts which had accumulated on
individual members of the Majlis in consequence of the decline of
the pearl industry. The Majlis kept asking the ruler to postpone
calling in these debts, or to adopt the local custom of dealing with
the matter himself instead of referring it to Shariah Law. This was
such an obvious attempt by the members to use their positions to
safeguard their own interests that the Majlis became subject to the
Irritation of the rest of the population. This disenchantment,
together with general lack of political sophistication among the
134
(Chapter three)
locals, meant that the reform movement did not receive firm grass-
roots support.
External elements
In addition to the above mentioned internal factors, two
major external elements contributed to the demise of the 1938
legislative experience in Dubal. The first was the collapse of the
Kuwaiti reform movement. The extent to which its fate had a
bearing on the collapse of the Duba! reform movement has rarely
been touched upon in discussions on the subject. The initial
success of the Kuwaiti movement certainly raised hopes of and
gave an example to follow for the elite in Duba!. The Kuwait!
Legislative Assembly was dissolved by the end of December 1938
and although re-established later was dissolved for the second
time on 10th March 1939. The second dissolution was
accompanied by bloodshed. The researcher asserts that this was
the signal for the ruler of Dubai to follow the same path and end
his Majlis movement on 29th March 1939.
The second element was the change In the British position.
By and large, the British support for the 1938 MajUs diminished by
the passage of time. It is believed (37) that the British opposition to
the role of the Majils eventually became the decisive factor in the
fate of the movement. There was, in the researcher's opinion, a
subile British consent towards the closure of the Majlis. The ruler
was too weak to take such bloody action by himself and must have
been confident of British support.
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3.8 Conclusion
In spite of all the shortcomings of the 1938 reform movement
in Dubai, it succeeded in persuading the conservative elements: in
that sense It was partly successful because it attempted to adopt a
modern form of constitutional government. The movement itself
offered an alternative to the traditional exit practice mentioned in
chapter 2. The elites, rather than withdrawing themselves and
their dependents from the emirate, stayed and defended their right
to participate in local affairs.
The fate of the reform movement proved that the British
accepted the existence of legislative bodies in the Gulf area as a
safety-valve to control and pacify political unrest. However, as in
the Kuwaiti experience, when the Maj Us started to deal with the
concession agreements the British altered their position. They
viewed these bodies as a threat to their interests in the area. Some
of the British Agents and Advisers wrote to the Political Resident
expressing their opposition to the formation of any kind of
consultative bodies (38).
Moreover, the reform movement showed historically that the
traditional ruling elites in the U.A.E. preferred an evolutionary
rather than radical change in the process of constitutional
development.
All the reforms introduced by the movement were preserved
and became the first step towards reforming the whole system.
However, the questions of a legislative assembly and public
participation In government were not touched upon till thirty years
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later when federation came to the Trucial Coast. This second
attempt will be the focus of the next chapter.
137
(Chapter three)
Footnotes:
1 - Heard-Bey, op. cit., p. 239.
2 - Prior to 1902, not more than five steamships called at Duba!
every year. But after 1904 Dubal became a regular station
for the British Steam Navigation Company. This indicates
the emergence of the port of Dubal as a commercial centre
for British interests in the area. See Zahlan (78), op. cit.,
p. 12.
3 - Ibid., p. 65.
4 - Abdullah, op. Cit., pp. 126-28.
5 - Mohamed Rumaihi, 'The 1938 Reform Movement in Kuwait,
Bahraln and Duba!" (in Arabic) Journal of the Gulf and
Arabian Peninsula Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4, 1975, p. 55.
6 - See Rosemarie J. Sa'id, "The 1938 Reform Movement in Dubai",
A1-Abhath (American University, Beirut), Vol. 23, 1970,
pp. 254-55. The author of this study was the first
researcher to write on the topic. She has presented all the
Majlis correspondence in the appendix of her study. All
the letters mentioned below are from her collection.
7 - For further details about the 1938 reform movement in Kuwait
see: Suhail K. Shuhaiber, political Development in
4 •	 f'#.,i êri .1 4.	 . - A	 ('1.1	 A
Independent Gulf State, Ph.D. Thesis, University ol
Oxford, 1981, pp. 55-70. Mlmoonah Al-Khalifah Al-Sabah,Kuwait Under British Protection (in Arabic), 1988, pp.
147-202. Jill Crystal, patterns of State-Building in the
Arabian Gulf: Kuwait and Qatar, Ph.D. Dissertation,
University, 1986, pp. 1
8 - Saeed Khalil Hashim,
1961, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Exeter, 1984, p. 109.
9 - Ibid., p. 208.
10 - A Kuwalti historian, from the ruling family, interpreted the
links between the British authority and the legislative
assembly as enforcing and enhancing British power in
Kuwait! Internal affairs. However, these allegations
contradict the sequence of events and the fact that the
movement was brought to an end with tacit British
approval. See A1-Sabah, op. Cit., p. 143.
11 - The Majils Is a gathering where the ruler meets his subjects
and listens to their grievances and Ideas about any local
issue. It was a person to person contact.
138
(Chapter three)
12 - Rumaihi (75), op. cit., pp. 57-60.
13 - For the complete text of the agreement see Appendix B, p.
382.
14 - Black, op. cit., p. 67.
15 - Bryan A. Graner A Dictionary of Modern Legal Usage,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987. p. 30. Ininternational law, an agreement Is usually of a less
significant or formal nature than a convention or treaty.
See Clive Parry (et al.) Encyclopaedic dictionary of
International Law, Oceana Publications Inc., New York,
1986. p. 12.
16 - Zahlan (78), op. cit., p. 158.
17 - Mohammad Al-Mutawa,
Ph.D.
University of Reading, 1983, p.
18 - A letter from the Majlis to Sa'id dated 5 Shawwal 1357 H.(26/11/1938).
1.9 - Zahlan (78), op. cit., p. 158.
20 - Heard-Bey, op. cit., p. 256.
21 - Al-Mutawa, op. cit., p. 63..
22 - A letter from the Majlis to Said dated 16 Dulhijjah 1357 H.(5/2/1939)
23 - Heard-Bey, op. cit., p.256.
24 - Said, op. cit., p. 264.
25 - Four of the members were from the ruling clan. They were
Jumma bin Maktum, Man!' bin Rashid, Hashir bin Rashid
and Suhail bin But!. The rest of the Majlis members were
Mohamed bIn Abdulla bin Huralz, Rashid bin Abdulla bin
Huraiz, Biat bin Mohamed, Rashld bin Mohamed bin
Dalmuk, Mohameci bin Said Al-Gandi, Mohamed bin
Than!, Abdulla bin Mohamed Al-Bodur, Nasir bin
Khalifah, Mijrin bin Sultan, Mohamed bin Said bin Allan
and Abdulla bin Obaid Al-Basti.
26 - See Shuhaiber, op. cit., pp. 59-60. J. Ismael, op. cit., asserts
that in the 1938 reform movement In Kuwait, seventy-six
per cent of the total public revenue was to be paid to the
ruling family (I.e. Al-Sabah) and its entourage. See pp. 73-77.
27 - Said, op. cit., pp.
28 - A letter from the Majlis to Said dated 28 Sha'ban 1357 H.(22/10/1938).
139
(Chapter three)
29 - Shaikh Said obstructed the building of one of the three
schools. Shaikh Man!' bin Rashid became the head of the
educational department.
30 - A letter from the Majlis to Sa'id dated 17 Dulhljjah 1357
H.(27/1/1939).
31 - A letter from the Majlis to Said dated 8 Ramaddan 1357 H.(31/10/1938).
32 - A letter from the Majlis to Said dated 5 Shawwal 1357 H.(26/11/1938).
33 - A letter from the Majlis to Said dated 24 Dulq&dah 1357 H.(14/1/1939).
34 - Two letters from the Majlis to Said dated 11,12 Muhrram
1358 H. (3,4 /3/1939).
35 - Heard-Bey, op. cit., p. 257.
36 - Zahian (78), op. cit., pp. 159-60.
37 - The same belief with regard to the British role in the fall of the
1938 MajIls in Kuwait was expressed by Ahmad Abdulla
Saad Baz in his unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Political
Elite and Development In Kuwait, George Washington
University, 1981, pp. 122-123. See also Jasim M. Jerkhi,
The Electoral Process In Kuwait: A Geographical
Study, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Exeter, 1984, p. 87.
38 - The Political Agent in Bahraln wrote:
If the British Government force the Shai.kh to accept a
council, the public would regard it as a sign that the
administration which had been approved by the
British Government for so many years had been
suddenly become failure."
See Hashim, op. cit., p. 220.
The same concern was introduced by Sir Charles Belgrave, a
British adviser to the ruler of Bahraln. He wrote:
"They [I.e. the Shaikhs of Bahrain] are one and all regard
any suggestion of a council as being the swan-song
of the Khalifah as Rulers of Bahrain. The Shaikhs
believe that the British Government would not wish
to undermine their position as Rulers of Bahraln.
They are certain that with a council In Bahrain(however it might be styled or formed) the KhaIIfah
would not remain the Ruling Family."
Quoted in M.G. Rumathi, Bahrain: Social and Political Change
since the First World War, Bowker Publishing Company,
Epping, 1978, pp. 201-202.
10
CHAPTER FOUR
THE LEGISLATURE UNDER THE NINE-MEMBER-
UNION (1968-1971)
4.1 Introduction
We have examined in the previous chapter the rise and fall of
the first attempt to establish a constitutional government in the
U.A.E. (i) However, the trend towards modern constitutional
system In the emirates was not totally abandoned. A second
attempt occurred in the period between 1968 and 1971 which
witnessed the formation of a federation among the Trucial states.
It is worth mentioning prior to the discussion of the second
attempt that in 1951 a common local defence force was established
and trained by the British authorities. A year later a council
consisting of the rulers of the emirates came into existence. This
council was known as the Trucial States Council (TSC). Its main
objective was to discuss local affairs and find solutions to problems
arising amongst its members. A fund was set up in 1965 in order
to develop the poor services in the smaller emirates (2). None of
these projects, however, was aimed at establishing a unified state
nor advancing the overall political system in the area. They were a
mere reflection of the British desire to create a governable co-
operative bodies in order to Implement Its policies.
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This chapter deals with the movement towards a form of
federation which began after the British announced in 1968, that
they were going to withdraw from the region. The chapter will focus
on the constitutional position of the legislature in the proposed
new union. First as part of the background it is important to
understand what led to the British withdrawal and then examine
the agreement which established the union and the main disputes
which arose from it.
The chapter is intended to show that the traditional nilers
were unwilling to consider the question of a full representative
legislature. They used dissension over representation in the
legislature as an excuse to hamper the advancement of the union.
4.2 British withdrawal from East of Suez:
Britain continued to remain in the Gulf area because of the
importance of oil to the West. There was in fact no local threat to
Britain's domination. To maintain a presence in the Gulf was
adopted as a principle of the then Labour Government's policy. Its
Defence Secretary, Denis Healey, announced in December 1967
that"it would be totally irresponsible for us to withdraw our forces
from the area" (3). However, this policy suffered a reversal a month
later when the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, announced in
the House of Commons that British troops would be withdrawn
from East of Suez by the end of 1971.
Many reasons for this decision have been offered by students
of British and Gulf area politics. Some have argued that it was
basically an economic decision due to the devaluation of the pound
142
(Chapter four)
sterling and IMF pressure on the British economy (4). Other writers
have suggested that the change in global politics was a major
factor leading to the withdrawal decision. Soon Britain realized
that It was not the sole power in the Gulf area and there was
severe economic competition with other Industrial countries in the
oil Industry. Furthermore, Arab nationalism was at its peak and
local people were becoming more aware of their situation (5).
However, the economic proposition was not sufficient justification
for withdrawal. Britain was going to save from this decision no
more than nine million pounds, while its interests in the area
netted four hundred and fifty million dollars annually (6).
No explanation Is entirely convincing. Perhaps the most
interesting is that the decision was a mere reflection of inter-party
politics at Westminster. The leftist MPs in the Labour Party were
opposed to any reduction in domestic social commitments and
were pressing for a large cut in the defence budget (7).
The withdrawal decision was condemned by the British
Parliamentary opposition. In the Gulf area, the rulers were not
ready to face the unknown future alone. They had not had the
experience in foreign affairs which would enable them to find for
themselves. The rulers were against such a decision because of the
regional ambitions which might threaten their territories. The
richest among the emirates went to the extreme of offering to bear
the cost of a continued British military presence (8). It was Abu
Dhabl that came up with this proposal. Their fears for the future
were justified, In the ruler's opinion, because there were many
political problems with other regional powers that were unresolved
at that time. For example, Iran was claiming sovereignty over
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Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia had similar claims on parts of Abu
Dhabi and Qatar.
4.3 The First Agreement
Abu Dhabfs proposal was declined by the British
Government. Instead, a local solution was introduced. In the light
of British advice, Dubal and Abu Dhabi, the largest and wealthiest
emirates among the Trucial states, declared on 18 February 1968
an agreement to establish a two-member-union. This agreement
settled certain boundary disputes between the two emirates. It
stipulated the formation of a union which would be responsible for
foreign affairs, defence and internal security, welfare services,
immigration and nationality. The union would handle the
legislative power In all matters with which it was entrusted. In
addition, the agreement restricted union competence to those
matters listed above. Finally, the two rulers concluded their
agreement by inviting their fellow Trucial states rulers to discuss
this agreement and join the union. They also extended their
invitation to the rulers of Qatar and Bahrain to join them in
deliberating on the future of the area (9).
It can be seen from what has been said that this agreement
was an ambiguous document. It promised no executive or judicial
powers nor were any constitution or constitutional committees
mentioned. The setting up of an infrastructure of a state was not
included in this agreement. One can, therefore, safely conclude
that the 18 February agreement was more or less a political
Initiative rather than a real union.
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The length of the first agreement was short, it lasted for 7
days because it was replaced by a second agreement as we will see.
Its terms were very vague, but it was the first step in a lengthy
process towards a larger union.
Some initial observations may be made. Firstly, the
agreement did not propose any name for the newly-created union.
This may have been due to the haste with which the agreement
was drawn up. Secondly, the proposed union was intended to be
merely a "protecting state" in the sense that the union would not
be involved in national affairs to any great extent. Thirdly, the
agreement confined the new state's jurisdiction to certain fields,
leaving the individual emirates free in all other areas. This was the
first indication of a policy, which would be adhered to in the rest of
the federative process, that favoured the units over the union.
Finally, the only governmental branch mentioned in the agreement
was the legislative branch, which was to be entrusted to the union.
However, there was not any specific body or branch of the
government which would take over this power. Was it to be in the
hands of both rulers jointly or would a council administer it?
The wording of the agreement was clear in favouring a union
among the seven Trucial states. The two signatories extended their
invitation to include Qatar and Bahrain because of British
pressure (io). Dubal and Ahu Dhabi had in mind a union
dominated by them and that would be out of the question if two
such strong partners as Bahrain and Qatar were included.
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4.4 The Second Agreement
The rulers of the Truclal States and their counterparts In
Bahrain and Qatar answered the invitation without any hesitation.
In fact, all of them were waiting for some such solution to relieve
them from the growing stress laid upon them by the withdrawal
decision. The nine rulers met in Dubal In the period of 25-27
February 1968. After a lengthy discussion they announced to the
world an agreement which established a new nine-member-union.
Reactions from regional and International powers to the
newly launched union differed. Denis Healey, the British Defence
Secretary, welcomed the new Initiative and said that this was:
an encouraging demonstration of a
constructive approach on the part of these Rulers to
the problems with which they will be faced as a result
of the decision to withdraw British forces from the Gulf
by the end of 1971. These consultations, were
arranged entirely at the initiative of the Rulers, and we
were not involved..." (ii).
Britain and the rulers were keen to show that the union was a
local Innovation and that its emergence was completely a local
decision. Such policy was intended to encounter any accusation,
by Arab nationalists in the area, of being a British-made
federation.
Most of the regional powers welcomed the union with the
exception of Iran and the radical Arab states. On the Trucial coast,
the news was welcomed by officials, but a Marxist movement in
neighbouring Oman, known as the People's Front for the Liberation
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of Oman and the Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG), denounced the "faked
union" and accused it of being "another British neo-colonial
federation" (12).
The Dubal agreement (13) consisted of three chapters and
seventeen articles. It stipulated the formation of a union amongst
the signatories to be named the "Union of Arab Emirates" (Article
one). In the second article the accord made it clear that the
purpose of the union was: to consolidate relations among the
emirates, to strengthen cooperation amongst them, to coordinate
their plans for welfare and progress, to support their individual
independence and sovereignty, to unify their foreign policy and to
organize a collective defence. The agreement established a
Supreme Council consisting of the nine rulers. It was to be
responsible for laying down a "complete permanent charter" for the
union, drawing up union policies and promulgating union laws
(Article four). The presidency of the union was to pass from ruler to
ruler in rotation. A "Union Council" and a "Federal Supreme Court"
were to be established. The former could be the executive branch
of the union but its decisions would not be final unless ratified by
the Supreme Council. Article fifteen gave the individual emirates
jurisdiction over local affairs which did not directly concern the
union.
The document signed by the nine rulers was known as an
"agreement" and not a "constitution" because of the emirates' lack
of experience in the field, the absence of precedents in the area
and the haste of the rulers to meet the deadline set by the British
withdrawal. Nevertheless, the document became the legal base for
a future union.
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The 27 February agreement was clearly much more of a legal
document than the 18 February agreement In a sense that it
identified the major powers of the government and distributed
them between the union and the emirates. It was proposing
"confederation" rather than "federation". However, the functions of
the proposed union, although more specific and much wider, did
not place the union, vis-a-vis the emirates, in a more practical
position than the first agreement had. The proposed "state" was
not a political unit for which there had been any precedent in the
political history of the area. Although the Dubal agreement
announced that It would be In effect by the 30 March 1968, in
reality the "Union of Arab Emirates" only ever existed on paper.
The deliberations that followed Its proposal indicated only too
clearly that this was to be the case (14).
Each ruler Insisted on his emirate's independence and
sovereignty within the union. Even the five smallest and poorest
emirates rejected a proposal to unite them into one larger political
unit. They argued that such a proposal was "belittling them in
comparison with the other rulers" and that "the size of an emirate,
whether small or large, was irrelevant" (15). In order to strengthen
their position, all they demanded that they all had one equal voice
and that all Supreme Council decisions be taken unanimously.
This was a major factor in the failure of the enterprise.
The agreement entrusted the Supreme Council with legislative
power. It did not demand the establishment of a popular
representative assembly because the fears on the rulers side of
power sharing. The Union Council was supposed to be the
executive organization even though the reality was that the
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executive power was in the hands of the rulers. In the final
analysis, the agreement was much more a "charter" than a
"constitution" - that is to say, it was granted by the rulers and not
established by the citizens themselves. In spite of the fact that
the agreement established a "Supreme Court" (Article 13), this
institution did not immediately take shape.
The process of setting up the machinery of the union started
three months later on May 25th• It was clearly not going to be an
easy task to unite the rival ruling families. The Supreme Council
met four times and the provisional Union Council met five times
during the period from 25 May 68 to 23 October 69, yet, all these
meetings were fraught with suspicion and distrust. The members
divided into two camps: Dubal and Qatar versus AJu Dhabi and
Bahratn. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss these
meetings and the problems arising during them, therefore, we will
concentrate on the major problems that affected the fate of the
union: drafting a constitution and representation in the national
assembly.
4.5 Drafting a constitution:
As mentioned above, the Dubal agreement assigned to the
Supreme Council the task of laying down a "Complete Permanent
Charter". The words chosen make it plain the way that the rulers
were dealing with matters which could have important legal
significance, viz, constitution-making. The projected document was
to be "complete" and "permanent". This meant that unless it
satisfied each ruler it would be incomplete and unacceptable. It
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also was to be a "charter" not a "constitution". This seemed to
Indicate that the rulers preferred a loose legal document binding
them together rather like a treaty. They were not ready to
compromise their privileges and accept a formal binding
constitution.
At its first meeting, the Supreme Council issued two
resolutions. The first resolution was to appoint Dr. Abdul-Razzak
al-Sanhurl, a prominent Egyptian public lawyer and constitutional
expert, to prepare the charter over a period of six months. The
second resolution established a committee of nine members to
collaborate with the expert (16).
Al-Sanhurl appointed two lawyers to help him in his task.
One of them, a Sudanese lawyer, visited the area with a
questionnaire consisting of over 129 questions. Some of the rulers
were suspicious of these long and detailed questions and for this
reason a tn-committee was formed at the second meeting of the
Supreme Council whose duty was to study the questions and to
review the answers submitted to the co-expert by some of the
emirates (17). The committee reached a decision to recommend a
provisional consultative national assembly. It would be appointed
for two years to discuss the charter. Two thirds of the assembly
members were to be elected and the rest appointed (is). This
suggestion did not take account of the political realities In the area
and consequently was Ignored.
Everything seemed to have come to nothing when the
constitutional expert resigned from his commission because of
illness, but the emirates' own legal advisers were successful in
150
(Chapter four)
convincing their rulers that they were capable of drafting a
constitution themselves. It was in the third meeting of the
Supreme Council (10-14/5/69) that the term "constitution' was
introduced. The constitution was to be designated "provisional"
because of the differences among the emirates and their desire to
protect their respective interests. This word was intended to
mitigate the impact of such an important legal document and to
the cautious it was enough to state in the constitution that its
provisions could be amended after a specific period of time. But it
seems that the rulers were in favour of a rule amending the whole
constitution and this in itself implies their unwillingness to be
bound by a constitution in the first place.
The first resolution, issued at the end of the third meeting,
was to form a new committee composed of eight legal advisers out
of whom one was to be a national (19). The committee was to draft a
provisional constitution within two months and then submit it to
the constitutional expert. Dr. Waheed Ra'afat, an Egyptian
constitutional lawyer and legal adviser to the Kuwaiti Crown
Piince, was appointed as the new expert. He was to review the ad
hoc committee proposal and send it together with his comments to
the Supreme Council in a month's time.
The ad hoc committee finished its task in record time. Its
proposal was composed of 126 articles contained in seven
chapters. On 21 July 69 two copies of the draft were sent to the
expert. Dubal and Qatar were keen to make their points clear to
Dr. Ra'afat. The former sent its legal adviser to meet him and
explain Dubal's commercial interests. Qatar preferred to send its
observations in the form of a new constitutional draft. However,
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the constitutional expert found it easier to present his own review
and comments on the proposals in the form of a third draft of the
constitution. His draft was composed of 164 articles contained in
ten chapters. It seems that his proposal was much more
informative, wider and detailed than the other two drafts. He did
not agree on the term "provisional", rather he preferred not to use
it (20).
The fourth meeting of the Supreme Council (2 1-23/10/69)
was presented with three drafts of the future constitution. The
time was limited and it was clear that the rulers did not want to
spend it discussing legal matters. They therefore appointed a new
committee to review the first committee and the expert's
constitutional drafts. It consisted of eighteen members, two for
each emirate, but was destined never to meet because of the
disappointing end to the fourth meeting. Two emirates, Qatar and
Ras-al-Khalmah, withdrew from the meeting in protest against a
message delivered by the Political Agent in Abu Dhabi. The nine-
member Supreme Council itself never met again.
Because of the joint efforts of neighbouring states, deputy
rulers met in Abu Dhabi on 14 June 1970. Here the members
agreed upon a new committee to review the constitutional drafts
which held two meetings in Dubal. The second committee
presented a new draft of the provisional constitution which was
more or less a modification of the constitutional expert's proposal.
The new draft was discussed at the second meeting of the deputy
rulers on 25 October. However, the parties did not fully agree upon
some provisions in it.
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The major issues that had to be solved before a provisional
constitution could be presented were three: the location of the
union's permanent capital, voting in the Supreme Council and
representation in the proposed national assembly (21). In brief, the
first obstacle was created because each one of the powerful
emirates was trying to accommodate the capital within its own
territories and not give any of the rival emirates the chance to have
it. The issue was politically motivated and legally presented. Even
when they agreed on a resolution to have a "provisional capital" in
Abu Dhabi and later the permanent one on the borders of Dubal
and Abu Dhabi there was disagreement on whether to include this
resolution in the body of the constitution or not. The second
obstacle emerged because the five small emirates insisted on the
principle of unanimity in Supreme Council decisions. The rulers
and their advisers were hiding their personal motivations behind
legal arguments.
4.6 Representation in the Proposed Consultative National
Council
From the beginning all the emirates were somewhat daunted
by the size of the Bahraini population. As figure 4.1 shows,
Bahraini citizens represented 42.9 % of the union's total
population. Therefore, the issue of representation was a crucial
factor in determining the fate of the union.
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As has been mentioned earlier, the issue of popular
participation in the process of forming a new state had been totally
overlooked. There had been no reference to this matter nor to the
establishment of a body which would enable the union nationals
as a whole to determine their own future. The Dubat agreement
was a reflection of the fact that power continued to lie with the
ruling elites. They alone were responsible for their citizens' future
and would remain so. Indeed, the issue of a representative body
was not even brought up until the third meeting.
Different names were proposed for the new body: Shura
Council, National Shura Council, Provisional Consultative National
Assembly, Consultative Federal Council, Consultative National
Council. The latter was chosen by the Supreme Council (22).
As regard the size and quality of the population, BahraIn had
the largest, best educated and most politically sophisticated
citizens. The rest of the emirates fluctuated between a moderate
size of population and a moderate level of education to a small
population and a low level of education. All the factors were in
favour of Bahraini domination In union affairs, yet, due to its weak
economic and political position, Bahrain did not have the ability to
utilize these advantages.
When discussing the Issue of representation, Ras-al-
Khaimah was the first to suggest the seats be divided equally
among the emirates. The smaller emirates agreed on this principle,
but Bahrain rejected it on the grounds that the purpose of the
National Council was to represent the people not the emirates (23).
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The wt.hoc committee, which was formed to discuss the
method and bases of representation, recommended equal
representation and stated that:
"AU the emirates should have an equal number
of representatives in the assembly. However, Sharjah
proposed that if a method of achieving a marriage
between the principle of representation according to
population, and the principle of absolute equality, can
be worked out, it should be adopted. But discussion
revealed that such a marriage is a difficult thing to
realize; moreover, representation according to
population is fraught with numerous practical
difficulties, such as identification of the original
nationals and real numbers of population" (24).
The last two points, that is to say the issues of the size of
population and identification of nationals, were perhaps the real
origin of the dispute.
Abu Dhabi proposed that Babrain should have six seats and
the rest of the emirates four seats each. This proposal was rejected
by the smaller emirates straight away. The constitutional expert
suggested in his draft a 'formula for distributing the seats (see
figure 4.2). The seats were to number not more than fifty and
should be distributed proportionally. No emirate should have more
than eight seats nor should it have less than three. This proposal
was accepted only by Bahram.
One important factor in the negotiations is that BahraIn was
passing through hard times. Threatened by Iranian expansion it
saw the union as a way of escape. As a result, Bahrain was ready,
at the fourth meeting to accept the formula introduced by the ad
hoc committee. It issued a press statement declaring its willingness
to comply with the equal representation
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rule (25). The decision, which was Included in Article 69 of the
constitution draft, was to have a consultative national council
consisting of 36 members, four for each emirate.
However, towards the end of 1970 the political situation was
changing rapidly, especially in BahraIn. Iranian claims were finally
settled through the United Nations in May 1970 (26). Relieved of
that particular threat the Bahraini Government found itself faced
with damaging strikes at home and was obliged to promise its
people a kind of liberal constitution (27). All these circumstances
prompted Bahrain to alter its position regarding representation in
the National Council.
Bahrain started demanding a revision of Article 69. It said
that its view point in the fourth meeting was mistaken and it now
wanted to correct it. The Bahraini representative in the deputy
rulers meeting stated that:
We believe that the most significant thing
which is supposed to concern the emirates and their
people Is the question of popular participation in the
proposed system ... The Union National Council Is one
of the most fundamental elements of the new system
and this council is either to be or not to be ... I am not
asking for a parliament like the British or the
American ones, but a council which represents the
people according to the present situatIon" (28).
In accordance with its new position, Bahra!n proposed an
amendment of Article 69 to be read as:
The Federal Government shall carry out an
official census of the population of the emirates:
accordingly, the number of nationals in each emirate
shall be taken into account regarding the proportions
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to represent the people in the Union National Council;
the census shall take place no later than four years
from the date when the Provisional Constitution shall
be in effect" (29).
It seems that Bahrain was prepared to accept equal
representation in the assembly for four years, but it wanted a
constitutional guarantee that its demand for proportional
representation would be met after the lapse of the interim period.
However, this was not acceptable either to Bahrain's rival emirates
(Qatar and Dubai) or to the small emirates. They kept insisting on
equality in everything.
Due to this dissension among the rulers, the British
Conservative government, which had been elected on 18 June
1970, appointed Sir William Luce (30) as the Foreign Secretary's
Special Envoy to the Gulf. The British finally came to the
conclusion that they had to be involved directly if the union was to
succeed. (31).
Sir William Luce as Special Envoy visited the area four
times. Having discussed the nature of the disagreements he sent
Mr. Hohnes, a British constitutional adviser, to settle what were
clearly constitutional disputes. This time Qatar was the major
objector. Mr. Holmes proposed a revision of Article 69 and of the
bases for representation. He supported the Bahraini point of view
in recommending revision after four years. Qatar stood firm in
rejecting this proposal. It alleged that if Bahrain was more
populous, then Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Dubal were much wealthier.
Holmes proposed that the council should be formed on the ground
of population size and each emirate's contribution to the union
budget. A fourth proposal was to create a bicameral legislature.
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Qatar, nonetheless, did not change its mind and Insisted on equal
representation (32). The fate of the British proposals were clear. A
joint Kuwaiti-Saudi mission suggested a proposal similar to the
BahraInl one, but it was decisively rejected by the emirates.
Another attempt to resolve the deadlock over the
representation question was launched by Sir Wiffiam Luce himself.
He suggested that the National Council should consist of forty-one
seats. The big four emirates should have six seats each, Sharjah
and Ras-al-Khaimah four seats each, and the remaining three
small emirates three seats each (see figure 4.3) (33). The fate of this
proposal was no different from that of its predecessor.
4.7 The Failure of the Nine-member-union and the Emergence
of The United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.)
On i March 1971, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec
Douglas-Home, announced that the British Government would
abide by the decision taken by the preceding Labour government
and, therefore, would terminate its treaties with the Trucial States,
Qatar and Bahrain by the end of the year. He offered them a treaty
of friendship and some military assistance and arrangements (34).
They all accepted the treaty and signed it later on (35).
The Trucial States Council held a meeting in Dubal between
10 and 18 July 1971 to discuss straightforward union among the
seven emirates. Ajoint communique was "Union of Arab Emirates".
The rulers signed a "Provisional Constitution" for the U.A.E.. It was
Issued at the end of the meeting announcing the birth of "United
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Arab Emirates". The name of the new state was chosen so
that it differed from that of the dying slightly different from that
introduced by the second constitutional committee at the last
deputy rulers' meeting on October 1970. Ras-al-Khaimah did not
join the union because of differences mainly on the issue of voting
methods In the Supreme Council and the number of its
representatives on the Federal National Council (FNC) (36). The
seats in the new assembly were to be distributed on the grounds of
affluence and influence. Bahrain declared the termination of its
special treaty relations with Britain on 14 August 1971, and Qatar
followed in its footsteps on 1 September.
4.8 Conclusion
A more detailed discussion of all the actual and potential
areas of contention among the individual emirates in the nine-
member-union lies outside this work. For the purposes of this
thesis, therefore, the constitutional and legislative difficulties were
been singled out for discussion.
One might wonder whether all the legal and political battles
occurring among the rival partners in the union were strictly
necessary. Why did such conifict arise on the representation issue?
Was there any justification for the emirates' fear of proportional
representation ? Why did Bahrain insist on popular participation?
Did the remaining emirates adhere to their positions regarding the
question of representation after 1971?
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The simple reason for their hesitation to agree was lack of
confidence on the part of the Individual rulers and because they
were not wholeheartedly committed to a democratic system of
government. The emirates need not have feared such an impotent
institution because the proposed assembly was to be "appointed"
arid "consultative" (37). This clearly Indicated that it was to be born
weak and powerless. The rulers could always secure their interests
through the Supreme Council where the decisions had to be
unanimous.
An example should make it clear how loath the emirates
were to have a legislative body. Article 111 in the revised
Provisional Constitution stipulated that a draft law should become
a law when it had been accepted by the Union National Council or
the Council of Ministers arid ratified by the Supreme Council.
Qatar's legal adviser objected to this wording and protested that
the Article gave the assembly a legislative power which was in
contravention of what had been unanimously agreed. The Article
was amended accordingly and the Union National Council had only
a consultative role (38). Yet, the rulers Insisted on equal
representation in it. It was probably more a matter of prestige and
self-esteem than a legal dispute.
It should be pointed out that whereas the smaller states had
been determined to have equal votes in the Supreme Council and
equal seats in the Union Council, they accepted a different formula
under the U.A.E. Provisional Constitution. The votes in the
Supreme Council were to be on a majority basis, which must
include the votes of Dubal and AJu Dhabl. Furthermore, the seats
in the Federal National Council (FNC) were to be distributed
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unequally (see figure 4.4). Then why did they hold to one opinion
in the first union and accept the opposite view point in the second
? The only explanation that one can suggest is that in the first
union there was, in the eyes of the rulers of these emirates, plenty
of time before British withdrawal. It appears that they thought it
worth manoeuvring and demanding equal rights. However, in the
second union only a few months remained before the end of 1971
and they had no alternative other than to accept the formula
presented by the two big emirates if they were to be allowed in. If
they rejected it then they would face the future alone.
On the subject of the Bahraini and Qatari positions, Bahratn
was not the best one to defend the cause of democracy and
people's rights to participate in the decision-making process. The
Bahrainl ruling family shamelessly oppressed its political
opponents and even deported their leaders. After 1971, Bahrain
had a partly elected legislature but the government could not
tolerate this legislature for more than twenty months. It seems that
Bahraln was cynically exploiting the "proportional representation"
principle in order to provide an excuse for not joining the union.
Qatar, on the other hand, did not even have a council after 1971
until some few years later. Neither of the two states was really
enthusiastic in trying to involve their citizens in decision-making.
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Finally, it could be claimed that the formation of the union
legislature was a smoke-screen to conceal the old rivalries among
the ruling families and the lengthy, heated legal debates were
conducted by advisers mindful of the rulers' interests.
Undoubtedly, the interests of the. people were sacrificed for
personal gain. As A. Taryam wrote:
The enthusiasm and desire for mutual
cooperation which characterised the meeting were
motivated by force of circumstances and not a genuine
conviction of the need for joint work. ... When the
impact of these circumstances began to lessen, the
enthusiasm of some members began to wane, goodwill
to evaporate, and the federation began to slump" (39).
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PART THREE
In part 3 of the thesis we examine the 1971 U.A.E. Constitution (
the basic characteristics, division of power), the constitutional
position and set up of the Federal National Council, its
membership, the socio-economic and political background, the
constitutional framework of the role of and functions of the FNC
(legislative, political, financial) and analyse the major political and
constitutional cases in which the legislature has a role.
Throughout the following chapters there is an attempt to give a
comparative analysis by relating them to the historical
development and the socio-economic background of the U.A.E.,
including a general perspective of the role of the legislature in
developing countries. Part 3 consIsts of four chapters.
Chapter 5 The 1971 U.A.E. Provisional Constitution.
Chapter 6 The Constitutional Framework of the Role of
the U.A.E. legislature.
Chapter 7 The Practical Working of the U.A.E.
legislature.
Chapter 8 An Analysis of the Major Political and
Constitutional Cases.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE 1971 U.A.E. PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter the evolution of the Nine-member-
union was discussed in terms of constitutional change and
development. From the outset the direct participation of the people
in the shaping of the state was not considered feasible. There was
no place for them In the constitution-making process and the new
Provisional Constitution was the result of committee meetings and
legal discussions among legal advisers also. The result was the
1971 Provisional Constitution of the U.A.E. (hereinafter the
Constitution).
The purpose of this chapter is first to examine the main
principles of the U.A.E.'s constitution, second the working of the
federal system, the various authorities within the union and third
the question of a permanent constitution.
Distinctive features of the U.A.E. Constitution:
We have seen in chapter four that the process of drafting the
U.A.E. Constitution was accelerated in order to meet the deadline
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set by the British and as a result many constitutional issues and
related controversies remained unresolved.
Papua New Guinea had a similar experience when two
deadlines set by the Australian colonial power were not met
because of lengthy constitutional negotiations. The fmal solution
was to pass over the intended interim period and simply declare
independence. In the case of Vanuatu, the chief minister actually
invited foreign officials to attend the independence ceremony, while
the constitutional negotiations were stifi in progress. (i)
The U.A.E. Constitution contained several distinctive
features which deserve mention before we move on to study the
structure of the state. First, the Constitution did not explicitly
revoke the pre-1971 political system or by its terms dismantle their
legal framework. On the contrary, Article 148 of the constitution
expresses the rule that "all matters established by laws,
regulations, decrees, orders and decisions in the various member
Emirates of the Union" were protected with effect upon the coming
into force of the Constitution. Such announcement granted a kind
of protection for the legal organization of the member emirates
which would be difficult to amend or change in later years. The
Constitution did not seek to repeal the existing status quo. It was
intended to protect and consolidate the status quo in the area. As it
did not come into effect through extra-legal means (e.g. by coup,
revolution or the rulers' relinquishing of their powers to the
masses) the Constitution was more or less bound to accept the
traditional system of rulership in the emirates and approve its
continuation. In short the U.A.E. Constitution was not designed to
rationalize the distribution of power nor to introduce
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"representative democracy", as known In the Western democracies,
within the union. Instead it accepted the existing constitutional
position of the rulers but sought to provide additional legislative
and political Improvements.
In sharp contrast to the U.A.E. Constitution, the experience
of constitution-drafting in continental Europe since the eighteenth
century had been modified to curb the executive powers of
government with provisions regarding the importance of the rights
of the individual in the face of arbitrary rulings. On the other
hand, the Eastern bloc constitutions in the wake of the Second
World War pursued the line of "popular democracy" which was
given a particular meaning, namely, popular type of government, a
system wherein a single ruling party seeks to protect and defend
the rights of the masses through Its legislature. The first category
was more or less, as Edward McWhinney put it, "professorial
constitutions", while the second was almost nomInal. (2) The U.A.E.
Constitution was intended to preserve and secure the spirit of
traditional rule while introducing a modern structure.
It may be concluded that the technique employed in making
the U.A.E. Constitution, as we have explained in the previous
chapter, is to a great extent Influenced by the British model of
constitution-making. British practice in the non-European colonies
where the constitutional system was "normally devolved from
the parent authority (above)" and the system tended "to have an
elitist or expert, and certainly non-popular, root of political and
legal sovereignty". (3)
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However the U.A.E.'s constitution was not issued under an
Act of Parliament. Unlike the Indian Constitution of 1950 and the
Irish Free State Constitution of 1920 with constituent assemblies
set up by Acts of Parliament, (4) the U.A.E.'s constitution was
established under the direct authority of the rulers of the emirates
and not by imperial laws. The constitution owes its authority to
Royal edict. Nevertheless, the formation of the U.A.E., although not
achieved without some consultation with the British, was a new
start and a break with the past.
It is important to mention that like the Constitutions of
Kuwait and Bahrain, the U.A.E. Constitution regards Shari'ah as a
main source of legislation in the Union (Article 7). The adoption of
Sharfah may be considered as a continuity of the legal situation in
the emirates prior to 1971. Such a trend in constitution-making
introduced changes to the existing system without entirety
rejecting the past.
The significance of Shari'ah, as we have seen in the
introduction, was stressed in several Union legislation such as Law
10/1973 setting up the Supreme Court, Law 6/1978 setting up
the Union Courts of First Instance and Appeal courts, Law of Civil
Transactions and Penal Law. This tendency was emphasised in the
U.A.E. by the establishment of Faculty of Sharl'ah and Law in the
U.A.E. University. It seems that the future trend In the emirates is
towards codifying Sharl'ah principles.
Tribal values were to a certain extent adopted in the 1971
Constitution. For example, the preservation of the rulership in
each emirate and the creation of the Supreme Council which
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represents an exclusive club. Moreover, these values directed the
constitution-makers towards establishing the Federal National
Council. This Council Is intended to be the modern resemblance of
the traditional Majils. In fact, the National Council exemplifies the
persistence of the traditional method of consultation. The
Constitution, therefore, preserved one kind of traditional
pressures, viz, the Majlis system.
The above mentioned position applies at the federal level. At
the local level, the Constitution reaffirmed the existence of the
traditional institutions In each emirate (Article 148). Indeed, every
emirate has nowadays its own Mauls where the shaikh meets his
fellow citizens. Sharl'ah role is also maintained In the local system
of courts in those emirates which did not relinquish their
jurisdiction in this field, namely Dubai, Ras-al-Khaimah and
Umni-al-Quwain. Sharl'ah Court, for Instance, have residuary
jurisdiction in most matters both in Dubal and Ras-al-Khaimah. (5)
5.2 The basic features of the Constitution
The U.A.E. Constitution Is contained in a single written
document. This follows the tradition of modern constitutions which
are usually written. The second noticeable feature is the federal
nature of the constitution. This may also help to explain why a
written constitution was required.
As we have seen the individual emirates have been ruled for
centuries by unwritten customs and traditions, but faced with the
task of building an entirely new constitutional system they agreed
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to revise their past legal framework. The Constitution, as
mentioned In the previous chapter, was the first written legal
document carrying the special status of constitution in the
geographical area.
One unusual feature of the Constitution is Its "provisional"
nature. The preamble to the text reads until the preparation of
the permanent Constitution for the Union may be completed we
proclaim .... our agreement to this provisional Constitution", while
article 144 actually specifies five years as being a reasonable
interim period.
The explanation for a "provisional constitution" has been
considered by some writers. The main reason is that a provisional
constitution provides a learning process for the citizens and serves
as a transitional step towards "modem democratic rule." (6) This,
however, is a rationalisation of what lies behind the provisional
nature of the Constitution. The truth of the matter is that the
degree of mistrust and lack of enthusiasm among the rulers of the
nine-member-union Is such that the present Constitution Is as far
as the seven rulers are at present prepared to go.
A provisional Constitution was the inevitable solution if the
new federation was to be first in place and if the fledgling Union
was to survive. As McWhinney stated "... it is not sensible to try to
resolve today's temporary problem by creating a long-range
solution in permanent, constitutional form: today's happy remedy
may be tomorrow's continuing burden that you have to live with as
gracefully as possible" (7). The rulers adopted a similar point of
view. The U.A.E. Constitution, therefore, in Its present form has
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proved to be the only acceptable one In the eyes of the political
leadership of the country.
Another feature of the Constitution is its rigidity. In other
words, it cannot be amended as simply as ordinary legislation but
certain key points were entrenched. There are different and stiffer
stipulations concerning any amendments and these are laid down
clearly in the text itself. First, the constitutional body that has the
right to Issue Constitutional amendments Is different from the one
that has the power to amend laws. Only the Supreme Council has
the right to amend the Constitution, while in the case of the
ordinary laws the Council of Ministers has that right. Whereas the
Constitution does not stipulate any conditions for amending
ordinary laws, It insists that the "topmost interest of the Union"
must be consulted before any constitutional amendment is made,
a term which is firm if somewhat vague. As a final safeguard, a
special two-thirds majority in the Federal National Council is
required to pass the amendment. (8)
The rigidity of the Constitution may be more of theoretical
value than real, as amendments have been called for, no more
than five times in the past nineteen years. These amendments,
moreover, have been on the whole simple formalities, such as the
inclusion of Ras-al-Khatmah into the Union, allocating it six seats
in the National Council, and the extension of the Constitution's
validity after the end of its interim period. The only substantive
amendment was that issued in 1976 repealing Article 142 which
gave the individual emirates the right to set up local forces.
Unfortunately this amendment, which was aimed at strengthening
the federal government, has since been disregarded.
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It should be remembered that two major systems of
government In the world are the parliamentary system and the
presidential system. In the traditional parliamentary system
balance is maintained between the executive and the legislature
through co-operation between the two institutions. The whole
cabinet is formed from and is responsible to the legislature. In the
traditional presidential system, however, the two institutions are
quite separate. Ministers under this system are not members of the
legislature and they are responsible to the president. (g)
Although Dr. S. Ibrahim (io) argues that the U.A.E.s system
is a mixture of the two systems, there are good arguments to
question this analysis. Thus it might be concluded that the
constitutional system of the U.A.E. can be classified neither as
parliamentary nor as presidential. First of all, the Constitution
does not to a considerable extent recognise the principle of
separation of powers. It does not, as is shown later, allocate a
certain function to a specific body. Secondly, the Constitutional
system of the country has not known the dual-heads of the
executive as in some parliamentary systems. Moreover, executive
and legislative powers are not handled by a single institution but
are divided among several bodies. (ii)
Many observers disapproved of one feature of the U.A.E.
Constitution, namely, the method of its adoption. For some it was
too much like a "grant" from the rulers to their subjects. This
argument has some weight as explained by A. Taryam, was "that
constitutions which are granted come from a ruler who holds all
power and sovereignty in his own hands so that the making and
not making a Constitution Is wholly subject to his will". (12)
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Following French political theory which propounds that
constitutions may be arrived at in one of four ways: by a contract,
by a plebiscite, by the will of a constituent assembly and by grant,
they argued that as none of the first three had been followed then
the new U.A.E. constitution must come into the fourth category.
However, this may not be an entirely fair assessment in the
circumstances. After all the rulers had no choice but to accept the
Constitution since they were under pressure regionally and
internationally. To form the new state with its own constitution
was almost the only option In the face of the unknown future. (13)
In addition, as the rulers are not on a position to revoke their
"grant" (I.e. the Constitution), then in the final analysis it is sui
generts.
de Smith, In his book Constitutional arid Administrative Law
(fifth edition), has accurately identified the three factors that have
the greatest Influence on the form and content of any fledgling
constitution. They are: " ... the forces at work when the
constitution Is established and amended,.., common sense
considerations of practical convenience, and ... the precedents
available to politicians and their advisers who draw up the
constitution" (14)
In the case of the 1971 U.A.E. Constitution, one can safely
conclude after discussing its historical background that the first
was the strongest factor while the third also played a relatively
important part. Undoubtedly the wishes of the rulers were the
prime influence on the form and content of the constitution. They
were unwilling to create a federal state stronger than their
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individual emirates, because this would mean relinquishing the
greater part of their absolute power. They were determined to have
weak federal institutions and not to share power with their
subjects through political participation. The final result of the legal
deliberations was a Constitution which embodied all their wishes.
It should be remembered that with regard to the previous
constitutional precedents in the Gulf area, Kuwait shares many
social characteristics with the U.A.E., but it is a unitary state
where a single family rules and its constitution allows political
participation through a freely elected legislature. Both conditions
were unacceptable to the emirates' ruling elites in 1971. The
constitutions of the other surrounding Arab countries, such as
Syria, Iraq and Yemen, were rejected as models because these
countries were republics ruled by ideological parties. The U.A.E.
constitution in the final analysis is without precedent in the area.
The U.A.E. Constitution places great emphasis on certain
aspects of the state, such as its ethnicity, that is Arabness, its
religion, that is Islam, and its economic structure. The economic
ideology it embodies is more or less a liberal one (see Articles 21
and 39), although community interests are zealously safeguarded
(see Articles 14 and 20).
5.3 The Federal System as under the U.A.E. Constitution
The U.A.E. Constitution is attempting to address the
problem of unifying the diverse political ambitions of seven rulers
in a single state in 1971 was too idealistic to be achieved. The
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emerging state was to be a federation rather than a confederation
or simple alliance. This much was clear from the preamble to the
Constitution which read: "desiring to create a closer links between
the Arab Emirates in the form of an independent, sovereign, federal
state". The formation of a federal state was interpreted by one
commentator as a colonial attempt to fossilize the status quo and
protect the interests of the ruling families and foreign powers. (15)
Federation causes far reaching implications. First, the Union
represents the new state in International law which means that the
member emirates have lost their external sovereignty, save for a
few administrative contracts protected by the Constitution. The
Union has exclusive powers In the field of foreign policy,
responslbffity for the conclusion of international agreements and
treaties, the appointment of diplomatic representatives and the
declaration of war. (16) Second, the Constitution stipulates that the
people of the Union are one people holding one nationality. Third,
citizens of the Union come under two authorities one central and
the other local, but the central authority has supreme jurisdiction
over them. (17) Fourth, the supremacy of the federal Constitution
and laws over local laws and legislations is guaranteed by the
Constitution. Significantly the Constitution does not tackle the
issue of secession which should be an important feature of any
federal agreement. (18)
One basic feature of a federal system is the division of power
between central and local administration. Drawing on the example
of the American Constitution and the Basic Law of Federal
Germany, the U.A.E. Constitution, in Article 120 lists the areas in
which the union has exclusive legislative and executive
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jurisdiction. They range from foreign affairs, defence, nationality,
health and education to currency and postal services. ArtIcle 121
enumerates the matters in which the Union has exclusive
legislative jurisdiction. They include inter alia labour relations,
banking, insurance and litigation procedures in the courts. Article
122 allows the individual emirates to retain powers in all
remaining areas.
The writer is of the opinion, like Dr. Abul-Majd (i g), that the
Constitution gives the Union unequivocal precedence over the
individual emirates. Yet, to wield its power effectively the Union
must have the efficient governmental machinery which at present
It lacks.
In practice the U.A.E.'s federal system faces difficulties
which threaten to render It a federation In name only. The major
difficulty is the lack of independent financial resources. The
Constitution guarantees that the natural resources of the
individual emirates shall remain their own. In return it requires
the emirates to participate in the federal budget. In fact, only three
emirates pay their share of the budget. The second major difficulty
is self-interest. The Supreme Council, which is composed of the
seven nilers, Is the highest authority In the Union. If a federal
policy Is proposed which might jeopardize the interests of one or
more of the members, a conifict naturally arises. (20)
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5.4 Institutions under the U.A.E. Constitution
The Constitution the U.A.E. did not cling to the doctrine of
separation of powers. As a result, there are not three but rather
five branches of the Union. (21) They are: the Supreme Council, the
President of the Union and his deputy, the Council of Ministers,
the Federal National Council (FNC), and the judiciary. The
legislative and executive powers are mainly distributed among the
first three authorities while the fourth plays a relatively minor role.
The (FNC) will be discussed in the forthcoming chapters.
5.4.1 The Supreme Council
The Supreme Council consists of the seven rulers or their
deputies in the event of their absence. The Council, therefore,
reflects the Independent nature of the emirates because each ruler
is a member by virtue of his post in the emirate he represents. It is
not at the consent of the entire Union population that he is a
member of the Council. (22) The Council represents the autocratic
element in the U.A.E.'s political system. It is in some ways
comparable to the Bundesrat in the 1871 German Constitution.
Here the princes of the German states (Laender) were represented
in the upper house by virtue of the posts they held in the states.
Their membership of the Bundesrat was to preserve their prestige
and to allow them a say in the Empire affairs. (23) But the emirates
differs in that the members of the U.A.E. Supreme Council have a
rather more Influential role in Union affairs than did the members
of that Bundesrat.
The Supreme Council under the terms of Article 47 of the
Constitution is responsible, triter alUm, for:
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- formation of the general policy of the Union;
- sanction of the Union legislation (laws, budget, fmal account,
decrees, etc.);
- ratification of International agreements and treaties;
- approval of the appointment or resignation of the Prime Minister;
- approval of the appointment or resignation of the President and
judges of the Supreme Court;
- election of the President of the Union and his deputy; and
- approval of new members of the Union.
Decisions in the Supreme Council may only be passed on
substantive matters by a majority of five, of whom two must be
Abu Dhabi and Dubal. In procedural matters the decision may be
passed by a simple majority. The "veto vote" of Abu Dhabi and
Dubal is something that was reluctantly accepted by the weaker
emirates at the time of the foundation of the new state.
From the foregoing it Is clear that the Supreme Council
retains vast powers In the legislative and executive realm. It was
intended to play a more integrative role in the Union, yet because
of its composition this can never be the case. The rulers, as
mentioned above, will always resist strengthening central
government and will block any attempt to lessen their Individual
autonomy because It is considered as a threat to their powers. The
Council, furthermore, meets rarely and this In itself complicates
the running of state affairs. (24) The Council is supposed to meet
once every two months. However, this does not occur in practice.
For instance, in the period of Dec. 1971 to 1977 the Council met
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only nine times. It did not even convene once in the period of June
1984 to December 1985. (25)
5.4.2. The President of the Union and his deputy
The posts of president and deputy were reserved for the
rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubal respectively, to reflect the
importance of both the two large, wealthy and Influential emirates.
Although both rulers are members of the Supreme Council, they
derive separate authority and status from what is a distinct
Constitutional position In the Union hierarchy. In theory the
president and his deputy should be elected from among all
members of the Supreme Council. The recent death of Shaikh
Rashid, ruler of Dubal, raised hopes that the Abu Dhabi / Dubal
monopoly might be broken. The new ruler of Dubal, however, was
allowed to retain all his father's posts and has therefore become
vice-president of the Union which Indicates that essentially
primogeniture has survived.
The role the president plays In Union affairs Is even more
active than that played by the Supreme Council. By the terms of
Article 54 of the Constitution he is responsible, inter alia, for:
- signing and supervising Union laws, decrees and decisions;
- appointing the Prime Minister or accepting his resignation;
- appointing Union diplomatic representatives to foreign states;
- approving the credentials of- foreign diplomats posted to the
Union;
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- representing the Union at home and abroad;
- declaring war should occasion arise, (with the consent of the
Supreme Council); and
- appointing high-ranking Union officials.
Certain problems have arisen because the position taken up
by the President vis-a-vis Union affairs and the division of power
between central government and the individual emirates is almost
at odds with that of his deputy. The president appears to be pro-
Union and demands more powers for the federal government while
his deputy is anti both ideas. Because of this severe difference of
opinion the Union has been on the brink of collapse several times.
The co-operation of the two most influential emirates is of crucial
importance to the survival of the state. Indeed such cooperation
made the Union to last for more than twenty years.
5.4.3 The Council of Ministers
The Council of Ministers is the bureaucratic body of the
Union. It consists of the prime minister, his deputy and a number
of ministers. The only condition laid down under the Constitution
is that a minister should be a citizen of the Union known for his
competence and experience (Article 56). Resolutions are passed by
a simple majority.
Ministers are forbidden to engage in conunercial,
professional or financial affairs, or to be a party to commercial
dealings with the Union, or to be a member of the board of
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directors of any financial or commercial institution (Article 62).
Furthermore ArtIcle 62 provides that the ministers, while In office,
are forbidden to hold any post in local government or in the
National Council.
In fact Article 62 has been violated by several ministers.
They (e.g. the Minister of State for Finance Affairs and the Minister
of Justice) are members, sometimes chairmen, of boards of
directors In different banks and commercial companies.
Furthermore, some of the ministers, especially those from the
ruling families ( e.g. the Minister of Finance the Minister of
Defence), preside over local government departments in their
respective emirates.
The Council of Ministers is responsible, inter alia, for:
- following up the implementation of the general policy of the
Union;
- Initiating drafts of federal laws, decrees and decisions;
- drawing up the annual general budget; and
- the appointment or dismissal of Union employees.
Constitutional lawyers writing on the subject of the U.A.E.'s
constitutional system disagree as to whether the Council of
Ministers is a full executive branch of government or not. Dr. A.
Tabtabal considers that the Council plays such a trivial role in
political matters that it can be said to have only a small share of
executive power and none of its essence. (26)
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Dr. S. Ibrahim, on the other hand, is of the opinion that
although the Council's tasks are mostly of an administrative
nature, It still retains jurisdiction over political matters such as
International treaties and declaration of war, in concert with the
Supreme Council. He, therefore, sees the Council of Ministers as
wielding very real and extensive executive power. (27)
The evidence discovered by the researcher in this matter is
that whatever the extent of the Council's power in theory, in
practice the Council represent a full or semi executive branch. It
has hitherto been the only part of the executive branch to take a
really active role in government. If we put constitutional provisions
aside, the Council symbolises Union authority.
The practice with regard to ministerial appointments is that
the Prime Minister, after consulting the rulers, presents his
government to the President for approval. The Prime Minister,
however, does not have a totally free hand in chosing his potential
colleagues. All Khalifa described the process in his own words:
recruitment to this body (is) part and parcel
of the federal balancing process, reflecting the actual
distribution of power not only among the member
emirates, but between competing power elites within
the emirates themselves. Hence, political
considerations rather than professional ability often
provide the most salient criterion for the distribution
of ministerial posts" (28)
In order to please all these competing factions at federal and
local level new ministries are specially created or existing ones are
artificially divided to swell the cabinet. (29)
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5.4.4 The Judiciary
The Federal judiciary functions at three levels: the Courts of
First Instance, the Appeal Courts and Supreme Court. Local
justice is administered in either Civil or Shariah courts. (30)
Out of the Constitution's sixteen articles relating to the
federal judiciary and the emirates, seven are concerned with the
Supreme Court. This reflects the importance with which it is
invested in the eyes of the constitution-makers. (31)
The Supreme Court Is composed of a president and a
number of judges, not exceeding five. The judges are appointed by
the President with the consent of the Supreme Council. In theory,
Supreme Court judges are immune from dismissal during their
term of office (See page 310). However, they are removable by the
Supreme Council. Their decisions are final and binding upon all.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court extends, inter alia, to
settling disputes among member emirates, examining the
constitutionality of the Union and local laws, interpreting the
Constitution, trying ministers arid senior officials and settling legal
disputes between federal and local courts.
All of the Supreme Court judges are foreigners due to the
lack of qualified indigenous. Of the twenty judges appointed to the
Court since 1973, eleven have been Egyptian, six Syrian, one
Jordanian, one Sudanese and one Tunisian. (32) It has been
suggested that the composition of the Supreme Court might affect
its decisions and Independence. The judges might come under
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pressure of various kinds - for instance, the threat not to renew
their contracts unless they toe a certain line, or the promise to
extend their contracts If they support a certain point of view. (33)
The Constitution permits the local authorities in the
emirates to transfer all judicial matters to the federal courts if they
so choose. Four emirates have taken advantage of this provision.
They are Abu Dhabl, Sharjah, Ras-al-Khaimah and Fujairah. The
remaining three retain their local courts.
5.5 Conclusion
In 1971, the U.A.E. laid down the framework for their federal
state in the form of a written constitution. It was a provisional
document, intended to last for five years until December 1976.
After nearly twenty years this constitution remains in force and
promises to endure for at least another decade because it works as
a compromise.
In the opinion of one commentator, the constitution did not
introduce a new structure to the emirates. Dr. Abdul-Khaleq
Abdulla argues that the 1971 Constitution "affirmed the structures
that were already in existence during the colonial period and gave
them a high(er) degree of power". He sees the federal apparatus as
"mere replicas of those originated by the British in the 1950s" (34)
In this, however, he might be challenged on the ground that
the governmental structure has been very much simplified by him
arid that many new elements have been introduced into the
political arena. The Supreme Council, for instance, may have
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certain features in common with the Trucial States Council, but It
cannot be labelled a "mere replica". In addition, the Council of
Ministers, Federal National Council and the federal judiciary are all
total new innovations.
The balance between federal and local authorities in a new
state with feudal roots Is difficult to strike successfully. The fine
legal provisions contained in the Constitution sprang more from
the minds of its makers than from the socio-political realities of the
society. The Constitution, notwithstanding, was the bottom line
that the all the rulers agreed upon, although it was understood
that It would be replaced by a permanent constitution in five years'
time.
Near the end of the five years and in pursuance of Article
144, the president of the Union, Shailth Zaid, issued a federal
directive (no. 2 of 1975) on the 26th June 1975 in obedience to
which a constituent committee met to prepare and draft a
permanent constitution. It consisted of 28 members from the seven
emirates. The committee finished Its task within nine months and
submitted a draft of a permanent constitution to the Supreme
Council (35) the adoption of which would mean:
- the weakening of the authority of the emirates and the
strengthening of the powers of central government;
- the removal of the veto granted to Abu Dhabi and Dubai;
- the clarification of Union powers and revision of their
distribution; and
- the strengthening of the National Council's role.
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The draft was rejected by the Supreme Council, most forcibly
by Dubal and Ras-al-Khaimah. The Supreme Council decided
instead to amend ArtIcle 144 and extend the life of the Provisional
Constitution for another five years. (36)
The Constitutional framework of the U.A.E., therefore, has
been the same since December 1971. Very little change has been
introduced into the power structure. The trend towards extending
the powers of local governments and their apparatus at the
expense of the central government is predominant nowadays.
The major champion of federal power and the role of the
central government Is the Council of Ministers. This is only natural
in view of Its composition and the political backgrounds of some of
its most active members who advocate a strong federal system
among the emirates. The National Council also plays a significant
role in upholding federation and its constitutional status within
the political system of the U.A.E. needs, therefore, to be studied
and explained.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE ROLE
OF THE U.A.E. LEGISLATURE UNDER THE 1971
CONSTITUTION
61 Introduction:
In the previous chapter we have seen from the discussion of
the basic features of the U.A.E. constitution that the power of the
federation as a whole is still to a great extent eclipsed by the power
of the Individual emirates. Such position reflects the desire of the
rulers to dominate the decision-making process and their
consideration of the federation as a threat to the rulers powers.
However, the Federal National Council (FNC), as a branch of the
federal government, plays an important part in the constitutional
system of the country.
This chapter will attempt to analyse the structure of the
Council. It will explain membership, method of selection, the
composition , legal set-up and summoning of the legislature.
6.2 Uni or bicameral Legislature:
The first Issue is whether the U.A.E. constitution may be
modelled to have a bicameral or unicameral legislature. In a federal
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state the legislature usually consists of two chambers. The first
represents the member states on a basis of equal representation
while the second represents the citizens of the federation on the
basis of proportional representation. The policy of electing the
same number of representatives for each state reflects the fear that
the smaller states may have of being dominated by the larger and
more powerful states. However, this policy is not a universal one.
In India, for instance, the seats of the Upper House (Rajya Sabha)
are distributed on the basis of one seat for every million people (i).
In the Lower House the seats are distributed proportionally. The
size of the population of each state determines the number of its
seats. However here, as under some constitutions, a maximum is
laid down for the number of members of the house.(2)
The U.A.E. Constitution may be said to have adopted a
bicameral legislature in that the Supreme Council represents the
upper house, where the states are equally represented, and the
FNC the lower house, where the citizens are proportionally
represented.
This point could be challenged by the researcher on several
grounds. First, the U.A.E. constitution does not state that it
favours a bicameral system for the legislature. Second, the factor
which controls the number of each emirat&s representatives in the
FNC is not only population. Third, although the emirates are
equally represented in the Supreme Council, yet this equality is
confined strictly to the number of the representatives. In terms of
power the two large emirates, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, have gained
In effect a veto while the rest have not. Fourth, and most
importantly, the Supreme Council's functions are not restricted to
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legislative matters. It has a considerable measure of executive
power.
The National Council consists of forty seats (3) which are
proportionally distributed among the emirates according to their
Influence, affluence and population. By this rule the idea of equal
representation, which had been called for by the smaller emirates
in the previous nine-member-union, has been disregarded. The
seats are distributed as follows:
Abu Dhabi	 8.	 Dubai	 8.
Sharjah	 6.	 Ras-al-Khaimah	 6.
Ajman	 4.	 Umm-al-Quwain	 4.
Fuj airah	 4.
This method of distribution has two consequences. On the
one hand, it pleases the powerful parties by giving them a degree of
supremacy over the rest. On the other, it offends the rest because
it changes their previous situation in that they are no longer
considered as equal rivals. Nevertheless, they have reluctantly
accepted the formula in the hope that it will eventually be rectified
in a permanent constitution.
But should a new member favour to join the Union, will the
formula be applied to it? Who will dictate the number of seats to be
allocated to it? As we have seen in chapter four, Ras-al-Khaimah
did not join the Union on 2 December 1971. When it decided to do
so on 10 February 1972, the Supreme Council amended the first
Article of the Constitution by adding a paragraph which reads as
follows:
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"In the event of the acceptance of a new memberjoining the Union, the Supreme Council of the Union
shall determine the number of the seats which will be
allocated to that member in the National Council,
being In addition to the number stipulated in Article
68 of this ConstItution." (4)
The present constitution then lays down that the Supreme
Council shall determine how many seats in the Council shall be
allocated to the new member, since this is a political issue. In
theory there is no restriction on the number of seats that the new
member can have, but by suggesting a limit the Article has laid
down an obstacle in the way of the new member in order to push
him into a weak position and allays the fear of domination among
the smaller emirates by restricting the size of the new member.
However, the situation remains hypothetical In that no new
member has so far applied to join the Union.
As the case In Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, the U.A.E.
Federal National Council is a single legislature assembly whose
seats are distributed proportionally. As in most Third World
countries, the FNC cannot claim free legislative powers although
its role in the political system must not be underestimated. It has
been in existence for almost twenty years (1972-1991) and
continues to function under the constitution. There were four
councils in this period: the first from 1972 to 1976, the second
from 1977 to 1981, the third from 1982 to 1986 and the fourth
from 1987 to 1991. It is worth mentioning that unlike the Kuwaiti
and Bahraini parliamentary experience, the FNC was not
suspended since its establishment. Its survival for such a period of
time indicates that it has a positive function in the system.
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6.3 Membership of the Federal National Council:
We now turn to consider the following matters: the method of
selecting of members, their qualifications, their social
backgrounds, privileges, turnover and contest for their
membership.
6.3.1 Qualifications for Membership of the Council:
The constitution stipulates the following conditions for the
membership of the Assembly:
1. He must be a citizen of one of the emirates of the Union, and
permanenfly resident in the emirate he represents.
2. He must be not less than twenty-five years old.
3. He must enjoy civil status, good conduct, reputation and no
previous conviction for a dishonourable offence.
4. He must have an adequate knowledge of reading and writing
Arabic.
Membership requirements may now be discussed as follows:
1- Citizenship: When analysing the first condition certain
points are worth discussing.
The first is one raised by the FNC constitutional adviser. He
argues that the condition requires the member to hold the
nationality of his own particular emirate. In his view this is in total
contradiction with Article 8 of the constitution which states:
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'The citizens of the Union shall have a single nationality
which shall be prescribed by law."
It would be better to stipulate that the member shall be a U.A.E.
citizen instead of a citizen of an emirate (5).
The writer believes that the first condition does not Indicate
explicitly that each emirate has Its own nationality. Such an
Interpretation might have been valid before 1971 when every
emirate had Its own nationality and passports. Now the term
"citizen of one of the emirates" can be understood as a moral link
between the member and the emirate which has nominated him (6).
However, It Is preferable that such a condition be crystal clear in
support of federal entity.
Secondly It should be pointed out that the first condition
requires the member to be permanently resident in the emirate he
represents. Such a stipulation conflicts with Article 77 of the
constitution which provides that the FNC member shall represent
the whole union citizens (i). Although most of the FNC members
now consider themselves as representative of the people, it is
better to state that the member shall be a resident of the emirate
that selected him.
The question of whom the FNC member represents has been
the subject of controversy among constitutional writers. The
researcher's opinion is that representation does not exist in the
first place because the members are not elected and therefore
cannot claim to be representing the people. Such inference,
however, does not diminish the independence of Individual
members. Article 77 may be understood therefore as a directive to
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the members not to be exclusively ioyal to their emirates and to
favour the interests of the whole union citIzens (8).
It may be assumed that being a citizen of the U.A.E. is
sufficient for selection to an FNC post. However, not all the citizens
are eligible to be FNC members. U.A.E. citizens fall into two
categories: citizens by origin and naturalized citizens.
Citizens by origin are defined by the law (9) as either
constituent citizens or original citizens. Constituent citizens,
according to the Nationality Law of 1972, are those who had lived
in one of the emirates prior to 1925 and are of Arab origin. No
explanation has been given for the selection of the year 1925; it
may be because that was the year of the fall of the last Islamic
Caliphate in Turkey. The Gulf States used to have a moral linkage
with the Caliphate. The condition of Arabness was added to the
Nationality Law in 1975. The residence period required for the
constituent citizens in the U.A.E. (47 years) is the longest in the
area.
Original citizens are those who acquired the citizenship
through JUS SANGUINIS. Any one born to a U.A.E. father would be
a U.A.E. citizen, regardless of the place of birth. The father must be
an original citizen at the time of birth. Exceptionally, a baby can
have U.A.E. original citizenship if he is born to a U.A.E. mother
under certain circumstances: if his father is unknown or if his
father has no citizenship or If his father's citizenship is unknown.
Save for one exception, the U.A.E. Nationality Law does not accept
the place of birth (JUS SQL!) as a warrant for acquiring citizenship.
The only exception to this rule is in the case of a foundling child.
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Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Nationality Law provides that
Naturalized citizens are those who have met certain conditions laid
down by the law. An applicant for U.A.E. citizenship must have
been living in the country for a long period of time. The residency
period required by the law differs according to the origin of the
applicant. He must also relinquish his previous nationality.
From the above summary one can assume with confidence
that only citizens by origin are eligible to be nominated to FNC
membership. Naturalized citizens are deprived of the right to be
members of the legislature. The inequality between the two groups
is only in the field of political rights and does not extend to civil
and social rights.
The question arises as to whether there is permanent
restriction. One possibility is that there is a time limit for the
prohibition. The U.A.E. is not the only state in the region that has
adopted such a restrictive nationality law. All the GCC member
countries have similar provisions with some variation, however, the
prohibition of political rights for the naturalized citizens in the
U.A.E. is much wider than the rest.
In Kuwait, for instance, a naturalized citizen has to wait for
thirty years before he can vote or stand in an election (io). The
Constitution of Bahrain requires the lapse of at least 15 years
before a naturalized citizen could stand in an election (ii). With the
exception of naturalized citizens of Oman!, Qatar! and Bahrainl
origin, there is no time limit in the U.A.E. Nationality Law on the
exclusion from political rights (Article 12).(12) It is a permanent
ban. It is restricted neither to a certain period of time nor to a
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certain number of generations. It is possible to see the practices
authorised above as a clear violation of human rights which really
create second-class citizens in the society.
2- Other qualifications: The second condition for FNC
members is age. The member must be not less than twenty-five
years old on the day of his selection. Only the Qatari Constitution
has a lower age condition for its Consultative Council ( 24 years).
The Kuwaiti and BahrainI constitutions stipulate thirty as the
minimum age for their MPs.
The fourth condition in Article 70 states that the member
should have an adequate knowledge of reading and writing, but
not any specific degree of education. If we look at what the
educational level of U.A.E. society was in 1971 we will appreciate
that such a condition reflected the reality of that society. Yet, this
condition should now be amended to take account of the
development of education after twenty years and a formal degree in
education should be required.
6.3.2 Election or Appointment:
By and large, members of a legislature claim to represent the
people. They generally justifr this claim on the grounds that they
are directly elected by the people. Election, hence, has become a
universal rule for selecting the members of the legislature. Under
authoritarian and one-party systems, however, elections may be
manipulated to make the system look democratic. Moreover,
elections do not always produce the most capable and efficient
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members of the society, especially in a newly Independent state
which has no previous constitutional experience and/or lacks a
high percentage of literacy. Such circumstances are likely to result
in a legislature full of incapable members who have been elected
because of their reputation rather than their merits.
Dr. Y. Al-Jamal rightfully argued against this school of
thought and asks what the alternative is? Is it the appointment
method ? What guarantees are there that this method would not
produce even less suitable members than the election system ?
Would not appointed members be more opportunist and
subservient towards those in power? He came to the conclusion
that:
"Trial and error and testing the members will
reveal their real substance. Testing them time and
again is the true academy for educating the people,
assuring democratic development and developing their
political consciousness. "(13)
The practice of nominating members of the legislature has
been abandoned in almost all Third World countries. However,
Hong Kong can be considered an exception to this rule up to the
1991 legislative elections. Under its constitution all legislators were
nominated by the executive, a practice justified on the grounds
that the small business community in Hong Kong would loose its
privileged position in free elections. Another excuse was the
characteristic apathy of the Chinese with regard to political
participation. (14)
The argument for retention of the nomination system in
Hong Kong seems to be urged by soclo-economic factors. Jill
Cottrell suggests that:
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the reluctance to accept direct elections is
connected with the desire to maintain the current
social and economic system: that direct elections
would encourage the growth of parties which would be
tempted to appeal to the voters on the basis of
schemes of social welfare which would be incompatible
with the continuation of the capitalist system." (15)
In the Arab Gulf States, parliamentary elections were held in
Kuwait and Bahrain. However, in the case of the U.A.E.
Constitution, Article 69 provides that each emirate shall be free to
determine the method of selection of citizens to represent it in the
FNC. The position of the constitution is not clear cut. It falls short
of declaring the method of choosing the FNC members whether by
election or appointment. Moreover, the Article does not speciIr who
is to make the decision on behalf of an emirate. A number of
questions arise: Is it the ruler ? Or the ruling family ? Or the
citizens ? The rulers have taken advantage of this latitude to
concentrate the power of selection in their own hands.
The ambiguity of Article 69 has been explained on a variety
of grounds. A. Al-Hosani, in his unpublished doctoral thesis,
suggests four reasons: (1) election as a basis for selection was
rejected during the nine-member-union discussion; (2) citizens had
no past experience in the election process; (3) it was difficult to
define which citizens are eligible to vote because the emirates were
not strict in their nationality laws prior to Independence; and (4)
the foundations for an electoral system ( e.g. education, political
experience) were far from sound (16).
The first reason is a genuine one while the rest can be easily
refuted. The absence of political awareness among the citizens is
an excuse adduced by the ruling families in order to deny the
people political participation. Furthermore, the problem of defining
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the indigenous people is no reason to deny them opportunity to
have a say In the running of their society. The small size of the
population In 1971 is enough to refute such allegations.
Because of the vagueness of the wording of Article 69 all the
rulers choose to appoint their emirate's representatives in the FNC.
None of the emirates choose to elect their representatives. The
appointment method has been defended by the same arguments
used to reject the election method. R.M. Batteek takes the view
that a ruler would never appoint his emirate's representatives
haphazardly or presumably in bad faith. Because of his contact
with the citizens, the ruler will appoint the most capable and
genuine Individuals as representatives of the emirate (17).
The researcher claims that consensus exists among the
rulers on the method of selecting FNC members. First, no one of
them would embarrass the others by adopting a method of
selection other than appointment because if an emirate tried to
select Its representatives by election, or even partial election, a
popular demand would erupt In other emirates to follow the same
path. Also, If this occurred, the FNC members would be of two
categories: those appointed by the rulers and those elected by their
constituents. Second, a more Important reason is that the rulers
do not want to risk their constitutional prerogative (i.e. selecting
the FNC members) and relinquish It to the people. Thirdly, the
rulers, recognize that the appointment method guarantees them
two privileges: the sole choice of who will represent the emirate and
that the FNC members will be answerable to them rather than to
the federal entity. In practice the rulers use their prerogative as a
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means of winning loyalty among the important segments in the
emirates. All Khalifa emphasise this point by stating that:
"To these rulers, appointing members to
this federal body not only meant having a loyal
leverage at the federate, but also allowed more room In
the process of distribution of political favours" (18).
In not stipulating the method of selecting the members and
leaving It to the will of the rulers, Article 69 proves crucial to the
U.A.E. constitutional system. One has to admit, however, that the
method of appointment has not greatly affected the public opinion
regarding the FNC nor it deter the members from being active in
their posts.
Public opinion would probably prefer an elected legislature.
The FNC does not seem to have the support of a large segment of
the citizens because of it being unelected council. In interviews
conducted in the period 20-26 January 1987 the majority of the
interviewees were of the opinion that the Council reflected to a
large extent their demands but would be far better in its duties
after the inclusion of more university graduates among its
membership (19).
Although FNC members are appointed, they are nevertheless
keen to play their role and demand the enhancement of their
powers. Many of them even demand a change in the method of
selection. The second President of the FNC is reported as having
said:
The absence of elections does not mean the
absence of democracy; democracy is a spirit rather
than a rigid process. "(20)
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Recently two members of the FNC declared In an interview
that it is necessary to review the method of selection (21). Khalifa
M. Khalifa (Ajman) said that it is essential now to introduce some
amendments to the political system of the U.A.E. which wifi lead to
wider participation. One of the most important amendments is to
compromise between the methods of appointment and election for
the selection of FNC members. Rashid Al-Owais (Sharjah) was of
the same opinion.
The journey towards a full free system of elections in the
U.A.E. is a long term one. There are two possible routes which
might be followed. The Council members could be elected in two
stages: a ruler will select candidates amounting to five times the
number of his emlrat&s seats in the FNC and those selected will
elect by a secret ballot the required number of representatives from
among themselves (22). The second way, practised in Bahrain, is
that the citizens elect half of the members and the ruler appoints
the remaining hail. The first way will obviously be preferred by the
rulers. The partial elections period must not be left open. A time
limit will have to be stipulated, otherwise the rulers will stick to
this method and delay full free elections. These two ways may be
reckoned as a veneer democracy. However, they are better than the
existing system.
6.3.3 Membership of the Council in practice:
On the question of membership and citizenship it must be
noted that not all eligible original citizens have the chance to be
nominated for FNC posts. When analysing the practice of
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appointing members to the Council It emerges that there are three
groups among the citizens by origin excluded de facto from the
membership. They are:
- members of the ruling families,
- women, and
- minorities.
I - Members of the ruling families: The ruling families in the
Gulf area like to place their authority above local politics. They
have created no precedents in which individual shaikhs have
relinquished their privileges in order to join a consultative
legislature.
The researcher believes that by avoiding participation in a
semi-democratic forum, the ruling families removes any
opportunity for questioning the legitimacy of their position.
The best example of this attitude lies in the Kuwaiti
constitutional experience. Kuwait had an active, freely elected
National Assembly, yet no one from the filing Al-Sabah family
attempted to run for a seat in the legislature. The same practice
was observed in Bahratn which enjoyed an elected National
Assembly in the period 1973-1975. WIth the exception of one
shaikh, known as the red shaikh, no member of the ruling Al-
Kalifah family stood for election (23). M. Al-Moqatei explained this
practice in Kuwait and called it a "constitutional customary rule".
He stated that not to participate in the elections
"preserved the Integrity of the Royal Family and
protected them from being connected with (an)
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acrimonious political campaign. It was also intended to
keep the election free from any actual or moral
pressure by the Royal Family." (24)
Such justification was criticized by a leading constitutional
writer, Dr. Adel Al-Tabtabai, on the grounds that the same reasons
which prevented the ruling families from participating in the
national legislature should prevent their appointment to a
ministerial portfolio. A minister would be even more open to the
sanction of criticism or accusation than a member of a legislature
(25). Nevertheless, one must not forget that it is against the socio-
political realities of Gulf societies to expect ruling families to
withdraw from executive power.
In the constitutional experience of the U.A.E. the same
practice has occurred. In the four councils that have been in
existence over the period from 1972 to 1991 there have been 111
FNC members in total. Only one of them was from the ruling family
In his emirate. He is a member of the A1-Sharqi ruling family in
Fujairah, which is not influential in U.A.E. politics. This exception
is not sufficient to contradict the rule but rather seems to affirm it.
ii - Women: In Arab societies the question of female suffrage
has been more complicated than in the West. On this point the
Sharlah has been interpreted as being both anti and pro women
rights. Although many Arab states have granted their female
citizens political rights, it is still a controversial issue in some.
A woman's right to vote or be elected for the legislature was
and stifi is a disputed matter In some societies. In western
societies women were only granted the suffrage at the beginning of
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this century ( e.g. Finland and Norway 1913, Denmark 1915,
U.S.A. 1920, Britain 1928, France 1944, Switzerland 1971) (26).
In the Gulf area no country has granted women the right to
vote. Although women participated in the Bahraini municipal
elections of 1926, they were later deprived of this right by the 1973
constitution (27). The issue of women participation has been
debated more in Kuwait than in any other of the Gulf states. Many
petitions have been presented to the National Assembly for and
against the right of women to vote. Kuwalti women have not
achieved this right for several reasons: the nature of the
Constitution and the electoral system, the fierce campaign by the
opposing camp, the lack of a strong feminist movement and the
overwhelming fact that the majority of Kuwaiti women and public
opinion are not In favour of women's involvement in politics (28).
Article 70 of the U.A.E. Constitution does not specify the sex
of the citizens eligible for FNC membership. Some writers (29) are
therefore of the opinion that women have the right to be members
of the Council. Such a view may be very liberal, but it is also
unrealistic and an example of wishful thinking.
U.A.E. women may not be constitutionally deprived of being
appointed to the FNC. However, it Is important to understand the
society a constitution governs. Women did not and do not have an
influential political role in the society of the emirates. It is no
wonder the FNC has had no woman member in the past twenty
years.
iii - Minorities: U.A.E. society Is to a considerable extent a
homogeneous society. Most of its citizens by origin are Sunni
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Arabs (see chapter 2). There are, however, some minority groups
amongst the original citizens. They are considered minority
because of their ethnic origin or religious sect.
There are Sunnis of both Persian and African origin. The
former migrated to the emirates at the turn of the nineteenth
century. They claim to be of Arab origin. The latter are the
descendants of African slaves brought by Arab traders from the
east coast of Africa. Both groups nowadays are to a great degree
integrated into the majority.
There is a small community of Shia Muslims in the U.A.E.
The members of this sect are either of Arab origin (Bahraini and
Saudi) or of non-Arab origin (Persian and Indian). The Shia are
concentrated in Dubal and Sharjah. Those who are considered to
be U.A.E. citizens by origin are largely integrated in the society.
As been discussed in the theoretical chapter, the legislature
in several Third World countries is used as a channel of
integration. It is probably the only political institution where
different segments of the society will meet and express their
demands. Such a practice may enhance the political participation
of the people and Increase support for the regime.
The U.A.E. legislature has not been utilized to promote
integration amongst different groups in the society. Among the 111
members who have served in the FNC In the past twenty years only
three members could be regarded as belonging to a minority group.
One was from Ajman and represented Persian Sunnis and two
were from Dubal and represented Indian Sunnls (30). However,
these three members were not appointed because of their ethnic
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origin but rather because of their mercantile importance In the
emirates. In addition they are fully assimilated in the majority and
have ceased to consider themselves as non-Arabs.
It is obvious that no original citizen of African or of Shia
origin has been appointed to any of the four councils. Although
there Is a kind of dissatisfaction amongst these groups, yet no one
publicly questions their exclusion from the FNC.
In spite of living in the country for almost a century and
being original citizens by law and participating in the
administration of the federal and local government, minority
groups in the U.A.E. have not fully participated in the political
arena.
6.4 Socio-economic Backgrounds of the FNC Members:
Jean Blondel, In his book Comparative Legislatures (1973),
rightly points out that legislatures, whether in Third World or
Western democracies, seldom reflect the diversity of the society.
They are not a mirror Image of the population. Blonde! recognizes a
universal truth when he states that:
U Legislatures are unrepresentative and the only
question which arises Is how vast is the distortion
between the composition of the country and the
composition of its legislature." (31)
Of the same opinion is Michael Gallagher in his study of the
Social Backgrounds and Local Orientations of Members of the
Irish DalI" (1985). He emphasizes that:
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Virtually all research into the composition of
legislatures shows that parliamentary representatives
collectively do not have the same sociodemographic
characteristics as the population which elects them."
(32)
Gallagher claims that legislators in Britain, West Germany,
Singapore, Bangladesh, Zambia and Tanzania are elites, " drawn
disproportionately from high-status and high-income occupations
(33)". Workers and women are underrepresented in these
parliaments.
Legislators tend to be generally better educated than the
majority of the population. Education is a major factor in the
election of legislators in many legislatures such as In Sri Lanka
and Tanzania (). Members of legislatures, furthermore, appear to
be wealthier than the average citizens.
However, it is highly risky to assume that the social
background of MP5 will automatically correlate with their political
orientation. Blondel warns writers on the subject of the
composition of legislatures against rushing to establish such a
linkage. He stated that:
At least until an acceptable theory of the
relationship between "attitudes" (and background) and
behavior has been developed, we need to be very
careful about attempting to extrapolate the
characteristics of members to those of legislators (35)."
Some of above general assumptions may be made as
generalisations of the FNC membership. Having examined the
socio-economic backgrounds of the members, one can conclude
that the FNC is not truly representative of U.A.E. society as a
whole.
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It is understandable that the soclo-economic realities of
every emirate affect the selection of its members. Abu Dhabl Is
largely a tribal society where tribal ties are strong and not
diminishing as in the rest of the emirates. Therefore, almost half of
its representatives in the four councils were tribesmen. In other
words, they were selected because of their tribal affiliation. One
can easily recognize representation of the major tribes of Abu
Dhabi in FNC, such as the Al-Mazroui, the Al-Mansori and the Al-
Hamli. Such practice may be interpreted as a sign of the survival of
the traditional tribal values and pressure groups in the society.
In Dubal representatives are drawn largely from mercantile
families. The emirate is the commercial centre of the U.A.E. In the
first three councils merchant families held six seats out of eight. In
the fourth Council the number has been reduced to five. The most
important mercantile families, such as the Lootah, the Nabodeh,
the Al-Tayer, the Al-Habtoor and the Al-Ghuralr, are represented
in the FNC.
In the rest of the emirates two factors determine the
selection of the emirate's representatives; their families' importance
and their economic position in the emirate. Sharjah members, for
instance, are basically selected because of their social
backgrounds. They are from the most important families in the
emirate, such as the Al-Owais, the Taryam, the Al-Jarwan, the Al-
Mahmoud and the Bin Jarsh. In one particular emirate, Ras-al-
Rhaimah, the economic position of a citizen is the main criterion
for his selection and therefore the representatives of the emirate
are the most wealthy members of the society.
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The FNC may be unique with regard to the imbalance of
occupations amongst its members. For instance, there Is a
complete absence of workers and peasants in the Council not only
because this group does not represent a significant percentage of
the nationals nowadays, but also because manual workers and
peasants had no important role In local politics in the past and
therefore one cannot expect them to be actively Involved in
present-day politics.
A second observation on the occupations issue is that,
unlike in other countries, professionals and government
bureaucrats are severely underrepresented in the Council. In the
present Council there are not more than six members who could
be regarded as professionals or civil servants. They are: two
lawyers, one civil servant, one physician, one teacher and one
academic.
A distinctive feature of the FNC is that It is dominated by the
commercial element ( i.e. small and big businessmen). This
category includes landowners, contractors, directors of companies
and importers and exporters. In none of the four councils did the
number of seats occupied by this category fall bellow 25 seats
(62.5%).
With regard to the educational level, a survey conducted by
A. Al-Hosanl showed that the number of university graduates is
steadily increasing. In the first council there were only two
members holding BA degrees (5%). In the second and third the
number increased to 10 (25%) and 16 (40%) respectively. In the
present Council the number has risen to 18 members (45%) (36).
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The writer, however, has some doubts about the figures
provided by Al-Hosarii since J.E. Peterson records that in the
second session of the third council there were four university
graduates (37), and certainly in the present Council the number of
university graduates does not exceed 14 members. The explanation
may be that Al-Hosanf a figures include those holding secondary
school certificates.
In spite of such discrepancies it is obvious that the number
of educated members in the FNC is increasing. This reflects the
inclination of the nilers to adjust their appointment criteria to the
changing social realities in the society.
To sum up, a typical FNC member tends to confirm the
universal generalisatlons. He is of the elite in the sense that he is
economically wealthier and more politically influential than the
vast majority of his fellow citizens.
6.5 DecIding the Validity of Membership:
Constitutions differ when dealing with the question of how
the validity of membership shall be confirmed. There are three
ways of dealing with such a question.
The first way is to hand the matter to the legislature so that
it can Independently decide the validity of the mandate of
individual members. If a result of the elections was contested then
the legislature will look into it. This method Is justified on the
grounds that it preserves the independence of the legislature by
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preventing the intervention of the other sections of the government
in its affairs (38).
This method has some shortcomings especially under a
party system. A legislature may abuse its power and declare the
results of electing a member null and void not on legal grounds but
rather for political reasons. The constitution of the Fourth French
Republic (1946) adopted this method. In practice, the National
Assembly abused its power and dismissed eleven MPs in 1956 and
replaced them with their political opponents. The Fifth Republic
Constitution (1958) avoided this temptation by handing this power
over to a Constitutional Council (39).
The second way is to give the power to determine the validity
of the membership to the courts. Here the contest over
membership is viewed as a legal dispute rather than a political
one. It is therefore important to place such a dispute in the hands
of a legal and neutral body (i.e. the court). Since 1868 in Britain
the power to question the election of a MP is in the hands of the
Election Court. Two judges decide the fate of the member.
However, their judgement is rarely called upon in present days (40).
Some constitutions adopt a middle course. They give the
courts the power to discuss the dispute and then submit a report
on its findings to the legislature. The latter will then give the final
decision over the dispute. This method has been adopted by the
Egyptian Constitution of 1971 (41).
In theory, the U.A.E. Constitution has adopted the first
method by assigning, in Article 76, the task of deciding the validity
of membership to the FNC itself.
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The Standing Order of the Council explains the procedures
for contesting membership as follows:
1- The challenge should be delivered to the president of the
Council within thirty days of the contested member taking the
constitutional oath.
2- The president of FNC shall refer the contest to the ad hoc
committee. The latter shall instruct the concerned member in
writing to defend his position.
3- The ad hoc committee has the right to summon both parties in
the dispute.
4- The committee shall present its report to the Council within one
month.
5- The FNC shall decide on the contest within a month. The
decision to nullilr the membership shall be passed by the majority
of the members.
In examining these procedures one may ask who has the
capacity to challenge the membership of a certain member and on
what basis. How will the FNC deal with a ruler one of whose
members has been contested?
Although the Standing Order specffies the procedures in
some detail it does not spell out who can initiate the contest. There
are two opinions as to who Is entitled to challenge the appointment
of a member.
The first considers that the objector must have the legal
capacity to initiate his objection. In other words he must fulfil the
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conditions stipulated by Article 70 and have reasonable grounds to
be selected instead of the respondent. The second asserts that
Council members have the right to challenge a colleague's
membership (42).
The writer sees difficulties in both scenarios. First of all how
can an appointed member be challenged? His selection lies in the
hands of his ruler not the people. This means that any contest over
his membership will implicitly challenge the ruler's will. Neither
the FNC members nor ordinary citizens would presume to do that.
Secondly, the member is selected by criteria known to the
ruler only. Therefore to fuffil the conditions required by Article 70
is not enough to give a citizen the right to challenge the
membership. The term "reasonable grounds" is vague and cannot
be taken seriously.
Thirdly, FNC members cannot use this power because they
were not given it. In addition, they represent their own emirates
and cannot dictate the membership of other emirates. No ruler
would accept his emirate's members contesting the choice of
another ruler.
From the foregoing discussion it can be concluded that
essentially the appointment of a member is political rather than
legal. Therefore contesting FNC membership has no place in
practice even though this power has been ambiguously mentioned
In the constitution.
The Standing Order articles regarding this power are more
hypothetical than real. No member of the FNC In the past was
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challenged. The validity of legislature membership may be subject
to challenge In the U.A.E. if there were free elections for the FNC
seats.
6.6. ImmunitIes and proscribed occupations for FNC members:
It is Important for the independence of a legislature that its
members should be given irrLmUnity from coercive pressures while
they are acting in their capacity. There are two main privileges that
a legislator may enjoy: (1) free speech in the legislature and (2)
immunity from prosecution (43).
In the context of the U.A.E. Constitution, ArtIcle 81 states
that Council members shall be free to express their views and
opinions in the Council and its committees. No member shall be
held liable In this respect.
In the FNC, a member shall not be held liable for his ideas
and views but his actions. He can express himself freely but he is
not free in assaulting and battering his colleagues. In addition, his
privilege is limited to the Council and its committees. He could be
held liable for his speech outside the Council (44).
The FNC member, furthermore, has an Immunity against
criminal charges or civil arrest. The Constitution provides that
except In the case of fiagran delicto, no penal measures may be
taken against him while the Council Is in session except with the
authorisation of the Council itself. The FNC must be notified of any
such measures taken against a member while it is out of session.
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One of the FNC members rights is a salary (45). Each one has
an annual salary of Dhs. 180000 ($49,315). This is generous in
comparison with that of the majority of citizens, yet much lower
than that paid to those employed in high federal occupations (i.e.
civil servants). However, considering the task they are doing and
the time they spend in carrying it out this salary is more than
adequate.
In addition to granting certain immunities to legislators,
constitutions tend to bar them from occupying certain posts or
participating in certain coimnercial activities. This is justified on
the grounds that It preserves the independence of the legislature.
The Kuwaiti and Bahraini constitutions, for example, bar
their legislators from holding any public posts other than
ministerial portfolios. They also ban MPs from being appointed to
the board of directors of any company while they are in their
mandate. Furthermore, these two constitutions prohibit their
legislators from participating in specific commercial transactions
such as those involving government concessions, renting or buying
public properties and selling or letting properties to the
government, except by public auction or tender.
Article 71 of the U.A.E. constitution stipulates that FNC
members are barred from holding public posts. 'Public posts' in the
U.A.E. constitutional system means any public occupation for
which its occupier gets a salary from the federal state.
The prohibition has been rationalised on the ground that
public posts are Incompatible with the duties of an FNC member.
He must be free from any Intervention or guidance from his
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superIors (46). Unlike in Kuwait and Bahrain, the prohibition in the
U.A.E. extends to include ministerial portfolios. The Executive has
no members in the U.A.E. legislature.
A member is barred from federal occupations but not from
local posts. He can be an FNC member and at the same time
occupy a post In his emirate such as municipal administration,
banking or in the ruler's court (Diwan). This situation has been
criticized as reinforcing the loyalty of the Council member to his
emirate at the expense of his loyalty to the federal entity (47).
Secondly, the same justification has been advanced in the case of
local public posts as has been applied to federal public posts.
Conflict of interests and pressures of superiors will probably exist
in both cases (48).
Finally, the U.A.E. Constitution does not bar a member from
being appointed a member of a board of directors. In this it is
content to follow the example of the Kuwaiti and Baliralni
constitutions.
6.7. Turnover of Membership within the FNC:
The turnover of members and the length of their service over
the period of a particular legislature is a rough guide to the
stability of membership. It is Important to have a stable
membership because It leads to improvement in performance and
increased expertise.
Peverlll Squire, in his study of "Career Opportunities and
Membership Stability in Legislatures" (1988) conducted on U.S.
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state legislatures, suggests two ways to measure membership
stability.
"The first and most often employed is turnover:
the number or percentage of new members, usually
calculated at the beginning of a session. The second
measure is average years of member service In the
legislature. ... The reason the two are not the same is
subtle but significant. Two legislatures could have the
same turnover rate and have different average years of
consecutive service- for instance, if one body has the
same seat turning over each election and the other
body loses members from a different set of districts
each time. The former legislature would have a higher
mean member tenure than the latter. (49)
Some writers (50) are of the opinion that a high rate of
turnover has some advantages. They claim that the legislature will
not be an exclusive club. The high turnover will eliminate the
emergence of a parliamentary class and therefore bolster
democracy. Others assume that new members will be more
responsive towards constituent demands than the incumbents (51).
There is an impression that membership In old democracies
is more stable than in new emerging states. In Britain, for
example, out of the 650 MPs elected in the 1987 General Election
only 144 (22%) were serving for the first time (52). Similarly, in the
U.S.A. In a study of the U.S. state legislatures, Niemi and Winsky
provided data showing that the mean values of membership
turnover in the period of 1931-1940 was 50.7 per cent for the
Senate and 58.7 per cent for the House of Representatives. This
percentage drastically declined through the years. It became 24.1
per cent for the senate and 28 per cent for the House (53).
In the developing countries the rate of membership turnover
tends to be very high. In the 1985 Tanzanian elections, 58 per cent
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of legislators were newcomers. The same applied to another one-
party state, Kenya, where almost half of the incumbents were
turned over at every general election (54). The high turnover was
observed in the last Kuwalti elections where 56% of the 1985
Assembly members were new to the job (55).
Squire categorized the legislatures in terms of their
membership turnover into three types. (1) The career legislature
which provides its members with respectable financial incentives
in order to encourage them to stay In service for a long period. (2)
The springboard legislature which is seen merely as a stage
towards political advancement. (3) The dead-end legislature which
neither offers its members financial gain nor advances them
politically (56).
Although FNC members are not elected, an analysis of the
members of the four councils reveals that the practice in the
U.A.E. does not greatly differ from that of Third World legislatures.
With regard to the rate of turnover one can see from figures
(1,2,3 ) that it is very high. The third council had the lowest
turnover (47.5%), but it was still a high percentage. In the second
and fourth Councils the rate was over two thirds of the members,
70 per cent and 67.5 per cent respectively.
Why does such a high rate of turnover exists in a non-
elected legislature? The writer would suggest that the turnover has
been exploited by the rulers for the purpose of local politics.
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In every emirate there are conflicting interests and a large
number of second-class politicians. The ruler rotates his emirat&s
seats among the most influential families or tribes so as to gain
their patronage. Another factor is that none of the rulers is willing
to create a hard-core political elite in the Council.
Regarding the average years of service in the FNC, figures
(4,5,6,7) show that more than 73 per cent of the members have
served in one council. The average Is therefore four years. Just
three members out of 111 members have served in all four
councils.
Abu Dhabl members were the longest serving. Just over half
of them served for at least one term. In contrast Sharjah members
were the most likely to be turned over. Only one member out of 23
served more than one term. The turnover rate amongst Sharjah
members Is 95 per cent. Incidentally, It Is not common practice to
inherit seats in the U.A.E. legislature. In only two cases, one in
Ajman and the second in Fujairah, did a son replace his father as
a member of the FNC. Three cases of a brother inheriting his
brother's seat were observed in Dubal, Ras-al-Khaimah and Umm-
al-Quwain. It seems that the rulers did not want to give a single
family in their emirates the chance to acquire a political base (57).
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6.8. The Formal Structure of the Council:
This part will of the chapter deal with the constitutional
arrangements regarding terms, summoning, presidency and
committees of the FNC. Further it will analyse practice and assess
whether the constitutional provisions have been implemented ad
verbum.
6.8.1. FNC terms and sessions:
A legislature, whether elected or appointed, is not supposed
to be In session permanently. It must have a specific term of
duration. It must be dissolved and then re-elected or re-appointed.
The term of duration differs from one political system to another.
Article 72 of the U.A.E. Constitution provides that the term
of membership in the FNC shall be two years, starting from the
first meeting. The Council will determine a renewal for the
remaining period of the interim stage. The Provisional Constitution
of the country was intended to last for five years, expiring at the
end of 1976.
The first council met on 12 February 1972 which meant that
its term would end on the same date after two years. Article 72,
which reads .. when this period expires, the Council shall
determine the renewal for the time remaining until the end of the
transitional period", Is ambiguous as to who has the power to
renew the FNC term after the lapse of the two years. It is unclear
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whether the word council" refers to the Supreme Council or the
National Council.
There is a division of opinion on this question. Two opinions
are advanced. The first Is adopted by the constitutional adviser to
the FNC. He argues that the word "council" in the article does not
refer to the FNC. The FNC cannot extend itself by its own decision
either before or after the lapse of the two years. He insists that an
error occurred in the typing of the script of the constitution and
the word "Supreme" was not included In the text. He, consequently
argues that the Supreme Council has the power to renew the FNC
term (58).
The second opinion is put forward by a Kuwait!
constitutional lawyer opposed to the foregoing interpretation. He
argues that the Supreme Council as a federal body has no power
in this regard. The Council cannot collectively renew the term of
the FNC without confficting with Article 70 of the constitution. He
suggests that individual emirates have the power to renew the FNC
term (sg).
My own researches based on an investigation of the nine-
member-union documents, offers a middle way between the two
views expressed above. The 1971 U.A.E. constitution was almost
identical with the 1968 proposed constitution of the nine-member-
union. Article 72 of the former resembles Article 73 of the latter,
save for one word. It seems that an error had occurred, not in
omitting a full word but rather a dot. The sentence In the 1968
constitution "The Council shall be renewed" became in 1971 as
The Council shall determine the renewal" (60). The writer therefore
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assumes that the Intention was to renew the FNC term by the will
of the emirates.
Article 72 thus divides the term of the FNC Into two terms,
the first to last for two years and the second tifi the end of the
Interim period. In practice no decision has been issued in the past
twenty years, either by the Supreme Council or by Individual
emirates, which renews the FNC term after the prescribed two
years ends. The term of the FNC has become a defacto five years.
6.8.2 Summons and adjournment
The FNC term is divided into sessions. Each session lasts for
not less than six months. This period of time Is less than the
period adopted by the Kuwait!, Bahrainl and Qatar! constitutions
(eight months).
Constitutions differ as to who has the right to summon the
legislature, whether it Is the executive or the legislature itself or
both or head of state. Some constitutions hand this power to the
legislature in order to secure its independence (e.g. U.S.A.,
Switzerland). Few constitutions grant the matter of summoning the
legislature to the government as does Qatar's. Most modern
constitutions have taken a middle way whereby the government
has the power to summon the legislature on specific dates but the
legislature may summon itself under certain conditions (61).
The U.A.E. constitution falls into the third category. It grants
the Head of the Union the power to summon the FNC by a decree.
However, If the Council is not summoned before the third week of
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November, the FNC then can summon itself on the 21st of that
month.
The FNC may be summoned for an extraordinary session by
a decree Issued by the President of the Union. The Council has not
been granted this power. Unlike the position under the Kuwaiti
and BahraIni constitutions, FNC members cannot ask for an
extraordinary session (62).
The meetings of the FNC can be adjourned by a decree
issued by the President of the Union with the consent of the
Council of Ministers. The adjournment period Is restricted to one
month. It must not be used more than one time in a session,
except with the approval of the FNC (63).
In practice these provisions are not fully observed. With
regard to the issue of summoning, the Council has usually been
summoned by a presidential decree on dates later than these laid
down by the constitution. The first session of the first council was
supposed to be held prior to 30-1-72 in accordance with Article 78,
but It was summoned on the 12-2-72. The same thing happened
with the next councils. It has now become a rule that the Council
shall be summoned later than its constitutional date.
The fourth council (1987-1991) was summoned for its first
session of the second term right at the beginning of March 1990
instead of November 1989. The FNC did not sustain the situation
and declared in Its reply to the presidential speech that it would
like the government to observe the dates set up by the constitution
for summoning the Council. Consequently, the first deputy of the
FNC president announced that the FNC would summon Itself on
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the 21st of November 1990 In compliance with Article 79 of the
constitutIon (64). It was the first time in FNC history that It was not
summoned by a presidential decree.
With regard to the question of adjournment, the FNC was
adjourned on six occasions for one month (65). The writer was told
by a source in the FNC secretariat that the major reason for these
adjournments was that November is usually the month for hunting
and the President of the Union, who likes to open the FNC sessions
In person, is always busy in this month. The best solution was to
adjourn the session.
It is Important to mention that the FNC meets twice every
fortnight. Since the minimum period of a session is six months, the
Council will meet at least 24 days in the whole session. It is
admittedly a poor record for a legislature.
6.8.3 The FNC Bureau and Committee system:
The Council is free to elect its president on the first sitting of
each term. He will be elected by a majority of votes in a secret
ballot. If this majority is not secured in the first round then
election will be repeated between the first two members. The same
procedures are applied in the election of the first and second vice-
presidents. However, if the position of the president Is vacant then
an election will be held to select a new one. The first vice-president
will, not replace him automatically.
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The president is responsible for representing the Council,
presiding over its meetings, presenting the annual budget of the
FNC, and observing the work of the SecretarIat (66).
The Council will also elect two controllers for one session.
With the President and two vice-presidents, they will form the
Council Bureau. The Bureau will be responsible for settling
procedural matters, selecting FNC delegates who will represent the
Council inside and outside the country, and supervising the
administrative work of the Council.
In practice, the posts of the FNC were virtually contested in
every Council except the first. The first president, two vice-
presidents and controllers were uncontested in their election. The
second president was not elected in the first round and neither
were the two vice-presidents. The third president and his deputies
won their seats in the second round. In the fourth council the
positions were contested.
Although it is not specified in the constitution who shall
occupy these posts, political realities in the U.A.E. direct the
election process. The two important emirates, Dubal and Abu
Dhabi, dominate the most important positions. Out of four
presidents Dubal has supplied three (first, third and fourth), while
the fourth was from Sharjah. In addition, out of eight vice-
presidents Abu Dhabi has supplied five and Dubal one. Ajman and
SharJah were the only small emirates to held a post and they have
had one post each.
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The FNC has eight committees with seven members in each.
A member can participate In only two committees. The committees
are:
- Committee for internal and defence affairs,
-,,	 ,, financial, economic and industrial affairs,
-,,	 ,, legislation and legal affairs,
-,,	 ,, education, media and Information affairs,
-,,	 ,, health, work and social affairs,
foreign affairs, petroleum, agriculture and fishery,
-,,	 ,, for Islamic affairs and public utifities, and
-,,	 ,, Inspecting contestation and grievances.
Each committee elects its president. A committee cannot
diredily contact a minister to discuss matters concerning his
ministry but has to address him through the FNC president. The
task of the committee is to ask for information from public bodies
and departments, to discuss what has been referred to it by the
Council and to present within three weeks its report to the FNC.
The researcher has noticed that new members tend to
participate more effectively in two committees than the longer
standing members. In the present council, for Instance, thirteen
out of seventeen members participating In two committees were
newcomers. Most of them are from small emirates and are well-
educated members. It seems that members of the small emirates
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want to compensate for their small number In the Council by
becoming Involved in more than one committee.
6.9 Conclusion:
The conclusion to this chapter may be shortly stated. The
U.A.E. legislature Is a unicameral council whose seats are
proportionally distributed. Its members are appointed by the rulers
although the constitution does not dictate any specific method of
selection.
It seems that tribal values have Intertwined with the
constitutional provisions in order to establish a modus vivertdL The
process of consultation in the traditional Mauls was open to
everybody In the society. The new institution of consultation which
was adopted by the 1971 Constitution, viz, the Federal National
Council, had to be acceptable to the tribal culture so that it could
survive. As we have seen in chapter 2, the tribal criteria for
leadership does not Include the method of election. The
appointment method does not, therefore, degrade the FNC in the
eyes of the public or its members because it is a traditional
system.
The members are selected from among citizens by origin.
They represent the minority elite in the society. The membership of
the council secure the dominance of this minority. They are male
Arabs from dominant merchant, tribal and co-operative families in
the emirates. In fact, the practice of selecting FNC members and
their soclo-economic background highlights the prevalence of the
old structure of the society and the continuity of traditional way of
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consultation. The FNC therefore, like its counterparts in other
countries, Is unrepresentative of its society. Furthermore no one
can contest the membership of the Council.
Membership of the FNC Is highly unstable in terms of
turnover and average years of service and as a result there are a
number of inexperienced members in each term. Furthermore, the
FNC must be considered a dead-end legislature. It might provide
its members with some financial Incentives, but it cannot serve as
a springboard for their political ambitions in the system. Aside
from one member who became minister of agriculture, no FNC
members have been recruited for higher governmental posts.
Finally, there can be no doubt that, because of lack of
previous constitutional experience, some provisions of the
constitution regarding the legislature have not been fully adhered
to In practice.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE PRACTICAL WORKING OF THE U.A.E.
LEGISLATURE UNDER THE 1971 CONSTITUTION
7.1 Introduction:
Generally, elected legislatures may be said to have two
primary functions: to represent the people and as an elected
legislature to authorise taxation and expenditure. The former
means it has the right to speak for the people having committed its
deliberations and decisions to the whole nation for approval U). As
for the latter, for example, the English Parliament was originally
established specifically to' sanction taxes needed by the Monarch
(2). The form of legislature which has come to exist in the western
democracies has many other functions, such as educating and
informing the public, controffing the executive, and framing
legislation.
After discussing the membership and formal structure of the
FNC in the previous chapter, this chapter explains and analyses
the functions of the U.A.E. legislature. The focus will be on the
three broad constitutional functions usually assigned to
legislatures: legislative, political and fiscal. Also the link between
the exercise of power and its accountability to the electorate.
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7.2 Legislation (law-making):
In the British model of legislature, historically Sovereign
power is vested in the Parliament. It was the prerogative of the
monarch to make laws, but by the seventeenth century,
Parliament, after a long constitutional struggle, succeeded in
wresting this power from the crown. The British Parliament
emerged as the supreme law maker in the U.K. However, in the
nineteenth century when the government started to expand its
activities, and the power of Parliament to make laws was reduced.
In theory Parliament sought to exercise control over the executive.
But In reality Parliament was subject to executive influence.
It is obvious that the power to enact laws also conveyed the
power to rule the country as we will see later when we discuss
fiscal powers. Under strict presidential system, legislation is the
privilege of the legislature. However, such absolute right did not
exist in reality. Many developments occurred in the presidential
system which enabled the executive to participate in the legislation
process (3).
The parliamentary system is based on the co-operation
between legislature and executive, with the government taking the
initiative in instituting Bills. The government is unique In its abifity
to authorise formal expenditures or taxations. Indeed under a
parliamentary system the government tends to dominate this
function. Griffith observed that:
When Parliament is called the Legislature what
is meant is that no body or person can Issue an order,
rule, regulation, scheme or enactment having the force
of law without Parliamentary authority. But it çloes not
follow that Parliament is responsible for the whole of
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the legislative process. In other words, " to legislate"
may mean either to authorise the action which turns a
legislation proposed into a law or to carry through the
whole legislative process. In this latter sense
legislation today is more a governmental than a
Parliamentary function (4)."
It seems that in this respect there is litfie distinction between
Parliament and government.
Some constitutions distinguish between two kinds of
legislation: that which has been made by the legislature and that
which has been made by the executive as in France. The 1958
French Constitution gives Parliament the power to legislate in
many subjects (Article 34) and the government has the power to
make laws in other matters (5). A Bill may be introduced by an
individual or by the government, and it may be a public or private
Bifi.
Some countries (e.g. France) gave the task of drafting Bifis to
those experienced in the subject involved, and those experts are
not necessarily lawyers; some are civil servants. Others (e.g.
Sweden) place the matter in the hands of a drafting commission,
which includes one or more lawyers or legal experts. Institutions
have been established specifically to review the legal aspect of
projected Bifis (e.g. Conseil d'Etat in France and Law Council in
Sweden) and in some cases there are special departments in the
ministry involved entrusted with doing the job (e.g. Germany) (6).
A number of general observations may be made about the
legislative process from the experience of different political
systems:
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- Most of the Bills originate with the government. This can be
justified on the grounds that the government is more equipped
with recruitment potential and has greater access to expertise and
information than the legislature.
- Government Bills are adopted by legislatures at a very high
rate.
- It is rare that the government fails to pass its Bifis.
- The rate of adopting non-government Bifis Is low (7).
It should be remembered that these observations are not
always true. For Instance, in the U.S.A., which adopts a
presidential system with separate and co-equal branches of
government, the rate of presidential Bifis (I.e. executive Bifis)
adopted by the Congress is very low (8). Most of the Bifis are
introduced by administrative agencies, interest groups and
individual representatives and citizens. One characteristic that the
U.S.A. system shares with other systems, however, is that Bifis
sponsored by individuals face more difficulties in passing through
Congress than governmental ones (g).
It is obvious from the preceding analysis that legislation,
despite being an Important function of the legislature, is not under
its exclusive jurisdiction because the executive contribute
substantially in this function.
Legislation under the U.A.E. Constitution confirms with the
above general observations except that the Initiation stage of the
legislative process Is wholly under the jurisdiction of the
government. There Is some similarity to the French Constitution of
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1814 which gave the King the right to participate in the legislative
power and Bills were only to be introduced by government. In effect
the two houses of Parliament were stripped of this crucial process.
This gap was corrected in the 1830 Constitution which returned
the power of Instituting Bills to the Parliament (io).
The Constitutions of Kuwait and Bahrain granted the
members of the National Assembly the right to initiate Bills.
However, the Bill must be adopted by not more than five members
(Art. 109, Art. 71). Moreover, no Bill shall be enacted unless
passed by the legislature (Art. 79, Art. 42).
Under the U.A.E. Constitution, the legislative process passes
through four stages: introduction, debate and discussion,
ratification and promulgation. The third and fourth stages are
under executive jurisdiction. The Union President and the
Supreme Council have the power to ratify laws discussed by the
legislature.
Regarding the initiation of Federal Bifis, Article (60) and
paragraph 2 of Article 110 provide that the Council of Ministers
hold a monopoly over this Important stage. The legislature has no
competence in the field of initiating Bifis. Each ministry submits
its Bill to the Council of Ministers for approval before passing it to
the FNC.
It seems that the Constitution restricts the role of the FNC in
the debate and discussion of Bifis introduced by the government to
the extent explained by Article 1 10:3a:
"If the Federal National Council inserts
any amendment to the Bill and this amendment is not
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acceptable to the President of the Union or the
Supreme Council, or if the Union National Assembly
rejects the Bill, the President of the Union or the
Supreme Council may refer it back to the National
Council. If the Federal National Council introduces
any amendment on that occasion which Is not
acceptable to the President of the Union or the
Supreme Council, or if the Federal National Council
decides to reject the Bifi, the President of the Union
may promulgate the law after ratification by the
Supreme Council."
Mechanisms of law-making in the U.A.E.
It should be remembered that there is no opportunity under
the 1971 constitution for a private member Bifi. Law-making in the
U.A.E. commences with a Bifi which originates in a department in
the relevant ministry, then is approved by the Council of Ministers
which submits it to the FNC. In the legislature the Bill will be
referred directly to the ad hoc Committee. The committee may
consult the legislative committee, seeking its opinion on the
wording of the Bill. The ad hoc committee will present a report
containing the original draft and its amendments. The report will
be debated later on in the FNC. Every member has the right to
discuss each Article of the Bifi. All amendments must be
introduced in written form before the FNC meeting although the
Council may consider any amendments produced during the
meeting. Finally, the Council shall vote on the Bill. The voting on
draft-law Is by roll call. A majority is required for rejecting or
amending a Bifi.
If the government disagrees with the FNC rejection or any
amendment introduced to the original draft, the Bill will be
referred back to the Council so that it may be reconsidered. If the
FNC insists on its view point then the President of the Union has
the power to override this decision and promulgate the law (ii).
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The Constitution permits the Council of Ministers in urgent
cases, with the consent of the Supreme Council and the President,
to promulgate laws In the absence of the legislature. The executive
must notify the FNC about these laws at the beginning of its next
session. The legislature has no power to vote on these laws.
From the above explanation of the constitutional
arrangements for legislation in the U.A.E. some conclusions may
be drawn.
First, the legislature may not be involved In the first step in
the life of a law i.e. initiation. Second, it may discuss, debate and
amend or reject a Bifi but what it does lack is mandatory power.
Third, as will be shown, the government may take advantage of the
period that the FNC is out of session and promulgate unchallenged
laws under its power to promulgate laws in urgent matters. In
short, it seems that according to the Constitution the role of the
FNC as far as legislation is concerned is to a large extent
consultative. The practice, however, showed that the FNC rejected
to be only a debating society.
It may be asked whether the role of the legislature in the
U.A.E. has been reduced to a mere pro forma ratification of
government Bifis and how far the government seizes the
opportunity to use its power when the Council is not in session?
For an answer to these questions one has to look in detail at
the experience of the FNC over the past twenty years. Research has
been undertaken to consider the Bifis introduced to the Council,
look at a case study of a recent penal law Bifi, and examine how
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the period between two sessions has been used for promulgating
new laws.
7.2.1 - Bills introduced to the Council:
In the period between 12 February 1972 and 12 July 1989,
two hundred and three draft-laws were initiated by the government
and introduced to the FNC (see figures 1,2). These may be divided
Into three categories: one hundred and eleven new Bills, forty
seven Bills amending existing laws and forty five fiscal Bifis. Sixty-
seven Bills were Introduced in the first Council, sixty-six in the
second, fIfty-six In the third and fourteen in the fourth. The reason
for the small number of Bifis in the present council is that the
period of study covers only the first one and half years of its life.
The Bifis passed without amendments numbered ninety-
three, Bifis passed with amendments numbered one hundred and
five and Bifis rejected by the Council numbered five. This means
that over half the Bifis were amended by the Council and this
indicates that It did not hesitate to use its power to its full extent.
In addition, the Council rejected a very small number of Bills,
obviously anxious to avoid clashing with the government at an
early stage.
Out of the 111 new Bifis presented, seventy-four were
amended; in other words, two thirds of them were not passed as
easily as the government would have wished. Even in the case of
Bifis amending standing laws the percentage of those passed
unopposed was less than 46 per cent. This indicates that the FNC
does not merely rubber stamp government projects, yet, its power
to revise Is very limited.
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In the case of fiscal Bills the Council tends to pass them
easily. Only six Bills were amended out of forty-five. In the case of
the third council all thirteen fiscal Bifis Introduced to it were
passed without any amendments. With the exception of the second
council, the FNC seems inclined not to get involved in financial
matters. This may be because of the technical nature of fiscal Bills.
It Is worth noting that not every Bill passed by the FNC
comes Into force immediately. For Instance, the Law of Social
Security, passed after being amended in late 1976, was not ratified
by the executive and actually promulgated till July 1981. Another
example Is the Law of Mffitary Service, which was passed in the
fourth session of the second term in early 1980, but has stifi not
been promulgated.
7.2.2 - A case study of the Penal Law Bill:
One example of law-making in practice is the Penal Law Bill.
The Penal Law Bifi has been described as "the most debated legal
document in the history of the U.A.E."(12) It took the government
thirteen months to reach a compromise with the FNC so that it
could promulgate the law. The Bifi was introduced to the Council
at its meeting on 19/3/1985 and was finally passed at the meeting
on 8/4/1986 (13). The purpose of this case study Is to examine the
procedures for scrutinizing the Bill before being promulgated into
law.
The original Bill recommended severe penalties, such as the
death sentence and life imprisonment. At the first meeting to
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discuss the Bill everything went smoothly and the council
discussed 148 Articles out of 458. At the second meeting, however,
a strong opposition was made against the Bill. The two major
points of contention were that (1) the Bill lacked a separate chapter
defining the legal terms it employed and (2) the Bill dealt
unsatisfactorily with crimes against state security.
The first point referred to is the ambiguity of many technical
terms in the Bill which needed clarification so that no one could
misuse them. The Minister of Justice replied to the opposition that
a definition chapter would be acceptable in the case of small Bifis,
such as those concerned with juvenile law, but that to define every
term in the Penal Law Bill would require a huge continuous effort
and volumes of books.
The second point was that the crimes described as crimes
against the security of the state were not clearly defmed and the
penalties were very harsh. A member of the Council with regard to
this point said that:
"Accepting the draft-law as it is, means that we
are asking the citizens to keep silent and not to talk,
debate or express their views In matters interrupting
the progress of their country."
In spite of the minister's defence of the Bifi, the FNC decided
by a majority of its members to postpone the debate to the next
meeting.
It became clear later on that the main obstacle to the
passing of the Penal Law Bill was the question of crimes against
state security. The Bill was debated at eight meetings before it was
finally passed in April 1986.
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Two major amendments were introduced to the original Bill.
The first concerned the Clauses dealing with crimes against the
state. The members were of the opinion that to tighten up state
security would definitely lead to the violation of the citizens'
human rights. They therefore succeeded in omitting articles 149,
169, 183, 184, 202 and 203. These articles took a hard line
against those expressing views or spreading information about the
country (14). The second amendment was the omission of the
Clauses dealing with alcohol-related crimes. The FNC
recommended these crimes to be addressed in a separate law. After
a long struggle the government agreed to all the concessions
demanded by the FNC, and the Penal Law was finally promulgated
in 1986, amended according to the wishes of the Council. The
FNC, after all, is not only a debating society.
7.2.3 - The practice of promulgating laws when the FNC is out of
session:
We have already seen that the U.A.E. Constitution gives the
Council of Ministers the power to initiate and promulgate laws in
the period between two sessions of the FNC. However, the usage of
this power depends largely on the nature of the relationship
between the executive and the legislature. The executive tends to
abuse Its power in periods of tension with the FNC.
As we will see in the next chapter, the second council tried to
fulfil its duties and even to expand them. It held a joint session
with the Council of Minsters in early 1979. The outcome of this
meeting was not acceptable to the rulers. Consequently, the
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Council of Ministers was reshuffled by the Supreme Council. The
remaining period in the life of the second council was tense and
the new government virtually ignored Its role.
Due to the strained relationship between the two bodies, the
executive used its constitutional power to promulgate four laws
when the council was out of session in the summer of 1980: the
Central Bank Law (15), the Press and Publication Law (16), the law
establishing the General Emirates Petroleum Corporation (GEPC)
(17) and the law amending the Legal Profession Law (18).
In accordance with paragraph 4 of Article 110 of the
Constitution the Council of Ministers informed the FNC about
these in Its first meeting of the next session on the 16/12/80, and
although the FNC had no power to contest these laws it
nevertheless protested against their promulgation in the summer.
The protest was based on the same paragraph of Article 110
which grants the executive the power to enact legislation in urgent
matters. None of the four promulgated laws could be said to be of
an urgent nature. The FNC stated in a protest letter to the Council
of Ministers:
"It has become clear to the FNC that the four
laws promulgated in its absence have no expedient
character which may justify the overstepping of the
Council's jurisdiction. What may prove this case is
that the FNC suggested the promulgation of these laws
some years ago.....For all these considerations the
FNC finds It necessary to raise Its opinion objecting to
the promulgation of these laws in its absence.....The
FNC Is keen to show that this objection does not
emanate from a desire to monopolize the power or
laying down restrictions and obstacles. The drive
behind the objection Is the adherence to the
constitutional bounds and respect of different powers."
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Although no response was issued by the Council of
Ministers, yet the government did not resort afterwards to abuse
its constitutional power in such explicit was.
The above example is an extreme case where the executive
may be said to have abused its powers and the legislature
defended its position in the legislative function. The legislature
wanted to make clear its concern about the usage of this power.
The aim was to restrict the exploitation of such an exceptional
power.
However, when relations between the executive and the
legislature improved the executive did not expand its power to
promulgate laws when the legislature was not in session. For
example, In the summer of 1983 only one law was Issued by the
executive while none was promulgated In the summer of 1984.
7.3 The political function of the FNC:
We now turn to examine the political functions of the FNC
and the procedures used to scrutinise legislation.
In theory, one of the roles of a legislature is to guarantee
government accountability towards the people, not to rule (19). A
legislature in theory is supposed to exercise control over the
executive and be a check on the administration. It can employ
various devices carrying out its role. It can table a question, call a
public debate, assemble a select committee, interpellate,
recommend or register a vote of no-confidence.
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The U.A.E. Constitution has not adopted all these methods
in dealing with the political function of the FNC. This section will
study the methods actually resorted to by the constitution and
their Implementation In practice.
7.3.1 - Parliamentary
 Questions:
Parliamentary questions have a variety of functions. They
may be considered as Inquiry instrument through which
information is exchanged between legislature and government, or
control Instrument used to reveal the government's mistakes (20).
The use of the question as a technique in controlling the executive
differs from one constitutional system to another. It may be related
to an internal matter in a particular constituency, it may be related
to national affairs and government services in the state as a whole,
or Its range may be extended to include all government policies at
home and abroad. The question may require a formal or Informal
answer. Where some matters are concerned advance notice must
be given (21).
The technique of question is important for both the member
and the minister. It makes room for the member of the legislature
to participate in discussing public affairs and to convey his
constituency's problems to the government. On the other hand it
affords the questioned minister a valuable opportunity to explain
to the public his policy or his department's daily work.
Some commentators on constitutional matters suggest that
the question is a personal privilege and no one other than the
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questioner can intervene, even to ask for more clarificatIon (22).
Some constitutions adopt this view and do not consider
supplementary questions (e.g. Kuwait), but some include other
members and In so doing to accept the supplementary questions
(e.g. India).
The U.A.E. Constitution grants the members of the Council
this device. It prescribes In Article 93 that:
The Prime Minister or his deputy or
the competent Minister shall answer questions put to
them by any member of the Assembly requesting
explanation of any matters within their jurisdiction."
The Standing Order of the Council lays down the procedure.
The question must be addressed by only one member. In addition,
the question cannot be Informal but must be written, brief and
specffic. The Council Bureau has the right to rule out any question
and the member can protest against that. The FNC provides for no
supplementary question either to the addressing member nor
others.
In practice only sixty-three questions were tabled by FNC
members during the period of 1972-1989 (see figure 7.3). More
than half of them were concerned with internal social matters such
as compensation for citizens, housing for low-income citizens, and
the building of local hospitals and schools. The first and third
councils attracted most of the questions and It was a small group
of members who dominated the use of this device.
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There were only five questions on foreign policy. Internal
affairs were widely discussed during the third council because it
sat at the time of the economic recession of the 1980s. Members
concentrated their questions on matters such as foreigners'
residence in the country, the state of the economy and the delay in
the promulgation of some necessary legislation. Ministers,
however, tried to evade such questions by providing the FNC with
written answers.
Questions have not been common practice in the U.A.E.
legislature because of their ineffectiveness. They have never
covered all governmental policies. Most of them have dealt only
with local Issues. In short, the question method in the FNC has not
been a control device but rather an Inquiry instrument.
7.3.2 - Public debates:
The legislature may act as a forum for public debate or
opposition. This method is suitable for a general subject pertaining
to state affairs. Members of the legislature may discuss a subject,
seeking clarification from the government. This method differs from
that of the question in that it deals with government policy as
whole rather than with a specific incident. Public debate opens the
door to contributions from among all the members. It may raise
many questions leading to Interpellatlon or a vote of no-confidence
in a minister. This being so, it is clear that public debate is one of
the most Important and efficient Instruments in the hands of the
legislature and as a result It has been surrounded by more
complicated procedures than any other devices.
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Griffith and Ryle, in their book Parliament: Functions.
Practice and Procedures (1989), (23) argued that under the system
of "parliamentary government" the two Houses of the British
Parliament can be considered neither as a governing Institution
nor as a law-making body. They claimed that the basic role of the
Parliament is to be a debating forum. Although the government
has a majority in the Parliament, it does not usually seek a total
control of public debates because this device, in the authors view,
is very important for the legitimation of the Minister's policies and
actions.
However, being a debate forum does not necessarily mean
that the Parliament lacks influence. The legislature does not
operate In a vacuum and its influence depends on the voters whom
the government cannot ignore. (24)
The U.A.E. Constitution has adopted such a method of
controlling the executive. Article 92 states:
'The Federal National Council may
discuss any general subject pertaining to the affairs of
the Union unless the Council of Ministers informs the
Federal National Council that such discussion is
contrary to the highest interests of the Union. The
Prime Minister or the Minister concerned shall attend
the debate. The Federal National Council may express
its recommendations and may define the subjects for
debate. If the Council of Ministers does not approve of
these recommendations, It shall notify the Federal
National Council of its reasons"
and Article 113 of the Council Standing Order provides:
"The Government can, itself or on the occasion
of a question addressed to it, ask for a public debate
on a subject related to Union affairs."
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From the previous provisions it is clear that public debate in
the FNC is restricted to Union affairs and that the Council deals
with federal rather than local issues. It is a method which may be
used by both the legislature and the executive. The former may use
it to broaden the frame of discussion while the latter may
manipulate this method to explain its policies. By adopting the
dual usage of this device, the U.A.E. constitution has taken a
different route than that taken by the surrounding systems (e.g.
Kuwait and Bahrain) which have restricted public debate to their
National Assemblies.
Both the Constitution and the Standing Order lay down the
conditions for the practice of this Instrument by FNC members. In
the first place there must be a request for a public debate signed
by five members. This reflects the importance of this method.
Second, It must be understood that the presentation of a request
does not necessarily mean that a debate will be held. The Council
must give its consent. Third, the Council of Ministers must be
informed about the request immediately. The Council of Ministers
has the power to object to the debate of any subject which it
considers contrary to the highest interests of the Union
Dr. Adel Al-Tabtabal criticised the third stipulation. He
argues that the executive will abuse its power and define the
highest interests of the union in its favour. He further argues that
the stipulation is a loose concept which can easily be extended to
include most subjects and deprive the FNC its power to call for a
public debate (26).
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However, experience has not confirmed Dr. Al-Tabtabal's
arguments. During the first three councils the government has not
objected to more than five subjects (26). This implies that the
government has not abused its power In this field and has allowed
the legislature to discuss matters raised by the members.
The researcher has looked at the subjects accepted for
public debate in the FNC during the first, second, third councils
and the first term of the fourth council (see figure 7.4). The survey
reveals several points. First, during this period one hundred and
forty-eight subjects have been debated in the Council, almost half
of this number during the first council. Second, the subjects have
ranged over almost all governmental activities. This indicates the
variety of the members interests. Third, the overwhelming majority
of subjects have been generalised and in only six cases have issues
related to a specific area or emirate been addressed. Fourth, FNC
debates have been open to the public except in seven cases.
Meetings in camera started in the second council with the debate
on foreign migration and its consequences for the population.
Other subjects discussed behind closed doors have been security
policy, the financial situation of the federal government, work
policy and media and information policy.
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Public services, such as education, health, electricity,
housing and social security, were the obvious subjects for debate
in the Council. They scored 45 per cent of the total, On the other
hand, foreign policy and federal matters have been least discussed.
Foreign policy has been debated three times under the first and
third councils, with the FNC upholding existing policy after
discussion. Federal matters, such as the emirates' contribution to
the federal budget and the financial situation of the government,
have seldom been discussed, This suggests that the legislature
tends to discuss matters concerning the welfare of the citizens
rather than question political matters of union policy.
Public debate in the U.A.E. legislature may result in a
recommendation on how to proceed, an expression of satisfaction
with the response given by the concerned minister, or the
formation of a committee to investigate or follow up the subject. In
just thirty-nine debates the Council was satisfied with the answer
provided by the minister. The FNC has issued recommendations in
over two thirds of the subjects it has debated. It is clear that the
Council has wanted to voice Its opinion publicly In most of the
matters it has discussed. It has not supported governmental policy
unreservedly; has often taken an independent stand.
The fourth council, especially, sought to be more
independent than its predecessors. It issued recommendations in
ten subjects out of fifteen. Moreover, it formed three committees to
investigate subjects as a result of public debates.
The Constitution requires the attendance of the Prime
Minister or the concerned minister at a public debate. However,
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this constitutional rule was not observed on several occasions and
the FNC accordingly protested vigorously. In the first council, for
example, no minister attended the first seven meetings of the
Council and the FNC was obliged to send a letter of objection to the
Council of Ministers demanding the presence of the concerned
ministers at public debates. At the following meeting seven
ministers were present (27). On another occasion the Council even
went so far as to threaten the government by issuing the following
decision:
The FNC has observed regretfully the
continuous absence of the government in the Council
meetings which Is contrary to the rulings of the
Constitution. This is calculated to paralyse the
Council's duty. The Council cannot but decide to
adjourn Its meetings to a time determined later ." (28)
Discussion and public debate has been frank and sincere.
Members have called explicitly for economic and political reform in
the country. One member, on the subject of the delay in fixing the
federal budget, said:
"I have here some notes on the delay in not
issuing the budget till the middle of this year. God
knows when it will be issued. I think that this delay
represents an unusual deficiency in the state
economy. It is an irregular phenomenon which must
be solved in some way.....A budget must be issued.
We are spending without knowing the exact budget
of the union ." (29)
Another member criticised the way that the government was
handling the financial situation. He was reported as saying:
It has been said that the reduction in the
budget and the cancellation of some approbations is
for the benefit of the citizen. I believe that this is
untrue.....Why does the government burden the
citizen with its problems? ... The government does not
support him nor does it provide him with a chance of
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work. What is desired for the citizen ? Has he to
migrate to other countries to earn his living or to ask
for social aims ? This is totally unacceptable . ( 30)
The openness of FNC members has not been restricted to
matters over which they have responsibffity but has extended to
areas in which they have no jurisdiction. Under Article 91, the
Constitution requires the government to notify the Council about
international treaties and agreements it concludes with other
states or international organisations but the FNC cannot pass a
vote over these treaties. The legislature may issue observations on
them.
The Council has not been totally constrained by the
provisions of the constitution. It has discussed, for example, in
public debate on 7/5/1985, the Economic Agreement among the
GCC countries. There was fierce criticism of this agreement. A
member voiced his criticism as follows:
"The U.A.E. does not make reservations on any
agreement regardless of its harm because the
agreement is not studied but signed. It is signed
because there are certain pressures exerted on us.
Those who made their reservations are in a powerful
position ... but we are told to do so and not to do so
and when to sign and not to sign." (31)
A recommendation was passed that all future agreements be
presented to the Council to look into and discuss, in order to help
the relevant ministry and thus benefit the U.A.E. The government
took this recommendation into account.
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7.3.3 The use of procedure known as "Recommendations":
The term "recommendation" refers to " an action which is
advisory in nature, rather than one having any binding effect." (32)
It can be described loosely as a non-binding suggestion.
This is the least efficient device for controlling the executive
but may be seen as a means of assessing the elite's opinion with
regard to a specific policy.
The U.A.E. Constitution grants the Council unrestricted
right to express recommendations as to its wishes and demands
relating to any public Issue. These recommendations emerge after
public debate, In answer to the presidential inaugural address or
following discussion of a draft-law.
Recommendations are addressed to the executive but they
are not mandatory. The Council of Ministers may reject them.
However, the executive should notiIr the legislature of its reasons ii
it does.
In practice recommendations are issued on a variety of
subjects, such as education, water and electricity, internal and
external affairs, social affairs, the economy and commerce.
This frustrates FNC members who long to be actively
involved in state affairs. A member during the 1985 economic
recession complained:
To whom are we going to address the
recommendation ? The situation has become
desperate. ... There Is no government. The best thing
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we can do now is to issue a strongly worded statement
of resentment concerning the internal situation.... We
must not become partners of the government in the
destruction of our future. There are future generations
who will ask us about these things. Mr. President,
there is no hope in recommendations even if we
proposed a solution." (33)
7.3.4 Interpellation and Vote of no-confidence:
Interpellation has been defmed as
a request made through the President of
either house to a Minister by a private member for an
oral explanation of some matter for which the minister
Is responsible." (34)
Interpellation in some cases suggests an element of
impeachment and can be interpreted as criticism and rebuke of
the minister. Some constitutions restrict the use of this method by
requiring a fixed number of members to move interpellation (35).
The Constitutions of Kuwait and BahraIn have adopted this
technique, although it was rarely used in practice. Like the
position of the Qatari Constitution, this device does not exist in the
U.A.E. In fact the denial of the Council the right to challenge
ministers is a reflection of the status quo In U.A.E. society. For
decades the citizens were not accustomed to impeach the
authorities. The need not to adopt such a technical device is in
harmony with the nature of the Constitution which gives
precedence to the executive over the legislature.
The vote of no-confidence is another technique of controlling
the executive. The U.A.E legislature Is denied this mechanism. The
constitution-makers of the U.A.E. Constitution were sensible when
277
(Chapter seven)
they did not give the FNC this Instrument. A legislature denied the
power to Investigate, impeach, Interpellate or even initiate Bills Is a
fortiori not to be given the power to demand the resignation of a
minister.
7.4 The financial function of the U.A.E. legislature:
Financial scrutiny is historically an important element in the
scrutiny of government. This is one of the most ancient functions
and the most fundamental role of the legislature. Historically, it
derived from the legislative and political functions of the English
Parliament. The function has developed from simple tax ratification
and authorisation to comprehensive control over the state's
financial affairs.
One of the most significant matters that the legislature deals
with in this function is the state budget, which is crucial to the
activities of the government. It is also empowered to sanction any
additional expenditure on the part of the government. The
government must present annual accounts to the legislature in
order that it may sctutinize its financial activities. It is also the
function of the legislature to ratiIr taxes and loans.
The budget may be defined:
"as a sort of tabular conspectus of estimated
public expenditure and income over a given period,
generally a year." (36)
Constitutions vary as to the arrangements they provide for a
national budget. In some countries the government submits a
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budget in the form of a Bifi and the legislature sanctions it
according to ordinary Bill procedures. In others, the government
submits a budget in the form of a financial programme or draft
proposal for which there is a different procedure (37).
Here the question arises as to how far an individual member
of the legislature can influence the budget or to what extent
opposition groups can put forward a Bifi which has a major
fmancial implications? Some constitutions grant each member the
right to propose any sort of amendment to the budget. Other
constitutions give the member the power to suggest a reduction in
the national budget but not an increase in it. Some constitutions
prevent the members introducing any changes to the budget
without the consent of the government or President (38). The fact
remains, however, that despite a certain amount of variation
among constitutional systems in dealing with the budget, there is a
general consensus that the sanction of legislature gives the budget
its legal validity and allows the government to raise revenue and
spend money.
In the U.A.E. Constitution Article 129 provides that:
"The draft annual budget of the Union,
comprising estimates of revenues and expenditure,
shall be referred to the Federal National Council at
least two months before the beginning of the fmanciai
year, for discussion and submission of comments
thereon, before the draft budget is submitted to the
Supreme Council of the Union, together with those
comments, for assent."
Although the Constitution ordains that the budget shall be
issued in the same way as a law, It nevertheless makes some
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special reservations. As previously mentioned, the FNC has the
power to approve, reject or amend ordinary Bills. In the case of a
draft budget, however, the powers of the FNC are restricted to
discussion and comment. Therefore, the role of the Council vis a
vis the budget Is not to sanction It or to give it legal validity but
rather to act in a consultative capacity. Furthermore, government
may transfer sums or spend money not provided for in the budget.
It must cover this action by law, but in case of urgency it could
arrange the foregoing by a decree and notify the FNC afterwards.
The Constitution covers such areas as taxation, duties and
loans, by providing that they shall not be imposed, levied or
contracted except by virtue of law. These financial matters are not
excluded from the Council's jurisdiction. Their Bifis are treated as
ordinary Bifis. The FNC, therefore, has the power to accept, reject
or amend these financial Bills.
Regarding the annual final accounts, which comprise the
actual revenue and expenditure of the state in a year, the
Constitution provides that:
"The final accounts of the financial
administration of the Union for the completed financial
year shall be referred to the Federal National Council
within four months following the end of the said year,
for its comments thereon, before their submission to
the Supreme Council for approval".
The significance of the final accounts is that they show how
the state income has been spent over the last financial year.
However, the outcome of the above provision is that the final
account is treated exactly as the budget. The Council is restricted
to comments. It is noteworthy that the Constitution provides for
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the establishment of an independent department to audit the
accounts of the government. This body is known as the "audit
department" (39).
The reality has not lived up to the constitutional provisions.
The U.A.E. budget was issued several months late and ever since
the early 1980s has consistently appeared almost a year later than
the time agreed by the Constitution. In fact Article 129 has never
been fulfilled in practice.
The final accounts of the state have never been submitted to
the legislature within four months as Article 135 stipulated. They
have invariably been presented to the FNC three or four years late.
For Instance, the final accounts for the years 79,84,85 were
introduced to the Council in the years 84,88,88 respectively.
With the exception of few critical articles in newspapers and
magazines and protest from FNC members, nothing happens when
there is a violation of the constitution In the above mentioned
cases.
To be fair, it must be admitted that the FNC did not accept
this situation and publicly criticized It on several occasions. It even
Issued at the end of one of its meetings a statement which read:
The FNC after discussing the policy of the
government in preparing the annual budget of the
Union ... would like to express its worry about the
unusual delay in preparing the Union budget for this
year which is In total contradiction with Article 129 of
the Constitution. The Council expresses its
dissatisfaction with all negative signs that have
accompanied this delay. The Council recommends an
earnest account as to the causes of the delay so as to
provide a remedy to the situation and a correction to
the progress." (40)
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7.5 Conclusion:
It Is clear that the 1971 U.A.E. Constitution was intended to
create a legislature with no formal constitutional powers in the
field of legislation except In debating and proposing amendments
to draft-laws. Moreover, the Constitution permitted the executive
the power to override even this contribution In the legislative
process by giving it the right to promulgate laws in the absence of
the legislature.
In contrast to the strict theory of the Constitution, in
practice the U.A.E. legislature has attempted to play a much more
positive role in the legislative function. The data provided and the
example of Penal Law Bill shows that the legislature in practice is
far more powerful than the constitutional text included. The writer
has been told that almost all the amendments to Bills proposed by
the Council have been accepted by the government.
Most of the members have criticised their position in the
legislative function. They have demanded a bigger share in this
function, specifically the right to initiate Bills (41).
As for its political function, the Constitution deprives the
Council of many significant and efficient control devices such as
interpellatlon and vote of no-confidence.
Despite the shortcomings In the political function of the
FNC, the Council has endeavoured to present itself as an
independent and critical body. In order to keep faith with this
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image the Council has preferred to capitalise on public debate
more often than questions and recommendations.
By and large the co-operation between the executive and the
legislature has enabled the latter to extend its power in the
political function. In the Constitution the FNC has no power to
establish investigating committees, yet the government has agreed
to the formation of such committees in several cases. These
committees are largely ad hoc. There were three investigating
committees in the second council covering the subjects of
electricity, health and the civil servIce (42). The present council has
formed committees to Investigate government policy with regard to
the administrative system, the condition of graduate nationals and
the health servIce (43).
In the fiscal field the Constitution not only prevents FNC
members Initiating financial Bills, but even deprives them of the
right to accept or amend the most important element of the
financial function which is the budget. This wifi come as no
surprise to those who have studied the social background of the
society. Traditionally, an emirate's revenue was owned by the
ruling family, or more precisely by the ruler himself, and he had
absolute power to spend it. Even now there are no clear rules or
laws dealing with revenue and Its spending in the emirates (44).
One must not forget that the effective performance of this
function does not depend only on constitutional provisions.
Certain social changes must take place for reform to be possible.
Legislation has to be issued to regulate revenue and expenditure
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and the idea that an emirate's revenue Is owned by its ruler must
be fmally abolished.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
AN ANALYSIS OF THE MAJOR POLITICAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CASES: THE (FNC
8.1 Introduction:
The value of constitutional provisions cannot be assessed
only in the abstract. The real test of their effectiveness is how they
function in the context of the political system they have been
designed for. Therefore, having discussed the functions of the
U.A.E. legislature in the last chapter it is essential to study the
U.A.E. Constitution in Its practical operation through the medium
of the FNC.
As a newly formed state, the U.A.E. had little experience of
democratic government but it was only a matter of time before the
FNC had to come to grips with certain constitutional crises and
court cases and deal with them at a practical level.
The chapter is divided into two parts. The first part is
concerned with the two major political crises in the U.A.E., namely
the four extensions of the provisional Constitution tenure (1976-
1981-1986-1991) and the 1979 joint memorandum between the
FNC arid the Council of Ministers. The focus is on the FNC's role in
these crises and the question of democracy in the country. The aim
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is to ascertain whether the U.A.E. legislature was strengthened
and the constitutional structure of the state reinforced or whether
the reverse was true.
In the second part of this chapter there is a discussion of the
constitutional cases before the Supreme Court. The FNC was a
party in two major disputes with the government over the
interpretation of certain provisions of the Constitution. These cases
reveal the effort of the legislature to protect and enlarge its
constitutional power. It will be instructive to examine the reaction
of the executive and the judiciary arms of government to the
attempts of the FNC to expand its power base.
8.2 The Political Crises
The emerging constitution of the U.A.E. was required to cope
with two major issues which resulted in clashes between the
federal authorities. The legislature wanted to protect the federal
entity and enlarge political participation in the decision-making
process.
The first issue that arouse was whether the tenure of the
Provisional Constitution, originally intended to last for only five
years, should be extended. The position of the legislature with
regard to this matter, which brought the newly fledged union to the
brink of collapse, will be discussed and analysed.
The second political crisis occurred when two branches of
the government, the FNC and the Council of Ministers, presented a
joint memorandum to the Supreme Council laying down many
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demands which would lead to the enhancement of union power at
the expense of the individual emirates. This raises the question of
whether It was a wise decision to involve the FNC In such a highly
risky move. What was the major issue dominating the
memorandum? What about democracy in the U.A.E. constitutional
system? What were the consequences of this movement? All these
questions will be dealt with in this section.
8.2.1 - Extensions of the U.A.E. Provisional Constitution:
The Constitution which had been enacted on 2nd of
December 1971 was intended to be replaced by a permanent
Constitution by the end of 1976. We have seen in chapter 5 that
the preamble of the provisional Constitution indicates this fact. It
reads:
and until the preparation of the permanent
Constitution for the union may be completed, we
proclaim ... our agreement to this provisional
Constitution, ..., which shall be Implemented during
the transitional period indicated In It."
Article 144 specifies this transitional period. It provides that" .. the
provisions of this Constitution shall apply for a transitional period
of five Gregorian years."
In fact in mid 1976 a permanent Constitution was drafted
but, as explained in chapter 5, the Supreme Council rejected this
proposal for various reasons. The drafted Constitution enlarged the
power of the federal authorities at the expense of the local
authorities. Furthermore, it strengthened the powers of the Federal
National Council. The permanent Constitution, in addition,
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revoked the veto power granted to the two largest emirates, Abu
Dhabi and Dubal.
Since then the provisional Constitution has been extended
three times, each time for a five-year period; 1971-76, 1976- 81,
198 1-86 and 1986-9 1.
1 - The first extension of the Constitution:
As we have seen in chapter 5, as the end of 1976
approached no agreement to introduce the permanent Constitution
had been reached. It seemed inevitable that a constitutional crisis
was bound to occur, especially when the president of the union
threatened to resign and not to renew his nomination for the post.
The Supreme Council met on 12 July and issued a proposal to
extend the validity of the provisional Constitution for another five
years.
In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 144, the Supreme
Council referred its proposal to the legislature. (1) The position of
the FNC was respected in this matter and the correct procedure for
a constitutional amendment was observed.
The FNC had three options. It could approve the proposed
constitutional amendment, which required a majority of two thirds
of its existing members, it could disapprove or it could amend the
amendment. The latter option meant that the Supreme Council
would be required to accept an amendment made by the FNC. It
was obvious that if the FNC resorted to such an option it would
delay the resolution of this important constitutional matter since it
would set a precedent where the legislature can obstruct or at least
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challenge a Supreme Council proposal. It was indeed a risky option
because of the contradiction with the position of the rulers.
The Speaker, who happened to be from Dubal which was in
favour of the extension of the 1971 Constitution, appointed a
committee to discuss the proposed constitutional amendment. The
committee decided to approve the proposal and recommended a
few amendments to the standing Constitution. (2)
The role of the legislature in this constitutional crisis became
clear in its extraordinary session on 12 October 1976. In this
session the FNC had to decide whether it was prepared to accept
the status quo with all its shortcomings, I.e. the weakness of the
federal structure, the imbalance in wealth distribution, the strong
tendency for localization of security matters, etc., or whether it was
going to try to present a firm stand against the negatives of the
first five years of the union.
The session lasted five hours during which the matter of
extending the life of an incapable constitution was rigourously
discussed. FNC members to a large extent upheld their emirates'
point of view and defended It. The Dubai and Ras-al-Khaimah
members were staunch defenders of the Supreme Council
proposal, while Abu Dhabi members were in favour of amending
certain Articles in the Constitution before passing the proposal. (3)
Such a tendency is a prima fade result of the appointment method
in selecting the legislature members. Had the members been
elected democratically, they would not automatically have allied
themselves with their rulers' position but would have been more
concerned with the will of the people.
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Three schools of thought emerged in the session regarding
the question of extension. One group disagreed with the Idea of
extending the validity of the provisional Constitution on the
grounds that this would imply weakness of the federal authority
and would keep the FNC's position in the power structure as it
was. (4) In other words the legislature, In this group's view, would
remain a consultative body.
The members who held this view were those who represented
Abu Dhabi and smaller emirates such as Umm-al-Quwain and
Fujairah. Abu Dhabl, whose position in the union as the capital of
the country was due to its being the largest and wealthiest emirate
and the only contributor to the federal budget then, hoped to
consolidate its political leadership by amending the Constitution
and thus become the main beneficiary of a strong federal state.
The smaller emirates lined up with Abu Dhabi in a bid to attract
its generous endowments in order to improve the living standards
of their inhabitants. It would be wrong, however, to deny the fact
that some members of this group were vigorous advocates of the
federal system and the unitary process.
The second group was in total agreement with the Supreme
Council proposal. (5) It demanded the approval of the constitutional
amendment without hesitation. The members advocating this
stand argued that the Constitution would expire on the 2nd of
December 1976 and because of this urgency the FNC should pass
the proposal straight away. They further argued that if any
member had any suggestion regarding the Constitution he could
raise it at the next meeting but not at the extraordinary one then.
(6) The Speaker even leaked a rumour that the amendments
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proposed by the first group would mean the dissolution of the
council and consequently the members would lose their financial
and social prIvileges. (7)
The members who belonged to the second group came
mainly from Dubal and Ras-al-Khaimah. These two emirates had
been allies since the inception of the nine-member-union (see
chapter 4). Dubal is the commercial centre of the country and has
the most sophisticated and ethnically mixed population. It
therefore adopts a laissez-faire policy and objects to any federal
governmental intervention in its commercial sector. There is a
strong autonomous feeling among its ruling elites. Ras-al-Khaimah
still basks in Its historical glory when It was the major land power
in the region in the last century. Its ruler resists any attempt to
assimilate his local institutions into the federal system. It is no
wonder that the FNC representatives of these two emirates
favoured the preservation of the status quo.
The attitude of the third group was a concifiatory one. (8) It
would accept the extension of the present-day Constitution under
one condition: that the FNC recommend the amendment of certain
articles In It. Most of the members of this group were from smaller
emirates such as Ajman and Sharjah. These emirates were in
favour of strong federal Institutions but were not willing to
antagonize those fellow members who defended the existing
constitutional structure.
• The third opinion gained more supporters during the course
of discussion, especially from among the first group. However, the
second group argued that no condition could be attached to the
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FNC's approval. The FNC's constitutional adviser explained that
the FNC's recommendations, whether subject to conditions or not,
would have to be referred to the Supreme Council which may
accept or reject them. (g)
At the end of the meeting the concifiatory group prevailed.
The FNC approved the proposal for amending Article 144 of the
Constitution. The FNC attached a recommendation to its approval
stipulating that certain amendments must be introduced to the
Constitution so that it could become consistent with the reality of
the federal state. The most important issues were the unification of
the armed and security forces, a fixed percentage to be cut out of
the emirates' revenue as a contribution to the federal budget, and
the nullification of the veto power given to Abu Dhabi and Dubal.
(io)
On 16 November 1976 the Supreme Council met and issued
a number of important resolutions. It made Article 142 null and
void and thus accorded the federation the ultimate power to
establish a unified armed force. The second resolution was to
establish a state security body under the supervision of the
President. The third one was that the emirates should contribute
to the federal budget. The last resolution was the unffication of
official control of the media institutions in the country. (ii) Finally
the Supreme Council sanctioned the amendment of the
Constitution at its meeting on 29 November and re-elected the
President and his vice-President for another five years. (12) In fact
not all the emirates implemented the above mentioned resolutions.
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The Supreme Council agreed to two of the FNC's
recommendations. They are the unification of the armed and
security forces and financial contribution to the federal budget.
This seemed to indicate that the rulers were willing to listen to the
advice of others and relinquish part of their emirates' sovereignty
to the central government.
2 - The second and third Constitutional extensions:
After ten years in existence, the Constitution had failed to
ensure a workable federal structure. The inteffigentsia had hoped
to reduce the traditional role of the rulers and diminish their
power. The intellectuals were convinced that a new Constitution,
which would bring Into being the democratic state to which they
aspired, was the right instrument to be adopted. They pressed in
the newspapers and magazines for the replacement of the
Constitution and urged the FNC to be resolute in its deliberations.
The educated section among the nationals insisted that the society
had reached a level of sophistication which qualified it to
participate In producing a new structure for the federation. (13)
The FNC on 16 December 1980 agreed to form an eleven-
member committee to handle the task of meeting the rulers and
discussing the need and the procedures for presenting a
permanent Constitution. (14) However the committee was suspect
from the outset because of its membership. At least four of its
members were known to be against any further steps in favour of
the federal state since such steps might jeopardize their emirates'
interests. In any case the conimittee was a fiasco because no ruler
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was willing to meet it or discuss the issue of a permanent
Constitution.
A union decree was issued (15) calling for an extraordinary
session of the FNC on 3 November 1981 to discuss a proposal
submitted by the Supreme Council amending Article 144 and
extending the Constitution for another five years.
The atmosphere in the FNC was one of frustration. The 1979
political crisis, discussed below, and the failure of the eleven-
member committee were the main reasons for this sense of defeat.
A member stood up and expressed the feelings of his fellow
colleagues;
When discussing this issue (i.e. extension of
the tenure of the Constitution) we must limit our
discussion to the vote on approving or disapproving
the proposal. In my opinion the majority of the
members approve the draft constitutional amendment.
(16)
Yet there were a few members who had the courage to
challenge the Supreme Council's proposal and demand its
withdrawal. A member of this group declared that:
Even if we came here ( I.e. FNC) through
appointment, this does not impede us from expressing
our frank ideas on this extension. ... If the Supreme
Council proposes this amendment then it's its right to
do so... Although we may know that our approval or
disagreement will make no difference, we still have to
declare our opinion honestly. ... that extension at thisjuncture is neither in the interests of the Supreme
Council nor of the people. (17)
Regardless of such desperate attempts by a small group in
the legislature to convince the FNC to concede to the demands of
the Intellectuals, the FNC passed the proposal, 31 against 3. The
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Supreme Council accordingly passed a resolution extending the life
span of the Constitution for another five years. (18)
The Constitution was due to expire on 2 December 1986
when the Supreme Council preferred to Ignore the FNC in the third
extension process. It chose not to follow the constitutional
procedure stipulated in paragraph 2 of Article 144 which
demanded the presentation of any constitutional amendment to
the FNC prior to its sanction. The Supreme Council simply issued
a resolution to extend the tenure of the Constitution without even
introducing It to the FNC. (is) The Constitution is due to expire on
2 December 1991.
3 - An analysis of the practice of constitutional extensions in the
U.A.E.:
For twenty years, the U.A.E. has been subject to a
provisional Constitution designed for a union of nine members
faced with problems very different from those faced by the present
union today, and there is no indication that it will not remain in
force for another term.
Experience has shown that the opposition to the extension of
the Constitution has lost impetus with the passage of time. The
FNC members were very keen at first to replace the standing order
with a new and more effective federal structure, but they failed to
resist the emirates' pressures over the first extension being
unwilling to amend the proposal of the extension and challenge the
power of the rulers. The members did not even attach to their
approval a proposition to enhance their power In the legislative
process or at least to modify the method of selection.
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The Supreme Council did not follow faithfully the
constitutional procedures for the amendment of the Constitution.
It even violated Article 144 in the third extension when it did not
submit a proposal for a constitutional amendment to the
legislature. No one challenged this constitutional violation, not
even the body most concerned, the FNC.
Moreover, Article 144 stipulates in paragraph 3 and 4 that
the Supreme Council should prepare a permanent Constitution to
replace the provisional Constitution. This should be followed by an
invitation to the FNC to an extraordinary session to discuss the
draft permanent Constitution six months before the end of the
period of validity of the provisional Constitution. Not even once did
the Supreme Council obey these stipulations. In the first
constitutional term a draft Constitution was prepared and
discussed by the Supreme Council but the FNC was not consulted.
In the second, third and fourth constitutional terms no draft
constitution was presented.
The extension of the U.A.E. Constitution means the
maintenance of the loose federal structure introduced in 1971. It
also preserves the distribution of power among the federal organs
and the government vis-a-vis individual emirates. The continuation
of the Constitution perpetuates the weakness of the FNC. The
Constitution guarantees a low proffle for the legislature in the
federal structure and will continue to do so as long as it is in force.
The extension of the Constitution, in the final analysis, is a legal
act which masks a political and economic failure in the state.
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The legislature has not seized the opportunity on the
occasion of any of the previous three extensions to enhance its
position in the federal structure. However, it can be suggested that
the reason for this lack of action over such a very crucial
constitutional matter is the method of selection of the members
most of whom can be relied upon to put the interests of their
respective emirates before those of the federation. The FNC did not
in actual fact set up a conmiittee to present a new constitution to
the Supreme Council. In this way the FNC could have moved the
question of the permanent constitution and save itself public
criticism. But it seems that in the end the members decided to
keep quiet and not get Involved in such a risky matter.
The fourth term of the U.A.E. Constitution ended on 2
December 1991. No permanent constitution has been drafted to
replace the provisional constitution. The tenure of the 1971
Constitution has been extended for another five years. The only
Innovation introduced this time is the creation of a committee,
under the presidency of finance minister. It has the task of re-
examining and suggesting some improvements to the existing
constitution. (20)
8.2.2 - The joint memorandum
After the first extension of the Constitution a new cabinet
and FNC were appointed. Both of them included university
graduates who were vigorous supporters of a unitary state rather
than a federal one. Many ministers and FNC members were
influenced by the slogans of Arab Nationalism and Arab unity.
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They were dissatisfied with the performance of the federal
authorities in the U.A.E.
Meanwhile, the Gull region as a whole was in tunnoil by the
end of 1978. Israel had invaded south Lebanon, the Shah of Iran
had been toppled by a popular revolution, the Soviet Union had
Invaded Afghanistan, and three Yemeni leaders had been
assassinated.
The political elites of the U.A.E. were divided into two camps.
They were either pro or anti centralisation of power. All M. Khalifa
describes the two camps thus:
there are the wandawis, unitarians, who
idealIstically view the union concept in totalistic terms.
They argue that step-by-step integration is a sign of
weakness and is tantamount to surrender to narrow
parochial interests..... wahciawis
 hope that the
realization of a unitary system will weaken the
traditional brand of rule, which has limited meaningful
political participation to the ruling families and their
upper-class allies. ... the ittihridis, or federalists, who
primarily believe that a step-by-step federation is the
most promising course of action in view of the
sociopolitical dynamics of the area. These gradualists
argue that any integrative step should be adopted only
after the voluntary acceptance of such a step by the
federating states. ... They tend to resist the pressure to
widen political participation and favor preserving the
traditional power structure, particularly on the local
level. (21)
The FNC with its enthusiastic pressure groups could not
resist the argument for the union when there was so obviously no
control over the economic and political situation or proper grasp of
current events. The legislature called for a joint meeting between
the FNC and the Council of Ministers to discuss the internal and
external affairs of the country. In the meeting (22) a joint committee
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was formed to present a memorandum dealing with national
affairs.
A joint memorandum was presented on 23 February 1979
which discussed the vital issues for the federation and suggested
solutions to them. The main recommendations of the
memorandum can be summed up as follows:
- unification of the armed forces because defence of the state
cannot be partitioned. The Union army must have a unified
command and monopoly on importing weaponry;
- unification of Internal security forces because security cannot be
segmented;
- abolition of Internal boundaries among the emirates because they
are part of the colonial legacy;
- limitation of foreign migration to the country and control over the
national exits;
- revision of the naturalisation process In force over the past eight
years;
- unification of the countrys national revenues in order to diminish
the imbalance of living standards among the emirates;
- establishment of a central bank and protection of the national
economy;
- unification of the judiciary in the emirates and the respectability
of federal laws;
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- the federal authorities must be respected and their powers
enhanced. The Supreme Council should meet regularly, the
Council of Ministers should be strengthened and the FNC should
be converted to a full legislature, and
- introduction of a permanent constitution to replace the existing
one. (23)
When analysing the joint memorandum one can make
certain observations. The memorandum did not ask more than the
provisional Constitution stipulated and what agreed upon by the
rulers at their meeting on 16 November 1976. With the exception
of a few points, the memorandum was in fact an appeal for the
Implementation of the Constitution. The only new subjects which
the standing Constitution did not already cover were the
abrogation of the emirates internal borders and the strengthening
of the existing legislature.
In fact the real issues of the joint memorandum were the
centralisatlon of power and the making of the federal institutions
more effective and governable. The memorandum drafters were
aiming at a unified state where no duplication of state apparatus
existed. They were disappointed with the first eight years of the
federal experience and therefore willing to introduce a speedy
remedy for Its shortcomings.
It is worth noticing that democratic principles were not the
essence of the memorandum. It was only mentioned twice. The
first time was in the section dealing with the idea of creating a new
state through fostering the ideal citizen. The memorandum stated
that" not by bread alone human beings live. The citizens should be
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nurtured democratically and fields of freedom of opinion should be
provided to him to participate in the country's politics in a
democratic way consistent with Islam. (24)"
The second time was when the memorandum dealt with the
legislature issue. It demanded the expansion of the FNC's base so
it could practice a truly democratic role. The memorandum stated
that" the time has come for the FNC to take up its normal position
in order to fulfil its real role In the legislative and political process."
However, the authors of the memorandum did not explain
what they meant by the phrase "expanding the base of the
legislature". Did it mean increasing the number of FNC members?
Or changing the method of their selection by adopting election
instead of appointment? The phrase may be Interpreted as
meaning the expansion of public support for the FNC. The
memorandum did not touch upon the question of full free election
or even quasi (part election) of members. Frauke Heard-Bey argues
that both parties, the FNC and the Council of Ministers, were
aware that the one-man-one-vote principle was impractical in
U.A.E. society because of the absence of political parties and
uncertainty about the population structure. (25)
In fact the U.A.E. legislature declined to press for a real
democracy and failed again to make the Issue of its weak
constitutional position the central focus of this Important political
Initiative. Because of the nature of its partner in the movement,
the. FNC drafted a memorandum that was more concerned with
administrative and executive matters than with popular ones.
304
(Chapter eight)
The joint memorandum was submitted to the President of
the Union so that the highest authority in the state, i.e. the
Supreme Council, could discuss it and then act upon it. The
Supreme Council was called to convene on 19 March 1979, but the
meeting was adjourned to 27 March because Dubat and Ras-al-
Khaimah declined to attend.
Meanwhile popular demonstrations erupted all over the
country demanding the Supreme Council accept the
memorandum. (26) Dubat and Ras-al-Khaimah issued two separate
memoranda against rushing into a unitary system. (27) Dubat
asked the neighbouring countries to intervene in the issue because
it was afraid of Abu Dhabi's increasing influence in union affairs.
(28)
The memorandum was presented to the rulers at their next
meeting but no decision was taken. Dubal was against the
unification of services because of the variety of their standards
among the emirates. Dubai's position was nearer to the German
interpretation of a federal system in holding the view that central
government " should not be more than the sum total of all the
member authorities and where constitutional attention is
constantly focused on safeguarding the federal elements vis-a-vis
the inevitable centralising tendencies of the federal government.'
(29)
The final outcome of the joint memorandum was that the
Supreme Council agreed to appoint the ruler of Dubai prime
minister, the government was reshuffled and the pro unitary
ministers were sacked.
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The zeal amongst the FNC members for reform of the
constitutional structure soon abated. Even in its first session after
the crisis, some FNC members reproached the Speaker for
mentioning the memorandum in his opening ,
 speech. (30) In
another meeting the Speaker complained of the absence of many
members from the council's meetings or committees. Some
members did suggest the formation of a cornniittee to meet the
President and his deputy to discuss with them the matters
Included in the joint memorandum. When they were asked what
they would do if the committee failed In its mission, an
enthusiastic member replied "we will resign from the Council." (31)
However, the conmiittee failed and to no one's surprise none of its
members resigned.
It seems that the far-reaching nature of the memorandum's
demands and the Impatience of its authors for its implementation
were the major factors in its rejection. The unitarian advocates in
both councils were trying to get rid of the federation overnight. No
ruler would willingly accept the abolition of his emirate's borders
nor readily agree to surrender his emirate's natural resources to
the state when both were vital to his power base. (32)
It appears that the Supreme Council was suspicious of the
collaboration between the FNC and the Council of Ministers. In the
view of the Supreme Council, they were transcending their
constitutional boundaries. The Council of Ministers is a body
designed to execute the general policy endorsed by the Supreme
Council. The FNC is an advisory body available for the Supreme
Council to consult. Neither council has the power to suggest or
propose extensive reform of the structure of the country.
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This suspicion was increased, especially among the emirates
opposing hasty movement towards unification, when both councils
sided with one party in the union. The fact that the memorandum
was fully supported by Abu Dhabl increased the fear of domination
among the smaller emirates. Had it not been so one-sided (ex
parte), the memorandum might not have faced such a fierce
reaction from the other camp. The move toward complete reform
was not to be gradual enough and therefore the FNC has lost its
credibility with the rulers. It was possibly unwise to raise this
tricky Issue so early In the life of the federation.
8.3 Constitutional cases before the Supreme Court in the
U.A.E.
Montesquleu stated in his book The spirit of Laws:
there is no liberty if the judiciary power be
not separated from the legislative and executive. Were
it joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the
subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for thejudge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to
the executive power, the judge might behave with
violence and oppression." (33)
It is, therefore, very important to separate and ensure the
independence of the judiciary from other parts of the government
so that it fulfils Its duties.
Justice is a basic principle in Shari'ah. The Holy Quran and
the traditions of the Prophet (peace be upon him) and his Caliphs
are loaded with references to justice. Allah commands in the
Quran:
God do commands you to render back your
Trusts to those to whom they are due, and when youjudge between man and man that you judge withjustice." (Chapter 4, Verse 58).
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In another verse Allah says:
let not the hatred of others to you make you
swerve to wrong and depart from justice. Be just; that
Is next to piety." (Chapter 5, Verse 9).
The messenger of Allah (peace and blessings of Allah upon him)
said in this regard:
"Judges belong to three categories: One who
would be admitted to Paradise and the remaining two
who would be thrown into the Hell-fire. The one who
would be admitted to Paradise, would b a judge
recognized the truth and gave judgement according to
it. The person who recognized the truth but deviated it
while giving judgement would enter the Hell-fire. The
man who would give judgement regarding the disputes
of people, while ignorant of the case will also enter the
Hell-fire." (34)
Islam, as we have already seen in the introduction,
acknowledges the autonomy of the judiciary. In fact, the judges
under the Islamic state were free in their opinions from any
interference by the executive power. (35) Such values did affect the
constitution-makers in the U.A.E. Accordingly, Article 94 of the
Constitution stated that "Justice is the basis of rule. In performing
their duties, judges shall be independent and shall not be subject
to any authority but the law and their own conscience."
As a federal state the U.A.E. judicial system is divided into
two levels; federal courts and local courts. Federal courts are
composed of three types; Supreme Court, courts of Appeal and
courts of First Instance (see Federal law 6 of 1978). (36) The
constitution gives the emirates the right to apply for incorporation
into the federal court system. Three emirates did not do this,
namely Dubai, Ras-al-Khaimah and Umm-al-Quwaln.
The U.A.E.'s Supreme Court was established under the 1971
Constitution but became effective in 1973. (37) It was given, inter
a1ia exclusive powers to interpret the provisions of the
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Constitution at the request of any federal authority or the local
government of any emirate and was to be responsible for the
examination of the constitutionality of federal laws. Its decisions
are binding on all.
Judicial Review, hence, was adopted in Article 99 of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court was given the power to declare
acts and laws, passed by the executive and the National Council,
unconstitutional. In other words, it was created to act as a check
upon the government.
In order to secure the independence of the Supreme Court
judges, the Constitution stipulated that the president and the
judges of the Supreme Court shall not be removed while they
administer justice. Their terms of office cannot be terminated
except in the following occasions; death, resignation, reaching age
of retirement, end of their contracts, appointment to other offices,
permanent incapacity and disciplinary discharge (Article 97).
Although it meant imposing a new institution on the
traditional legal framework of the country, such a court had long
been needed to settle disputes between the FNC and the
government. Actually the fact that disputes arose and the
frequency with which they had to be referred to the Supreme Court
coniIrrns that the traditional power monopolists were against any
challenge to the status quo and not wiffing to renounce any part of
their authority. On the other hand, the reference of such cases to
the Supreme Court also indicates that there was a power struggle
going on among different factions within the new federal bodies.
Each one of them was keen to consolidate its constitutional powers
and to extend them to cover certain issues that the Constitution
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kept silent about. Furthermore, the cases reflects the respectable
position of the Supreme Court in the federal structure.
Two major cases occurred between the FNC and the
government and both times the main issue was the interpretation
of the relevant provisions of the Constitution.
8.3.1 - The case of the Social Security Bill: (381
In this case the traditional power holders, the Supreme
Council members and their agents, the Council of Ministers,
sought a Supreme Court injunction in their favour to restrict the
powers of the FNC. The focal point of the dispute was the
interpretation of Article 110 (3)a of the Constitution. Article 99 of
the Constitution explains the procedures with regard to
constitutional interpretation. Only federal and local institutions
can submit an application for the Supreme Court so that it may
render an interpretation of the Constitution.
The case began when the Council of Ministers submitted to
the FNC a draft law for social security. The Bifi determined those
groups eligible for social alms and how much each group was
entitled to. The FNC agreed to the Bifi but Introduced certain
amendments, among them. one to include a further group and one
to increase the alms amount. The Council of Ministers submitted
the Bifi to the Supreme Council which promulgated the original
Bill without taking Into consideration the FNC's recommendations.
(39)
The FNC, defending its constitutional rights, objected to the
promulgation of the law because the Bifi had not been referred
back to the legislature as the Constitution required. The
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government reacted by tabling an application to the Supreme
Court seeking its interpretation of Article 110 (3) a.
The Council of Ministers defended the position of the
President of the Union and the Supreme Council, insisting that the
procedures provided in Article 110 (3) a do not lay any obligation
on the Supreme Council to re-submit the Bifi to the FNC. The
concerned Article provides that:
If the Federal National Council inserts any
amendment to the Bill and this amendment is not
acceptable to the President of the Union or the
Supreme Council, or if the Federal National Council
rejected the Bifi, the President of the Union or the
Supreme Council may refer it back to the Federal
National Council."
The Council of Ministers argued that the question of
referring the Bifi back to the legislature was optional. The
President or the Supreme Council may or may not choose to refer
it back. It was not a compulsory duty on either of them and the
failure to do it did not affect the validity of the promulgated law.
Therefore, there was no point on Insisting on sending it back to the
FNC. (40)
The FNC took the opposite view. It argued that the
legislature under the U.A.E. Constitution had two options: one was
to accept the Bifi presented by the government in which case the
President of the Union or the Supreme Council could promulgate
the law straight away, the second was to amend or reject the Bifi in
which case re-submission of the Bifi to the FNC was compulsory.
The Constitution had clearly stipulated this step and therefore it
must be respected and implemented.
The Supreme Court decided in favour of the FNC and proved
to be independent to a certain extent from other federal
311
(Chapter eIght)
Institutions. It made It clear that referring a Bill back to the FNC Is
to be an optional matter for the President of the Union and the
Supreme Council. However, re-submission is a part of the
legislative process if the President or the Supreme Council want to
override the FNC's objections to the Bill. Consultation, the
Supreme Court stressed, is a necessary requirement for
promulgating legislation. The Supreme Court furthermore set forth
that the consultative nature of the FNC does not obstruct its right
of re-submission. The President must wait for the FNC's final
opinion before sanctioning the Bill.
As a result of this case certain principles were introduced
into the legal and political framework of the U.A.E. The Supreme
Court became the arbiter between federal Institutions and this in
turn served to consolidate the new federal system. (41) That the
FNC did not hesitate to challenge government interpretation of its
role in the legislative process also led to lasting benefit. Although
the Supreme Court decision did not change the consultative nature
of the FNC, It gave the legislature the power to delay Bifis.
Moreover, this case demonstrated that the rulers were prepared to
accept the fact their decisions might be challenged in the courts.
8.3.2 - The case of the National Bank of Investment and
Development: 1421
This case lay the FNC's desire to extend its power from
simply amending Bills to actually introducing new Bills. The core
of the dispute was the extent of FNC's amending powers. Was it
allowed to exclude provisions from or include new provisions in a
Bill introduced by the government or was it restricted to mere
literal amendment? Was the FNC's power limited to the
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amendment of a projected Bifi or could it extend to the revision of
the original law?
The Council of Ministers submitted a Bill amending Law No.
10 in 1973 regarding the establishment of a National Bank of
Investment and Development (NBID). In fact the Bill included only
one amendment which related to the title of the bank. The FNC,
however, took the opportunity of introducing a number of
amendments to the original law. The Council of Ministers protested
against such action and declared it unconstitutional.
The FNC submitted an application to the Supreme Court
demanding the court's interpretation of Article 89 of the
Constitution in order to determine the FNC's constitutional powers
vis-a-vis governmental Bifis.
Two positions were raised in the disputed issue. The first
supported the Council of Ministers' position. () It argued that the
FNC had the power to amend Bifis drafted by the government but
this power was restricted to the provisions included in the Bifi and
could not exceed them. The FNC could amend the provisions by
adding or omitting sentences to them, modifying their wording, or
breaking them down into smaller articles. It has no power to
amend articles in the original law which had not been introduced
in the Bifi. (44)
The other position defended the FNC's position. (45) It pointed
out that Article 89 of the Constitution, which provides that" ... The
National Council shall discuss these Bills and pass them, amend
or reject them", did not restrict the power of legislature in
amending Bills. Both addition or subtraction from a Bifi amounts
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to amending and to deny this violates the Constitution. The
Constitution, moreover does not specilr the meaning of the word
"amend " and leaves it open. The term might mean making minor
or substantial changes in the Bifi. If it is interpreted as meaning
that the FNC can omit from the disputed Bill but cannot add new
provisions, then this contradicts the Constitution in two ways.
First it limits the amending power of the FNC which conflicts with
Article 89. Second to assert that the FNC cannot add to a projected
Bill designed to amend an existing law means in practice that such
a Bifi is immunised against any addition to it.
The Supreme Court in this case decided to stick to the strict
interpretation of the Constitution and adhere to the exact wording
of it. It accepted that the amending power prescribed for the FNC
in the Constitution is unrestricted but stressed that this
unrestricted power is limited to the provisions included in the Bifi.
In other words the Supreme Court was of the opinion that adding
new provisions to the Bill mounted to proposing a new Bifi,
something which the FNC is not empowered to do under the
existing Constitution. The FNC therefore could not add any
provision to the Bill concerning the establishment of the NBID
since this would mean amendment to other articles in the original
law.
The Supreme Court agreed with the Council of Ministers and
forbade the legislature to amend any non-submitted articles. It
declared that " amending other articles in the law amounts to
initiating a proposal to change a law and is not simply a
complementary amendment to a draft law. The proposition to
amend a law is a proposition which the National Council is not
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permitted to make since it embraces participation in the legislative
power which Is a power exclusive to the Council of Ministers. (46)
When discussing this ruling a number of observations may
be made. It seems that the Supreme Court differentiated between
new Bifis projecting new laws and Bifis amending existing laws. In
the former case the Supreme Court gives the FNC unrestricted
amending power. It can add to or omit from the Bill. In the latter
case, however, the Supreme Court limits the FNC's amending
power to the provisions of the Bill. The FNC cannot deal with other
articles of the law which are not included in the amending Bill.
This distinction does not exist in the Constitution. Article 110 (3)b,
which states that" the term "Bill" ... shall mean the draft which is
submitted to the President of the Union by the Council of Ministers
Including the amendments, if any, made by the National Council",
treats all Bifis In the same way. This suggests that the power of the
FNC should not be restricted with regard to the second kind of
Bills in the way that the Supreme Court alleged. (')
The Supreme Court accepted the right of the FNC to amend
a new Bifi by adding or omitting provisions, but did not allow it the
same latitude in the case of a Bifi amending an existing law
because in the eyes of the Court this amounted to proposing a new
Bill, the power to do which the Constitution denies the FNC.
However, amendment to a Bifi, whether that Bifi is new or designed
to amend an existing law, is considered by some lawyers to be to
all intents and purposes a proposal for a new Bill attached to the
original Bifi. The FNC therefore has such power but It depends on
the Council of Ministers presenting a Bill. In other words the FNC
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can propose a new Bill only through amendment to Bills
introduced by the government. (48)
One may ask whether such a situation would have arisen in
the U.A.E. constitutional system had the legislature been given the
power to initiate Bifis. If the FNC had power ab irtitio it would not
have to wait until the government submitted a Bifi to remedy an
unacceptable state of affairs but could initiate a Bill amending any
unsatisfactory law. Because of the existing constitutional system
which restricts the FNC's role in the legislative process, the FNC
has had no alternative but to resort to a wide interpretation of its
constitutional powers in order to participate in the process
effectively.
The Supreme Court chose to adhere to the provisions of the
Constitution and favoured the Council of Ministers' argument. In
his Ph.D. thesis, Hadif Al-Owais, praised the Supreme Court
decision not to extend the powers of the FNC. He stated that"if
the Constitution denied the National Council the power to
introduce new Bifis, then the Supreme Court was not willing to
allow that Council to achieve that power under the disguise of
making amendments to Bill submitted by the Council of
Ministers." (49)
8.4 Conclusion:
The U.A.E. legislature has attempted to play a major role In
the political life of the state. It allied itself with the Council of
Ministers on some occasions and sought the help of the Supreme
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Court on other occasions. It endeavoured to override any
constitutional restraints on its powers but in the end it failed to
make much headway.
The members of the FNC were sincere in their efforts to
advance the cause of popular political participation in the
government of the country. However, many obstacles were put in
their way. Under the Constitution, their institution is a
consultative body which cannot endow its members with the
authority to Implement their ambitious plans. The Constitution
became a major fetter on the participation by the democratic
elements in the country. FNC members are appointed by their
emirat&s rulers and therefore their first allegiance, in spite of
Article 77 of the Constitution, is to those rulers and not to the
people. Such tradition is coherent with a tribal system of
government.
Finally, the FNC has not been helped by other governmental
bodies in Its mission to advance the constitutional reform in the
U.A.E. The Council of Ministers, since 1979, has failed to hold a
single joint session with the legislature. It only condescends to
cooperate with the FNC on the level of committees. The Supreme
Court defended the procedural rights of the FNC in the case of the
Social Security Bill but was reluctant to widen the FNC's legislative
function in the second case.
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CONCLUSION
The thesis has set out to explain how the 1971 Constitution
was introduced and adopted to the requirements of the rulers of
the U.A.E. It also explains how the legislature may operate within a
constitutional system even when It lacks real political or economic
power.
In chapter 1 we have seen that Western scholars have
favoured a particular kind of analysis of the constitutional
arrangements in developing nations which has led them to the
conclusion that legislatures in developing states were ineffectual,
impractical and anomalous institutions when compared or
contrasted to the western experience of legislatures.
In chapter 2 we have seen that the state in the U.A.E. was
not the creation of a single, national or colonial influence. Britain
did not establish any democratic form of constitutional and
administrative apparatus in the emirates, as a basis for civilian
bureaucracy after 1971. It did not even recruit large numbers of
the indigenous work force for Its local departments. Instead, the
British authority reinforced the position of the rulers and increased
their powers.
Chapter 2 also has shown that the U.A.E. society has
historically allowed a kind of citizens' involvement in the running
of their affairs through the traditional Majils. In 1971, however,
this kind of involvement was for all intends and purposes
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abandoned to a certain extent in the Constitution and was
replaced by a largely unelected legislature.
The backdrop of the traditional socio-political structure of
the society, was explained in chapter 2, chapters 3 and 4 dealt
with the pre-1971 attempts to establish a constitutional system of
government in Dubai and the whole of the U.A.E. The two Chapters
have explained that the rulers were unaccustomed to being
constrained by a supreme constitution in performing their
decision-making role. Chapter 3 has specifically set out to point
that In the U.A.E. where the Institution was not so deeply rooted in
history, the British were not prepared to support the one and only
legislative experiment in the pre-1971 era (i.e. the 1938 reform
movement). Furthermore, reluctant to interfere with the traditional
system, they made no attempt to provide a legal framework for the
area after their departure.
Chapter 4 has shown that the practical working of the 1971
Constitution rests to a large extent on the power and consent of
the rulers. Its legal status is unclear but ultimately is at the whim
of the rulers. First, the rulers have used the Constitution as an
instrument to regulate their internal problems. Secondly, they
used the Constitution to accommodate and channel demands from
relevant effective segments of the society; that Is the merchants
and newly emerging "middle class". For these reasons the
continuity of the present constitution depends on their position.
Much of the debate surrounding the form the constitution of
the U.A.E. should take, centred upon the aims and limits of federal
power. The outcome was not without controversy. Individual
322
(Conclusion)
emirates were deeply apprehensive about centralization and
desired a constitution which would diffuse such power by creating
subordinate federal institutions. At the same time, their fears were
tempered by aspirations of socio-economlc development which,
especially in the poorer and smaller emirates, would mean allowing
those federal institutions a very major role.
With the failure of the two pre-1971 attempts to establish a
legislature, the U.A.E. has adopted a provisional constitution in
1971 which is highlighted In chapter 5. This chapter explains that
one of the functions of the modern 1971 constitution is to
establish democracy or at least prepare the way forward in that
direction. The U.A.E. 1971 Constitution declares In its preamble
that one of its ambitions is to progress "by steps towards a
comprehensive, representative, democratic regime." Democracy
was there In the minds of the constitution-makers, yet the difficult
part was how to accommodate the traditions of the past within the
constitution.
We have seen In chapters 6 and 7 how the constitutional
framework of the legislature and its actual role in the political
system of the U.A.E. was developed. Both chapters were
corresponding to the historical development of the country as was
discussed in chapter 2, and the general perspective of legislature
in developing countries as was outlined In chapter 1.
In chapter 6 we have seen that there are similarities between
the traditional Majils and the federal legislature. These similarities
may be summed up as follows. The decisions of neither are final.
They have to be sanctioned by the ruler. Their suggestions and
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criticisms are considered as consultative opinions with no binding
power. Another shared feature is that both the Majlis and the
Federal National Council represent the traditional groupings in
society. Finally both bodies are unelected.
The FNC has become the new traditional Majlis but with
some differences. First, it is institutionalised and protected by a
written constitution and for a body in a traditional -society this is a
huge development in itself. Second, it is the first time in U.A.E.
history that a group of citizens representing the seven emirates has
got together under one roof to discuss state affairs. Traditionally
each emirate had its own Majlis to deal with local affairs. Third,
the role and functions of the FNC are much wider than those of the
Majils. Nevertheless, It is appropriate to notice that the traditional
custom of any citizen expressing his opinion on any issue in the
shaikh's Majlis still persist. One must admit that the old order of
behaviour and values have continued notably unaltered.
The chapter has also made it clear that the socio-political
factors which lead to the weakness of the U.A.E. legislature are
probably more significant than the constitutional restrictions. First
among them is the characteristic absence in the traditional society
of an intermediate group able to mediate between the ruler and the
ruled. The openness of the ruler's court does not encourage the
emergence of any group seeking to be the mouthpiece of the
society. The tradition has persisted since 1971 and has to a large
extent damaged the legislature's chances of representing the
demands of the people. One expects now with the complexity of the
society that the decline in the tradition of free access will
strengthen the legislature's mediating role.
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Another factor to be considered is that since the coming of
oil the ruling elites have sought to create a general sense that the
people are in need of them rather than vice versa. The people are
not able to run their affairs and are obliged to accept the type of
legislature the ruling elites are prepared to grant them. Thirdly, it
seems that a weak legislature, in terms of its law making powers
and control over the executive, has been the price the people have
paid for the rapid soclo-economic growth of their country.
Fourthly, in the absence of such things as political parties U.A.E.
society remains politically uneducated.
In chapter 7 the thesis has shown that the U.A.E. legislature
does have certain specific legislative and political functions to
perform but its power to fulfil these functions is restricted by
constitutional factors. These are as follows.
In normal circumstances one expects a legislature to
represent the people, to legislate and to be a check on the
executive. In common with most developing countries, the U.A.E.
Constitution has established a legislature whose nature somewhat
frail. The FNC members are appointed and therefore, responsible to
the ruler who appointed them. Furthermore, the legislature is
denied the power to initiate Bills, check the executive or have a say
in financial matters.
When comparing the general perspective of the role of
legislature set out in chapter 1 and that of the U.A.E. legislature
explained in chapter 7 one may ask how such a restricted
legislature differs from a traditional Majlis? What are the functions
of such an expensive institution? It is definitely not the law-making
4.
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function that justifies the existence of the U.A.E.'s legislature nor
any control It exercises over the executive. In common with most
Third World legislatures the FNC is not a law-making body, yet it
has a role to fulfil in this area. It discusses all proposed legislation
and in many cases presents its own amendments. Its sessions are
lively and forceful. Therefore, although it does not have the final
word in the law-making function it has an Influence on the law-
maker through its deliberations.
With regard to executive control, once established, the
legislature seems to be a latent constraint on the executive. It has
a serious function in that it makes the government responsible for
its actions and practices. However, administration can benefit from
its existence. In the case of the U.A.E., the FNC attempts to
monitor and criticise the government in its debates and at question
time. By building good relations with the executive, the legislature
has been successful in overcoming some of the constitutional
restraints aimed at preventing such activities as the formation of
investigative committees.
However, it is important before anything else to stress again
that the traditional Majlis still survives in each emirate and play a
role in the executive control function. The rulers stifi meet their
followers and consult with them the major issues of the emirates
affairs. It appears that the emergence of the FNC in the
constitutional system of the country did not diminish the role of
the Majils in this function.
With regard to the representative role of the legislature, there
seems to be a persistent lack of genuine representation in the
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legislatures of the new states. Yet, the distortion varies from one
country to another.
The FNC cannot be said to be truly representative. At
present the U.A.E. legislature is composed of unelected members
and therefore has no mandate from the people. For this reason it
usually takes into account the wishes of the rulers because each
member feels that he has no backing from the people.
Furthermore, the legislator tends to disregard local issues in his
emirates during FNC sessions. He rather prefer to concentrate on
federal and constitutional matters.
The major obstacle to genuine representation is the fact that
the U.A.E. has never had any kind of free elections throughout its
history. This had created among the ruling elites a general
atmosphere that the absence of elections is something acceptable
to local political culture. One even may argue that to introduce
elections would be an odd thing to do in 1971, especially as their
absence does not represent a threat to the system or even shake
its stability and legitimacy. In other words, the ruling families have
never tried the election device and would rather stay in the safe
side and not take the risk of adopting it.
Beside the election issue the composition of the U.A.E.
legislature increases its unrepresentativeness. In a close socio-
political system where nepotism and personal relationships take
precedence over expertise and merit, one expects to see legislators
appointed on the most spurious grounds. The FNC therefore is not
an open forum.
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With regard to political recruitment function the FNC has
been partially successful in this. Its existence has provided the
system with posts to be distributed among the politically ambitious
and those of local importance. This has helped to increase loyalty
amongst influential segments of the society.
However, the U.A.E. legislature has failed to perform the task
of training future politicians to serve in the cabinet and federal
departments. With the exception of one, all cabinet ministers have
been appointed from outside the legislature.
The U.A.E. legislature has played no significant role in the
mobilization of the masses by creating a democratic movement or
the integration of society. The former is not a major concern of the
system because most of the people are already mobilized around it.
The fact that the FNC has had to gather citizens from the different
emirates has in itself achieved a degree of integration, but the
emirates' society Is not ethnically or culturally so disintegrated as
to need a legislature devoted to such a function.
The legitimating role Is an important one shared by many
Third World legislatures. However, the legitimacy of the ruling
families of the emirates does not emanate from the people or the
legislature. They are there because of tribal power and service
distribution. Nonetheless, the FNC serves the system through
passing laws, legitimating government actions and being a pro
forma representative of the people.
Chapter 8 has presented how the provisions of the 1971
Constitution were implemented and interpreted by the Supreme
court for the sake of preserving the power of the rulers. We have
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seen that the constitutional and political crises made It obvious
that the traditional quasi-undemocratic way of ruling had
triumphed. The rulers admittedly listened to their people and
consulted their advisers, but the final decision always lay in their
hands. When they were faced with a new order under which
certain sections of the population, represented by the FNC and the
Council of Ministers, would be able to participate in the formation
of the country's present and future structure, the rulers were
resentful. They ignored the writing on the wall and continued to
monopolise the real power.
Some conclusions may be drawn from the thesis. First,
constitutional evolution rather than radical change has been the
U.A.E.'s experience of constitutional development. The traditional
rulers conceded new constitutional arrangements as long as they
did not undermine their personal status and ultimate authority.
They moreover have used the 1971 Constitution as a mean
to legitimate their position. This veneer of democratic government
has protected and entrenched the rulers influence and power. This
is consisted with the legitimating ideology which auspicate for their
historical claim to rulership but the constitution has become a
useful device for anticipating and controlling demands for reforms.
The future task, therefore, Is to reconcile their power with
the constitution. The aim must be to convince the rulers after the
end of the Gulf war that the future trend is towards a democratic
system of representative government. Such a system may be best
brought about through a period of constitutional monarchy in
every emirate.
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Second, it is clear from the evidence that legislatures in most
Third World countries have never been intended, either in the
colonial period or since independence, to perform the legislative
function of making laws in the democratic sense or to control the
executive. The colonial powers did not encourage the legislature
and even where it was established, legislature was seen as a
control device rather than a means of power sharing.
In some developing countries the law-making function is not
executed by all the members of the legislature either because of
their lack of interest or, more probably, because of the powerful
and decisive participation of the executive and political agencies in
legislation.
Political leaders in developing countries, therefore, defend
the existence of a weak or minimal legislature in their regimes for
the presence of these bodies symbolizes the notion of pluralistic
and popular government.
Third, it is simplistic to label a legislature as a mere rubber
stamp because of its limited power in the law-making function.
Third World legislatures usually prefer not to say directly and
explicitly "no" to the executive government or the administration.
Instead, they use diplomatic and subtle ways. They are likely to
concentrate their efforts on deliberating privately rather than
publicly, and seeking amendments rather than defeating
government-sponsored bills. Legislative bodies in developing
countries tend to use powers at their disposal in order to delay,
amend, and modify unacceptable policies though this, apparently,
is not taken to the extreme of rejection.
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Fourth, it is important in the case of drawing of the
constitution for a developing country to take into consideration
how to make changes to the existing system without totally
rejecting the past. The present constitutional system in the U.A.E.
allows room for peaceful and gradual transition rather than radical
change. This will come about through increased popular
participation in the decision-making process based on preserving
and respecting federal institutions, amending those restrictive
provisions in the Constitution which deny the legislature real
power and maintaining good will on all sides.
Certain early reforms to the existing legislature may be
recommended in order to implement some democratic ideals. A
gradual process of free elections of FNC members must be the
cornerstone of any drafted constitution in the U.A.E.
Representation in the council should be open to all citizens. Each
emirate should be represented in the legislature according to the
number of its nationals, although a maximum number of
representatives should be laid down in order to secure the
interests of the smaller emirates. The legislature must be allowed
to participate actively in the law-making process and to operate
positive control over the executive. Its decisions must be taken
seriously and acted upon. Finally in order to ensure the
effectiveness of the legislature it must be a major partner in any
future constitution-making process.
The researcher does not claim that these reforms can have
immediate or dramatic effect on the existing constitutional system,
but in future years it ought to help.
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Fifth, indeed, its legitimating role is probably the only reason
for the existence of a legislature in some developing countries since
it symbolizes popular participation In the decision-making process
or at least implies the role of the masses in the political system.
This symbolic function is clearly important in new states where the
elite need the appearance of public support. In fact, through its
election and representation of different socio-economic groups, a
legislature acquires a legitimacy that other non-elected institutions
may fall to achieve and, hence, can legitimate government
proposals and policies through ratifying and approving legislation
and executive actions.
However, as in the case of the U.A.E.'s legislature, unelected
legislatures with nominated members representing different
sectors of society tend to lack legitimacy. They owe their existence
to the reluctance of the political elite to allow the creation of a
separate political group through election by the population.
Accordingly, election to the legislature is the practice in most
political systems as being a prerequisite to its legitimacy in the
public mind and hence to the utifity of the institution in the
political process.
Finally, it is important not to draw on a categorical
relationship between democracy and political culture of many
Third World countries.
On one hand, the absence of democracy is not always
attributable to the autocratic nature of their leaders or their
personal beliefs. There are other values which can prevent the
establishment of democracy in some developing states, such as an
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unwillingness to accept public criticism of those in power, the
traditional dependency on rulers for survival, a high degree of
centralisation of power and state control over civil society.
In some cases, the political culture considers compromise a
sign of weakness and evidence of a lack of ability to solve problems
on the part of the ruler. In the light of this approach, the actions
taken by the ruler of Dubal in 1938 against the legislative
movement and the continuous refusal of the emirates' rulers to
amend the constitution or appreciate the demands of the FNC,
may be interpreted as expressions of strength.
On the other hand, history shows that the seeds of
democracy do exist in the political culture of many developing
countries. For example, the 1938 "reform movement" in Dubat was
a positive demonstration of a democratic impulse in that society.
The same spirit has infused the political culture of the U.A.E. since
1971 and has been manifest in debates such as those on the
extension of the Constitution and the joint memorandum.
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THE 1971 PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE U.A.E;
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ThE	 ISIAL a'rn yrIcn cp ThE	 PaP	 (1)
We, the Rulers of the Fznirates of A1i Dhabi, 1).zbai, Sha.rjah,
Ajrnan, Utin Al wain ar Fujairah (2):
Whereas it is our desire ath the desire of the people of our
an.irates to establish a Union between these Ehirates, to prarote
a better life, more eix1uring stability ar a higher international
status for the nirates axx3. their people;
Isiring to create closer links between the Arab Eknirates in
the form of an iix1epexent, sovereign, federal state, capable of
protecting its existence ax the existence of its nnbers, in co-
operation with the sister Arab states azxl with all other frlerk3.ly
states which are maiibers of the United Nations Organisation ard
of the family of nations in general, on a basis of mutual respect
ard reciprocal interests. ard benefits;
rsiring also to lay the fourdatton for federal rule in the
cxining years on a sourd basis, ocrrespc*xIing to the realities ark:I
the capacities of the Enirates at the present time, enabling the
Union, so far as possible, freely to achieve its goals,
sustaining the identity of its manbers providing that this is rt
inconsistent with t?se goals aM preparing the people of the
Union at the sane time for a dignified aM free stitutional
life, aM progressing by steps trds a cx:*riprehensive, repre-
sentative, denccratic regime in an Islamic aM Arab society free
fran fear aM anxiety;
AM whereas the realisation of the foregoing was our dearest
desire, tc,ards which we have bent our strongest resolution,
being desirous of advancing our intry aM our people to the
status of qualifying them to take appropriate place among
civilised states aM nations;
For all these reasons and until the preparation of the
permanent Constitution for the Union may be completed, we
proclaim before the Suprne aM Qmipotent Creator, aM before
all, the peoples, our agreent to this provisional Constitution,
to which our signatures were aeix1ed, which shall be intpleiented
during the transitional period irritcated in it;
My Allah, our Protector aM DefaMer, grant us success.
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Article 1
The United Arab Emirates is an independent, sovereign,
federal state and is referred to hereafter in this Constitution
as the Union. The Union shall consist of the following
Emirates: -
A1*i t*abi - EXibal - Sharj ah - Ajrnan - Win Al wain -
Fujairah - Ras A]. Khaimah. (3)
Any other independent Arab country may join the Union,
provided that the Suprne Council agrees unaniimsly to this.
Article 2
The Union shall exercise sovereignty in matters assigr to
it in accxrdance with this Qstitution over all territory and
territorial waters lyizj within the International. bc*indaries of
the nnber nirates.
Article 3
member flnirates shall exercise sovereignty over their
rJ. territories and territorial waters in all matters which are
nct within the jurisdiction of the tlnicn as assigned in this
oustituticxi.
Article 4
Union may rt cede its sovereignty or reliruish any
part of its territories or waters.
Article 5
The Union shall have a Flag, an nblem and a National
Anthem. Flag and the flnblem shall be prescribed by Law.
Each Etiirate shall retain its own flag for use within its
territories.
Article 6
The Union is a part of the Great Arab Nation, to which it is
bound by the ties of religion, language, history and common
destiny.
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The people of the Union are one people, and one pert of the
Arab Nation.
Article 7
Islam is the official religion of the Union. The Islamic
Shari'ah shall be a main souros of legislation in the Union. The
official language of the Union is Arabic.
Article 8
The citizens of the Union shall have a single nationality
which shall be prescrftei by law. When abroad, they shall enjoy
the protection of the Union Government in accordance with
accepted international principles.
b citizen of the Union may be deprived of his nationality
rr may his nationality be witldrawn save in exceptional circun-.
stais which shall be defined by law.
Article 9
1 • The Capital of the Union shall be estabUs1 in an area
allotted to the Union by the nirates of Abe rtiabi and Dibe.t
on the berders between then and it shall be given the nan
"Al Karani&'.
2. There shall be allocated In the Union lu3get for the first
year the aimmt neoassary to r the expenses of tethnical
stlies and planning for the struction of the Capital.
Iijever, ocinstruction wrk shall begin as soon as pDssible
and shall be xztpleted in rt nore than seven years fran the
date of entry into foroa of this xrstitution.
3. Until the construction of the Union Capital is cclTplete, Abe
Cbabi shall be the provisional headquarters of the Union.
Article 10
The aims of the Union shall be the maintenanoa of its indep-
endence and sovereignty, the safeguard of its security and
stability, the defenoa ageinst any aggression upon its existen
or the existence of its me'ter states, the protection of the
rights and liabilities of the people of the Union, the
achievnent of close co-operation between the flnirates for their
ciiin benef it in realising these ain and in praroting their
prosperity and progress in all fields, the provisiai of a better
life for all citizens together with respect by each flnirate for
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the independence and sovereignty of the other nirates in their
internal affairs within the framerk of this Constitution.
Article 11
1, The Eknirates of the Union shall form an ecornic and custcxns
entity. Union Laws shall regulate the progressive stages
appropriate to the achieverient of this entity.
2. The free movement of all capital and goods between the
Emirates of the Union is guaranteed and may not be
restricted except by a Union Law.
3. All taxes, fees, duties and tolls imposed on the rrovent of
goods from one member nirate to the other shall be
abolished.
Article 12
The foreign policy of the Union shall be directed tcards
suxrt for Arab and Islamic causes and Interests and tards the
ocnsolldation of the }xuià of friship and cx>-operaticzi with
all nations and peoples on the basis of the principles of the
tharter of the United Nations and Ideal internaticrial standards.
Ul1VThL &IAL
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Article 13
The Union and the manber flnirates shall co-operate, within
the limits of their jurisdiction and abilities, in exeaiting the
provisions of this Part.
Article 14
Fqiality, social justice, ensuring safety and security and
eguality of oç.portunity for all citizens shall be the pillars of
the Society. (b-operation and mutual mercy shall be a firm Ixx
between then.
Article 15
The family is the basis of society. It is founded on
morality, religion, ethics and patriotism. The law shall
guarantee its existence, safeguard and protect it from
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corrupticn.
Article 16
Society shall be respersible for protecting childlxxi ard
ITotherhocxl and shall protect mirors and others unable to look
after themselves for any reascz, such as illness or incapacity or
old age or forced unemployment. It shall be responsible for
assisting t1n and enabling then to help themselves for their cwn
benefit and that of the cczrwun.ity.
Such matters shall be regulated by welfare and social
security legislations.
Article 17
flucaticn shall be a fundaitntal factor for the progress of
society. It shall be cxznpilsory in its primary stage arx free of
charge at all stages, within the Jnicti. The law shall prescribe
the necssary plans for the prcgatiai and spread of educaticn
at various levels and for the eradicaticn of illiteracy.
Article 18
Private schools may be established by individuals and
organisations in accordance with the provisions of the law,
provided that such sc1ls shall be subject to the supervisicn of
the xetent piblic aut1rities and to their directives.
Article 19
Medical care and means of prevention and treatment of
diseases and epidemics shall be ensured by the xznm.inity for all
citizens.
The iminity shall prciiote the establishment of p±lic and
private Fspitals, dispensaries and cure-lxxises.
Article 20
Society shall estn srk as a corner-stone of its develop-
ment. It shall endeavour to ensure that employment is available
for citizens and to train than so that they are prepared for it.
It shall furnish the aropriate facilities for that by providing
legislations protecting the rights of the employees and the
interests of the employers in the light of developing
international la1ur legislations.
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Article 21
Private property shall be protected. Ccriitions relating
thereto shall be laid down by Law. No one shall be deprived of
his private property except in circumstances dictated by the
pb1ic benefit in accordance with the provisicns of the Law ar
on	 iint of a just caripensatiai.
Article 22
Public property shall be inviolable. The protection of
pthlic property shall be the duty of every citizen. The Law
shall define the cases in which penalties shall be imposed for
the contravention of that duty.
Article 23
The natural resrces arxi wealth in each nirate shall be
considered to be t1 piblic property of that Enirate. Society
shall be responsible for the protection ar proper exploitation
of such natural resources and wealth for the benefit of the
national ex*xxny.
Article 24
'Ibe basis of t] national eaxany shall be social justice.
It is fnx3ed on siire c-cçeraticn between piblic ani private
activities. Its aim shall be the achievement of economic
developit, irrease of productivity, raising tbe star3a.rds of
living ax tbe achievant of prosperity for citizens, all within
the limits of Law.
The Union shall erourage cx)-cperaticn an savings.
PA •n
fl4, RIUrn$ PJ4 RRIC iATri
Article 25
All persons are equal before the law, without distinction
between citizens of tbe Union in regard to race, nationality,
religious belief or social status.
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Article 26
Personal liberty is guaranteed to all citizens • No person
may be arrested, searched, detained or imprisoned except in
accordance with the provision of law.
No person shall be subjected to torture or to degrading
treatment.
Article 27
Crimes ar pinishments shall be defined by the law. No
penalty shall be imposed for any act of cammission or cimission
autinitted before the relevant law has been pratulgated.
Article 28
Penalty is personal. An accused shall be presumed innocent
until proved guilty in a legal ar fair trial. accused shall
have the right to appoint the person wt is capable to xtxuct
his defence duriz the trial. •i1 law shall prescribe the cases
in which the presa of a axinsel for defence shall be assigned.
Physical ar uoral athse of an accused person is prthibited.
Article 29
Freeian of iovanent ar residence shall be guaranteed to
citizens within the limits of law.
Article 30
Freedan of opinion ar5 expressiz it verbally, in writir or
by other means of expression shall be guaranteed within the
limits of law.
Article 31
Freeian of camunicaticn by post, telegraçh or other means
of ccminication ath the secrecy thereof shall be guaranteed in
accordance with law.
Article 32
Fres3an to exercise religious rship shall be guaranteed in
accordax with established custcs, provided that it does not
conflict with piblic policy or violate piblic norals.
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Article 33
Freeicin of assanbly and• establishing associations shall be
guaranteed within the limits of law.
Article 34
Every citizen shall be free to chDose his occupation, trade
or profession within the limits of law. Due consideration being
given to regulations organising sane of such professions and
trades • No person may be subjected to forced la1x.ir except in
exceptional circumstances provided for by the law ar1 in return
f or canpensatiori.
No person may be enslaved.
Article 35
Public office shall be open to all citizens on a basis of
euality of o.çortunity in aaordanc with the provisions of law.
Public office shall be a national service entrusted to ticse w
lx,ld it.	 piblic servant shall aim, in the execution of his
duties, at the piblic interest alone.
Article 36
Habitations shall be inviolable. They may rct be entered
wit1*it the permission of their inhabitants except in acardance
with the provisions of the law and in the circumstances laid dcn
therein.
Article 37
Cit.izeris may it be deported or banished fran the Union.
Article 38
Extradition of citizens and of Political refugees is
prohibited.
Article 39
General confiscation of property shall be prohibited.
Confiscation of an individual's possessions as a penalty nay not
be inflicted except by a court j ndgenent in the circumstances
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specified by law.
Article 40
Foreigners shall enjoy, within the Union, the rights and
freed.ci stipulated in international charters which are in force
or in treaties and agrents to which the Union is party. They
shall be subject to the corresponding obligations.
Article 41
Every person shall have the right to subnit canplaints to
the cczetent authorities, including the judicial aut1rities,
concerning the abise or infringatnt of the rights and freedan
stipulated in this Part.
Article 42
Paent of taxes and public charges determined by law is a
duty of every citizen.
Article 43
fence of the Union is a sacred duty of every citizen and
military service is. an honour for citizens which shall be
regulated by law.
Article 44
Respect of the Constitution, laws and orders issued by
public aut1rities in exeaition thereof, observance of public
order and respect of public mrality are duties inambent upon
all inhabitants of the Union.
PARE kUJC ThE trI AWi1tuTiJ.
Article 45
The Union aut}rities shall sist of:-
1. The SuprEne Ccuncil of the Union.
2. The President of the Union and his Deputy.
3. The Conncil of Ministers of the Union.
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4.	 National Assnbly of the Union.
5. The J1ciary of the Union.
AF1 I - 'IE	 axcrr. cF 'IDE tNt(
Article 46
The Supreme Council of the Union shall be the highest
aut1rity in the Union. It shall consist of the Rulers of all
the nirates canxsing the Union, or of tlxse who deç*itise for
the Rulers in their n1rates in the event of their absence or if
they have been excused frci atterding.
Each flnirate shall have a single vote in the deliberations
of the Council.
Article 47
The Supreme Council of the Union shall exercise the
folling matters: -
1 • Fornulation of general policy in all matters invested in the
Union by this Caistitution ard ct*isideraticn of all matters
which leads to the achievnt of the goals of the Union ard
the ix1Iu1an interest of the uriter nirates.
2. Sanction of va.riais Union laws before their pranulgation,
incltxitng the Laws of the Annual General iget ard the
Final	 mts.
3. Sanction of decrees relating to matters which by virtue of
the provisions of this Constitution are subject to the
ratification or agreement of the Supreme Council. Such
sanction shall take place before the prciiulgation of these
decrees by the President of the Union.
4 • Ratification of treaties arxl international agrenents. Such
ratification shall be accailished by decree.
5. Approval of the appointment of the thairman of the Council
of Ministers of the Uniczi, acceptance of his resignation arxi
his reioval fran office upcn a proposal fran the President
of the Union.
6. Approval of the appointment of the President ard J1ges of
the Supreme Court of the Union, acceptance of their
resignations and their dismissal in the circumstances
stipulated by this Constitution. Such acts shall be
acccmplished by decrees.
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7. Suprne Control over the affairs of the Union in general.
8. Any other relevant matters stipilated in this Constitution
or in the Union laws.
Article 48
1 • The Supreme Council shall lay dn its n bye-laws which
shall include its proure for the co3.uct of 1*isiness aid
the procedure for voting on its decisions.
	 The
deliberations of the Council shall be secret.
2. The Supr council shall establish a general Secretariat
which shall consist of an adequate number of officials to
assist it in the execution of its duties.
Article 49
Decisions of the Supreme Council on substantive matters
shall be by a majority of five of its rrnbers provided that this
majority includes the votes of the Pnirates of Abe Dhabi aid
1).ibai. The mincrity shaU be bixird by the view of the said
majority.
sit, decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be
by a majority vote. Such matters shall be defiz in the bye-
laws of the Oinc11.
Article 50
Sessions of the Supreme O:xincil shall be held in the Union
capital. Sessions may be held in any other place agreed upon
beforehard.
II- 'fliE	 jj	 caa AIl
Article 51
Supreire Council of the Union shall elect fran arrrzq its
rrnbers a President aid a Vice President of the Union. ¶L Vice
President of the Union shall exercise all the powers of the
President in the event of his absence for any reason.
Article 52
'It term of office of the President aid the Vice President
shall be five Gregorian years. They are eligible for re-election
to the same offices.
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ch of them shall, on assuming office, take the follci'ing
oath before the Supreme Council:
"I swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful to the
United Arab fluirates; that I will respect its Constitution
and its laws; that I will protect the interests of the
people of the Union; that I will discharge my duties
faithfully and loyally and that I will safeguard the
independence of the Union and its territorial integrity."
Article 53
Upon vacancy of the office of the President or his Deputy
for death or resignation, or because either e of them ceases to
be Ruler in his Enirate for any reason, the Suprare Qncil shall
be called into session within one month of that date to elect a
successor to the vacant office for the period stipulated in
Article 52 of this Constitution.
In the event that the t offices of the President of the
Supreme Qxincil and his Deputy beixne vacant siiailtanec*isly, the
Council shall be irrniiately called into session by any one of
its members or by the thairman of the Q:xincil of Ministers of the
Union, to elect a n President and Vice President to fill the
t vacant offices.
Article 54
The President of the Union shall assume the following
ixrs : -
1. Presiding the Supreme Oz*incil and directing its discussions.
2. (1ling the Suprete Council into session, and terminating
its sessions accxrding to the rules of procedure upon which
the Cuncil shall decide in its bye-laws. It is obligatory
for him to ivene the Quncil for sessions, whenever a of
its znbers so requested.
3. Clling the Supreme Qxincil and the Cc*incil of Ministers
into joint session whenever necessity demands.
4. Signing Union laws, decrees and decisions which the Suprai
Council has sanctioned and prczmilgating them.
5. Appointing the Prime Minister, accepting his resignation and
relieving him of office with the consent of the Supreme
Council. He shall also appoint the Deputy Prime Minister
and the Ministers and shall receive their resignations and
relieve them of office in acccrdance with a proposal fran
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the Prime Minister of the Unicn.
6. ppointing the diplomatic representatives of the Union to
foreign states and other senior Union officials both civil
and military (with the exception of the President and Jges
of the Supreme Court of the Union) and accepting their
resignations aix! dismissing then with the consent of the
Council of Ministers of the Union. Such appointments,
acceptance of resignations and dismissals shall be
accanplished by decrees and in acrdance with Union laws.
7. SignIng of letters of credence of dipiciriatic representatives
of the Union to foreign states and organisations and
accepting the credentials of diplomatic and consular
representatives of foreign states to the Union and receiving
their letters of credence. He shall similarly sign
documents of appointment and credence of representatives.
8. Supervising the impinentaticn of Un.ion laws, decrees and
decisions thrcgh the Q:xincil of Ministers of the Union and
the cxiiçetent Ministers.
9. Representing the Union internally, vis-.a-vis other states
and in all international relations.
10. Exercising the right of pardon aix! xtuu.itation of sentences
aix! aroving capital senteres according to the provisions
of this Constitution and Union laws.
11. Oxiferring decorations and rnertils of hc*ic,ur, both civil aix!
military, in accordance with the laws relating to such
decoraticzs and medals.
12. Any other pr vested in him by the Suprne Qncil or
vested in him in oxiformity with this Constitution or Union
laws.
p1 UI - ThE	 ThE 11I(11
Article 55
The Council of Ministers of the Union shall consist of the
Prime Minister, his Depity and a numher of Ministers.
Article 56
Ministers shall } chosen fri aimxig citizens of the Union
krQn for their cxznpetence aix! experience.
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Article 57
The Prime Minister, his Deputy and the Ministers shall,
l:efore assir the responsibilities of t..heir office, take the
follirx oath before the President of the Union:-
"I swear by Almighty Gd that I will be loyal to the United
Arab flnirates; that I will respect its Ccristitution and
laws; that I will discharge my duties faithfully; that I
will caiipletely observe the interests of the ople of the
Union and that I will xrnpletely safeguard the existence of
the Union and its territorial integrity."
Article 58
The law shall define the Jurisdiction of the Ministers and
the pcers of each Minister. ¶Ihe first Ccuncil of Ministers of
the Union shall be cxinposed of the following Ministers: -
1. Foreign Affairs
2. Interior
3. Defence
4. Finance, Eocnciny and Industry
5. Justice
6. ucaticn
7. Public Health
8. Public ?brks and Pgriculture
9 • Qxrirunicatiais, Post, Tlegraçki and Tlec&nes
10. Labour and Social Affairs
11 • Thfoniation
12. Planning.
Article 59
The Prime Minister shall preside over the meetings of the
Council of Ministers. He shall call it into session, direct its
debates, follow up the activities of Ministers and shall
supervise the co-ordination of work between the various
Ministries and in all executive organs of the Union.
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The Dexity Prime Minister shall exercise all the LxMers of
the Prime Minister in the event of his absence for any reason.
Article 60
The Council of Ministers, in its capacity as the executive
aut1-r1ty of the Union, and under the suprre control of the
President of the Union and the Supreme Council, shall be
responsible for dealing with all dcistic and foreign affairs
which are within the ccmpetence of the Union according to this
Constitution and Union laws.
The Ccuncil of Ministers shall, in particular, assiine the
folling pcers : -
1. Follcing up the impltentation of the general policy of the
Union Goveranent, both dcznestic and foreign.
2. Initiating drafts of Federal laws and suhnitting t1n to the
Union National Council before they are raised to the
President of the Union for presentation to the SupremeQ:xincil for sancticz.
3. Drawing up the annual general bx3get of the Union, and the
final accxunts.
4. Prepering drafts of decrees and varions decisions.
5. Issuing regulations necessary for the implementation of
Union laws withont amending or suspaxling such regulations
or i ding any exeii*ion fran their exeaition. Issuing also
policy regulations relating to the organisation of public
services and administrations, within the limits of this
Cc*istitution and Union laws. A special provision of the law
or the Cc*incil of Ministers, may charge the cxinpetent Union
Minister of any other administrative authrity to prcinulgate
sax of such regulations.
6. Supervising the implementation of Union laws, decrees,
decisions and regulations by all the a*xerned aut1Drities
in the Union or in the flnirates.
7. Supervising the exea.iticn of jndnents rendered by Union
Law O:xirts and the implanentaticn of international treaties
and agreenents concluded by the Union.
8. Appointment and dinissal of Union enployees in accordance
with the provisions of the law, provided that their appoint-
inent and dismissal do xt require the issue of a decree.
9. Cc*itrofling the conduct of. rk in departments and .iblic
services of the Union and the ccnIuct and discipline of
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Union enployees in general.
10. Any other autlx)rity vested in it by law or by the Supreme
Conncil within the limits of this Constitution.
Article 61
Iliberations of the Cc*.mcil of Ministers shall be secret.
Its resolutions shall be passed by a majority of its rrnbers. In
the event that voting is evenly divided, the side on which the
Prime Minister has voted shall prevail. The minority shall abide
by the opinion of the majority.
Article 62
While in office, the Prime Minister, his ip.ity or any Union
Minister, may not practise any professional, commercial, or
financial occupation or enter into any cxirinercial transactions
with the Government of the Union or the Governments of the
flnirates, or oxibine with their office the nbership of the
board of directors of any finarcial or oxnercial cunpany.
Furthermore, they may rct cczitine with their office riore
than one official post in any of the flnirates and shall
reliriuish all other local official, posts, if any.
Article 63
members of the CQ.uil of Ministers shall aim to serve
in their conduct the interests of the Union, the pratotion of
piblic lfare and totally rern personal benefits. They nust
rot exploit their official capacities for their n interests or
that of any person related to then.
Article 64
Prime Minister and the Ministers shall be politically
responsible collectively before the President of the Union and
the Supreme Ccuncil of the Union for the execution of the general
policy of the Union both datestic and foreign. Each of than
shall be personally responsible to the President of the Union and
the Supreme Caincil for the activities of his Ministry or office.
The resignation of the Prime Minister, his removal fran
office, his death, or the vacating of his office for any reason
whatsoever shall involve the resignation of the whole Cabinet.
The President of the Union may require the Ministers o remain in
office temporarily, to carry ait irrndiate administration, until
such time as a new Cabinet is formed.
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Article 65
At the beginning of every financial year, the Council of
Ministers shall su1nit to the President of the Union for present-
ation to the Supr Q:xincil, a detailed statnt of internal
achievements, on the Union's relations with other states ard
international organ.isations, together with the recamii1ations of
the Cabinet on the best ard rrost practical means of strengthening
the fourdations of the Union, ocnsolidating its security ari
stability, achieving its goals ard progress in all fields.
Article 66
1 • The Council of Ministers shall draw up its cn bye-laws
incltxlthg its rules of procedure.
2 • The Council of Ministers shall establish a general Secret-
ariat provided with a number of eiployees to assist it in
the ccnuct of its besiness.
Article 67
'11 Law shall prescribe the salaries of the Prime Minister,
his Depity ard the other Ministers.
21 IV - E ?Ud'IL A
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Article 68
National Assbly of the Union shall be cariçxsed of
forty (4) members. Seats shall be distribeted to matiber flairates
as folls:-
Abe Dhabi	 8 seats
Dubai	 8 seats
Sharjah	 6 seats
Ras Al haimah	 6 seats
Ajman	 4 seats
Utin A]. wair1	 4 seats.
Fujairah	 4 seats
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Article 69
Each Emirate shall be free to determine the method of
selection of the citizens representing it in the Union National
Assenbly.
Article 70
A nnber of the Union National Assanbly imist satisfy the
folling coxlitions : -
1. tist be a citizen of one of the Emirates of the union, ard
permanently resident in the Emirate he represents in the
Assanbly.
2. tist be rct less than twenty-five Gregorian years of age at
the time of his selection
3. tist enjoy civil status, goal aniuct, reç*itation ard not
previously cvnvicted of a dis)uxxirable offere unless he
has been rehabilitated in ardax with the law.
4. 'tist have adequate ncwledge of readii azxl writir.
Article 71
Membership of the Union National Assembly shall be
incompatible with any public office in the Union, including
Ministerial. gortfolios.
Article 72
The term of menbership in the Union National Assenbly shall
be t Gregorian years carrnencing fran the date of its first
sitting. When this period expires, the Assembly shall be
cxvletely renewed for the time rnaining until the erxl of the
transitional period as laid down in Article 144 of this Ccristit-
uticn.
Any menber who has completed his term may be re-elected.
Article 73
Before assuming his duties in the Assembly or itsQ:mnittees, a menber of the Union National Assembly shall take
the following oath before the Assaitly in ixiblic sessicri:-
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"I swear by Almighty Gd that I will be loyal to the United
Arab flnirates; that I will respect the Constitution and the
laws of the Union arid that I will discharge my duties in
the Assembly arid its Ccmnittees Inestly arid truthfully."
Article 74
If, for any reason, a seat of any member of the Assembly
beccines vacant before the end of the term of his rrnbership, a
replacnt shall be selected within t months of the date on
which the vacancy is announced by the Assembly, unless the
vacancy occurs during the three months preceding the end of the
term of the Assembly.
The new member shall xtnplete the term of nnbership of h.is
predecessor.
Article 75
Sessions of the Union ?ticnal Assembly shall be held in the
Union capital. Ebcceptionally, sessions may be held in any other
place within the Union on the hasis of a decision taken by a
majority vote of the meiters arid with the approval of the Oxincil
of Ministers.
Article 76
Assembly shall decide upon the validity of the mandate
of its members. It shall also decide upon disqualifying nrbers,
if they lose one of the required axKlitic*s, by a majority of all
its members arid on the proposal of five ancng them. 1e Assbly
shall be xietent to accept resignation fran mitership. ¶I
resignation shall be ccrisidered as final fran the date of its
acceptance by the Asseitly.
Article 7•7
A member of the National Assembly of the Union shall
represent the whole people of the Union and not merely the
flnirate which he represents in the Assembly.
Section 2 - Organisatiai of brk in the Assly
Article 78
The Assembly shall Fold an annual ordinary session lasting
not less than six months, commencing on the third week of
vember each year. It may be called into extraordinary session
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whenever the need arises. 'l'ne Assembly may not consider at: an
extraordinary session any matter other than those for which it
has been called into session.
Not ithstarding the preceding paragra±, the President of
the Union shall suni the Union National Assnbly to convene its
first ordinary session within a pericd not exceeding sixty days
fran the entry into force of this Constitution. This session
shall er at the tirre appointed by the Supreme Ca.incil by decree.
Article 79
The Assembly shall be suninoned into sessic*, ar its session
shall be terminated by decree issued by the President of the
Union with the consent of the Q,.incil of Ministers of the Union.
Any ntir held by the CcLincil without a formal sunicns, or in a
place other than that legally assigned for its xreeting in accord-
ance with this Constitution, shall be invalid arx3 shall have no
effect.
Nevertheless, if the Assembly is not called to hold its
meeting for its annual ordinary session before the third week of
November, the Assembly shall be ipso facto in session on the
tty first of the said ntith.
Article 80
The President of the Un.ton shall inaugurate the ordinary
annual session of the Assembly whereupon he shall deliver a
speech reviewing the situation of the mtry ar1 the important
events aid affairs which happered during the year aid aitlining
the projects aid reforrr the Union Gwerrmnt plans to uidertake
during the new session. President of the Union may de.ite
his Vice President or the Prime Minister to open the session or
to deliver the speech.
National Assembly shall select, fran ang its members,
a ccminittee to draft the reply to the Opening Speech, emlxdying
the Assembly's observations aid wishes, ard shall suhnit the
reply after açroval by the Assembly to the President of the
Union for suhnission to the Suprte Couril.
Article 81
Members of the Assembly shall not be censured for any
opinions or views expressed in the irse of carrying out their
duties within the Assembly or its Cczrinittees.
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Article 82
Except in cases of "flagrante delicto", r nal prodings
may be taken against any rrber while the Assnbly is in session,
without the autlx)risation of the Assanbly. The Assnb1y rrn.ist be
notified if such proceedings are taken while it is not in
sessicn.
Article 83
The President of the Assanbly and its other mnbers shall he
entitled, fran the date of taki.rq the oath before the Assembly,
to a remuneration which shall be determined by law, and to
travelling expenses fran their place of residence to the place in
which the Assembly is meeting.
Article 84
The Assembly shall have a 3.ireau asisting of a President,
a First and Second Vice President and two controllers. The
Assembly shall select then all fran ang its mnbers.
The term of office of the President and the two Vice
Presidents shall expire wti the term of the Assembly expires or
when it is dissolved in acardaz with the provisions of the
seca paragra*i of Article 88.
term of office of the axitrollers shall expire with the
chDice of i cxxitrollers at the cçening of the next ordinary
annual session. If any post in the .ireau bexznes vacent, the
Assaitly shall elect wt, shall fill it for the remtaining period.
Article 85
'I Assethly shall have a Secretary-General w shall be
assisted by a number of staff wt, shall be directly responsible
to the Assembly. The Assethly's standing orders shall lay dcwri
their aniiticcis of service and their piers.
ii Assembly shall lay dcMn its standing orders, issued by
decree prarulgated by the President of the Union with the Consent
of the Council of Ministers.
The standing orders shall define the ers of the President
of the Assembly, his two Vice Presidents and the Controllers and
shall define generally all matters pertaining to the Assembly,
its ccnnittees, its members, its Secretariat, its employees, its
rules and procedures of discussion and voting in the Assembly and
the Committees and other matters within the limits of the
provisions of this Constitution.
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Article 86
Sessions of the Assembly shall be p.iblic. Secret sessions
may be held at the request of a representative of the Government,
the President of the Assembly or one third of its members.
Article 87
Deliberations of the Assembly shall not be valid unless a
majority of its menbers at least are present. Resolutions shall
be taken by an absolute majority of the votes of members present,
except in cases where a special majority has been prescribed. If
votes are equally divided, the side which the President of the
session supports shall prevail.
Article 88
Meetings of the Assembly may be adjourned by a decree
prclTulgated by the President of the Union with the approval of
the Ccuncil of Ministers of the Union for a period not exceeiirq
xe nctith, provided that such aijourritnt is not repeated in one
session except with the approval of the Assembly and for c*e
only. 'ft period of adjonmrt shall not be ded part of the
term of the ordinary session.
The Assethly may also be dissolved by a decree prcnilgated
by the President of the Union with the approval of the Supr
Council of the Union, provided that the decree of dissolut.tcn
includes a summons to the new Assembly to come into session
within sixty days of the date of the decree of dissolution. •i1
Assembly may not be dissolved again for the same reason.
Section 3 - rs of the tima1 Assly
Article 89
In so far as this does not conflict with the provisions of
Article 110, Union Bills, including financial bills, shall be
sulznitted to the National Assembly of the Union before their
suhnissicn to the President of the Unicn for presentation to the
Supreme Council for ratification. The National Assembly shall
discuss these bills and may pass them, amend or reject them.
Article 90
The Assembly shall examine during its ordinary session the
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Annual General Bx1get draft law of the Union ard the draft law of
the final accounts, in accordan with the provisions in (Thapter
Eight of this Constitutic*z.
Article 91
The Goverrunent shall inform the Union Assembly of
international treaties ari agreements concirded with other states
and the various international organisations, together with
appropriate explanations.
Article 92
The Union National Assembly may discuss any general subject
pertaining to the affairs of the Union unless the Council of
Ministers informs the Union National Assembly that such
discussion is contrary to the highest interests of the Union.
The Prime Minister or the Minister cerned shall attend the
debates. The Union National Assembly may express its recarinend-
ations and may define the subjects for debate. If the Caincil of
Ministers does not arove of these reaimnerdaticns, it shall
notify the Union National Assaly of its reasons.
Article 93
Gwernrnent of the tlnic*i shall be represented at sessions
of the Union National Assembly by the Prime Minister or his
depity or ct meitr of the Union (binet at least. a Prime
Minister or his deuty or the oxçetait Minister, shall ansr
questions pit to t1n by any maiter of the Assembly requesting
explanation of any matters within their jurisdiction, in
omforinity with the proce2ures prescribed in the starklling orders
of the Assatly.
5 -	 JtUIcThRY Di E tUI A1
Article 94
Justi is the basis of rule. In performir their duties,judges shall be independent and shall not be subject to any
authority bit the law and their in cascienoe.
Article 95
The Union shall have a Un-ton Supreme Ccart and Union Primary
Tribinals as explained hereafter.
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Article 96
The Unic*i Suprne Court shall consist of a President and a
number of judges, not exceeding five in all, who shall be
appointed by decree, issued by the President of the Union after
approval by the Suprte Council. The law shall prescribe the
number of the chambers in the Court, their order and procedures,
conditions of service and retirnt for its mnbers and the
precoixiltions and qualifications required of then.
Article 97
The President and the Jndges of the Union Suprre Court
shall not be removed while they administer justice. Their tenure
of office shall not be terminated except for one of the follcdng
reasons:-
1. Death.
2. Resignation.
3. Ecpiration of term of tract for thse who are appointed
by fixed term xtitráct or xztpletion of term of sexñtnt.
4. Reaching retirEnent age.
5. Permanent incapacity to carry the lxirdens of their duties by
reason of ill health.
6. Disciplinary discharge on the basis of the reasons and
proceedings stiilated in the law.
7. Aççxinthent to other offices, with their consent.
Article 98
President arkI the Jndges of the Union suprane Court
shall, before holdin office, swear on oath before the President
of the Union and in the presence of the Union Minister of Justice
that they will rier justice withc*it fear or favour and that
they will be loyal to the Constitution and the laws of the Union.
Article 99
The Union Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction in the
folling matters:-
1 • Various disçutes between member flnirates in the Union, or
between any one irate or more and the Union Coverrment,
whenever such dispites are suthdtted to the Court on the
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request of any of the interested parties.
2. Examination of the constitutionality of Union laws, if they
are challenged by one or nre of the Finirates on the grounds
of violating the Constitution of the Union.
Examination of the constitutionality of legislations pranul-
gated by one of the flnirates, if they are challenged by one
of the Union aut1rities on the grounds of violation of the
Constitution of the Union or of Union laws,
3. Examination of the constitutionality of laws, legislations
and regulations in general, if such request is referred to
it by any Court in the country during a pending case before
It. The aforesaid Court shall be bound to accept the ruling
of the Union Suprre Ccurt rerdered in this connection.
4. Interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, when
so requested by any- Union aut?crity or by the Governrrent of
any anirate. Any such interpretation shall be considered
binding on all.
5. Trial of Ministers and senior officials of the Union
appointed by decree regarding their actions in carrying out
their official duties on the drd of the Suprene Ccuril
and in ardar with the relevant law.
6. ines directly affecting the interests of the Union, such
as criies relating to its internal or external security,
forgery of the official. recxrds or seals of any of the Union
autherities and interfeiting of curry.
7. Conflict of jurisdiction between the Union judicial
authorities and the local judicial authorities in the
FnJzates.
8. Q:xiflict of jurisdiction between the judicial autirity in
a flnirate and the judicial authority in arther Emtrate.
1 rules relating thereof shall be regulated by a Unton
law.
9. ny other jurisdiction stixilated in this Constitution, or
which nay be assigned to it by a Union law. -
Article 100
The Union Supreme Court shall hold its sittings in the
capital of the Union. It may, exceptionally, assemble when
necessary in the capital of any one of the Eknirates.
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Article 101
The judgents of the Union Suprar Court shall be final and
binding upon all.
If the Court, in ruling on the constitutionality of laws,
legislatictis and regulations, decides that a Union legislation is
inconsistent with the Union Constitution, or that local
legislations or regulations under consideration contain
provisions which are inconsistent with the Union Constitution or
with a Union law, the aut]rity concerned in the Union or in the
nirate, accordingly, shall be obliged to hasten to take the
necessary measures to remove or rectify the constitutional
inconsistency.
Article 102
The Union shall have one or more Union Primary Trth.inals
which shall sit in the permanent capital of the union or in the
capitals of some of the Enirates, in order to exercise thejudicial pcQers within the sphere of their jurisdiction in the
folldng cases:-
1. Civil, xitinercial and administrative dispites beten the
Union and individuals whether the Union is plaintiff or
defendant.
2. Crimes coninitted within the boundaries of the permanent
capital of the Onion, with the exception of such matters as
are reserved for the Union Supreme Court under Article 99 of
this Constitution.
3. Personal status cases, civil and ccntercial cases and other
cases beten individuals which shall arise in the permanent
capital of the Union.
Article 103
The law shall regulate all matters connected with the Un-ton
Primary Prihinals in respect of their organisation, formation,
chambers, local jurisdicticri, procedures to be folled before
them, the oath to be sxn by their judges, conditions of service
relating to then and the ways of appeal against their j udgements.
The law may stipilate that appeals against the judgements of
these Thibenals shall be heard before one of the chambers of the
Union Supreme 0*irt, in the cases and according to the procedures
prescriled therein.
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Article 104
local judicial authrities in each Enirate shall havejurisdiction in all judicial matters rt assigned to the Unionjudicature in accordance with this Constitution.
Article 105
All or part of the jurisdiction assigned to the localjudicial authorities in accordance with the preceding Article may
be transferred by a Union law issued at the request of the
flnirate concerned, to the Primary Union Trilxinals.
Circumstances in which appeals against judganents by the
local judicial authorities in penal, civil, cxzrnercial and other
litigations may be referred to the Union Thibinals, shall be
defined by a Union law provided that its decision in such appeals
shall be final.
Article 106
The Union shall have a Public Prosecutor who shall be
appointed by a Union decree issued with the approval of the
Ccuril of Ministers, assisted by a niznber of mnbers of the
Public Prosecutor's office.
The law shall regulate matters relating to the manbers of
the Union Public Prosecutor's Office with respect to their met1d
of ax,inthent, ranks, prcirotion, retiriit and the qualific-
ations required of than.
Besides, the
shall regulate the
competence of its
security officers.
Union Law of Criminal Procedure and trials
r of this lxxly and its procedures and the
assistants from the police and the public
Article 107
The President of the Union may grant pardon from the
execution of any sentence passed by a Union judicature before it
is carried out or while it is being served or he may caiuute such
sentence, on the basis of the reconnendation of the Union
Minister of Justice, after obtaining the approval of a caitnittee
formed under the chairmanship of the Minister and ccisisting of
six mEnbers selected by the Union Ccuncil of Ministers for a term
• of three years which may be renewed. The members of the
committee shall be chosen from citizens of good repute and
capability.
?TIbership of the ccinnittee shall be gratis. Its deliber-
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ations shall be secret. Its decisions shall be issued by a
majority vote.
Article 108
No sentence of death imposed finally by a Union jicial
autix,rity shall be carried c*it until the President of the Union
has confirmed the sentence. He may substitute it by an attenuate
sentence in accordance with the procedure stipulated in the
preceding Article.
Article 109
There shall be no general amnesty for a crime or for
specified criss except by law.
'I praiulgaticn of the law of ansty shall nsider such
crins being deed ri avenu, aM shall rnit the execution of
the sentence or the remaining part of it.
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Article 110
1. Union laws shall be promulgated in accordance with the
provisions of this Article and other appropriate provisions
of the Caistituticrt.
2 • A draft law shall bmxzie a law after the adoption of the
folling procedure: -
(a) The Ccincil of Ministers shall prepare a bill and suhnit it
to the Union National Assly.
(b) The Council of Ministers shall submit the bill to the
President of the Unicn for his approval and presentation to
the Supreme Ccxincil for ratification.
(c) The President of the Union shall sign the bill after ratif-
ication by the Supr Caincil and shall pratulgate it.
3.. (a) If the Union National Assembly inserts any amerirent to
the bill and this amendment is not acceptable to the
President of the Union or the Supr 	 Qxincil or if the
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Union National Assanbly rejects the bill, the President of
the Union or the Supre Council may refer it back to the
National Assembly. If the Union National Assembly
introduces any amendment on that occasion which is not
acceptable to the President of the Union or the Supr
Council, or if the Union National Assnbly decides to reject
the bill, the President of the Union may praa.ilgate the law
after ratification by the Suprne Council.
(b) The term "bill" in this clause shall mean the draft
which is subnitted to the President of the Union by the
Council of Ministers including the amenments, if any, made
to it by the Union National Assembly.
4. Notwithstaring the foregoing, if the situation requires the
pranulgatiai of Union laws when the Naticrial Assembly is not
in session, the Council of Ministers of the Union may issue
than through the Supreme Council amI the President of the
Union, provided that the Union Asseitbly is notified at its
next meeting.
Article 111
Laws shall be piblished in the Official Gazette of the Union
within a rnaxinun of t weeks fran the date of their signature
arxl praivlgation by the President of the Onion after the Supreme
Council has ratified than. Such laws shall beorre in force one
ircnth after the date of their pblication in the said (zette,
unless another date is specified in the said law.
Article 112
No laws may be açplied except on what ocirs as frai' the
date they becane in force ar no retroactive effect shall result
in such laws. The law may, haever, stipulate the contrary in
matters other than criminal, if necessity so requires.
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Jirticle 113
S1ild necessity arise for urgent pranulgation of Union laws
between sessions of the Supreme Qxincil, the President of the
Union together with the Council of Ministers may pratulgate the
necessary laws in the form of decrees which shall have the force
of law, provided that they are not incx,nsistent with the Constit-
ution.
Such decree-laws must be referred to the Supreme Council
within a week at the maxinun for assent or rejection. If they
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are approved, they shall have the force of law and the Union
National Assatibly shall be notified at its next meeting.
However, if the Supre Cc*incil does not approve then, they
shall cease to have the force of law unless that it has decided
to sanction their effectiveness during the preceding period, or
to settle in sane other way the effects arising therefran.
PR In - aRy
Article 114
No decree may be issued unless the Qncil of Ministers has
confirmed it and the President of the Union or the Supreme
Cc*.mcil, acording to their powers, has ratified it. tcrees
shall be piblished in the Official Gazette after signature by the
President of the Union.
Article 115
While the Suprate Caincil is ont of session and if necessity
arises, it may authorise the President of the Union and the
Qxincil of Ministers cxllectively to prcxulgate decrees wFse
ratification is within the per of the Suprane Qxincil, provided
that such autrity shall not include ratification of inter-
naticral agreements and treaties or declaration or rescission of
martial law or declaration of a defensive r or appointhent of
the President or Judges of the Union Supreme Ort.
PAI2 six
Article 116
'It nirates shall exercise all prs not assigned to the
Union by this Cctistitution. flnirates shall all participate
in the establislinent of the Union and shall benefit fran its
existence, services and protection.
Article 117
The exercise of rule in each flnirate shall aim in particular
at the maintenance of security and order within its territories,
the provision of piblic utilities for its inhabitants and the
raising of social and ex*xinic standards.
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Article 118
The rrnber flnirates of the Union shall all rk for the -
ordination of their legislations in various fields with the
intention of unifying such legislations as far as possible.
TD or rire Emirates may, after obtaining the approval of
the Suprre Cc&incil, agglarate in a political or administrative
unit, or unify all or part of their p.iblic services or establish
a single or joint administration to run any such service.
Article 119
Union law shall regulate with utnost ease matters pertaining
to the execution of judgements, requests for commissions of
rogation, serving legal documents and surrender of fugitives
between nnber flnirates of the Union.
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Article 120
The Union shall have exclusive legislative and executive
jurisdiction In the folling affairs:-
1. Foreign affairs.
2. Tfence and the Union Armed Forces.
3. Protection of the Union's security against internal or
external threat.
4. Matters pertaining to security, order and rule in the
permanent capital of the Union.
5. Matters relating to Union officials and Union jndiciary.
6. Union finance and Union taxes, duties and fees.
7. Union *iblic loans.
8. stal, telegraçh, telepne and wireless services.
9. Construction, maintenance and improvrent of Union roads
which the Suprene Conncil has determined to be trunk roads.
The organisation of traffic on such roads.
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10 • Air Traffic Control aixl the issue of licences to aircraft
and pilots.
11 • Education.
12 • Public health and medical services.
13. Currency board and coinage.
14. asures, standards and weights.
15. Electricity services.
16 • Union nationality, passports, residence and inTnigration.
17. Union properties and all matters relatir thereto.
18. Census affairs and statistics relevant to Union pirposes.
19. Union Information.
Article 121
Without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding
Article, the Union shall have exclusive legislative jurisdiction
in the follirv matters:-
Labcxir relations and social security; real estate and exprop-
riation in the piblic interest; extradition of criminals, banks;
insuraz of all kinds; protection of agricultural and anina].
wealth; major legislations relating to penal law, civil and
cxxrinercial transactions and axpany law, procedures before the
civil and criminal irts; protection of cultural, technical and
industrial property and copyright; printing and publishing;
import of arns and arrrminiticn except for use by the armed forces
or the security forces belonging to any Enirate; other aviation
affairs which are riot within the executive jurisdiction of the
Union, delimitation of territorial waters and regulation of
navigation on the high seas.
Article 122
The Pnirates shall have jurisdiction in all matters not
assigi to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Union in acrdance
witi the provisions of the t precsdir Articles.
Article 123
As an exception to paragra 1 of Article 120 concerning the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Union in matters of foreign policy
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and international relations, the member Fznirates of the Union may
concli.xie limited agreements of a local and amiistrative nature
with the neighbouring states or regions, save that such
agrents are not inocnsistent with the interests of the Union
or with Union laws and provided that the Supreme Ccncil of the
Union is inforrrd in advance. If the Council objects to the
oDnclusion of such agreements, it shall be obligatory to suspend
the matter until the Union Cci.irt has ruled on that objection as
early as possible.
The mtrates may retain their membership in the OPEC organ-
isation and the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting
Countries or may join them.
Article 124
Before the colusion of any treaty or international agree-
ment which may affect the status of any of the flnirates, the
competent Union authorities shall consult that Enirate in
advance. In the event of a dispute, the matter shall be
subnittei to the Union Supreme Q,.irt for ruling.
Article 125
The Governments of the Emirates shall undertake the
appropriate measures to inpiatent the laws praulgated by the
Union and the treaties and international agreaDents luded by
the Union, including the prailgation of the local laws, regul-
ations, decisions and orders necessary for such iiiplaiientation.
The Union authorities shall supervise the inplementation by
flnirates' Gwerrirents of the Union laws, decisions, treaties,
agreements and Union judgements. The ccziçetent administrative
and judicial authorities in the flnirates sluld forrd to the
Union authorities all possible assistance in this xenection.
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Article 126
The general revenues of the Union shall consist of the
incane fran the folling resirces:-
1. Thxes, fees and duties imposed under a Union law in matters
within the legislative and executive jurisdiction of the
Union.	 -
2. Fees and rates received by the Union in return for services
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provided.
3. Contribution made by
Annual x1get of the
herein coming after.
mther Emirates of the Union in the
Union in acrdance with the article
4. Union incarie fran its n properties.
Article 127
The member Emirates of the Union shall contribute a
specified proportion of their annual revenues to ver the annual
general Lxget expenditure of the Union, in the manner and on the
scale to be prescribed in the &3get Law.
Article 128
The law shall prescribe the uet]xx5 of preparing the general
budget of the Union and the final accounts. The law shall also
define the beginning of the financial year.
Article 129
1 draft annual Ix1get of the Union, caTprising estimates
of revenues and expenditure, shall be referred to the Union
Natic*al Assethly at least t naiths before the beginning of the
financial year, for discussion and sulxiission of comments
thereon, before the draft tu5get is subnitted to the SuprQne
Cncil of the (ktton, together with tIse xwrents, for assent.
Article 130
annual general Iedget shall be issued by a law. In all
cases, where the lxx3get law has not been pratulgated before the
beginnir of the financial year, tanporary nthly funds may be
made by Union decree on the basis of cne twelfth of the funds of
the previais financial year. Revenues shall be collected and
expenditure disbursed in ardance with the laws in force at the
end of the preceding financial year.
Article 131
All expenditure not provided for in the bxlget, all expend-
iture in excess of the bxget estimates and all transfers of suns
fran cx part to another of the dget must be covered by a law.
twithstanding the foregoing, in cases of extrane urgency,
such expenditure or transfer may be arranged by decree-law in
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conformity with the provisions of Article 113 of this
Constitution.
Article 132
The Union shall allocate in its annual bdget a s.un fran its
revenue to be expended on be.tlding and cc*istruction projects,
internal security and social affairs according to the urgent
needs of sane of the nirates.
The execution of these projects and the disbirsnent thereon
shall be drawn fran these funds, accauplished by means of and
under the supervision of the canpetent Union IxDdies with the
agreent of authorities of the Fnirates concerned.
The Union may establish a special fund for this pirpose.
Article 133
b Union tax may be 1içoeed, amended or abolished except by
virtue of law. !* person nay be exaiçted fran payment of
taxes except in the cases specified by law.
Union taxes, duties and fees may nct be levied on any person
except within the limits of the law and in accordar with its
provisions.
Article 134
tb piblic loan nay be catracted except by a Union law. !b
caiinibnent involving the pant of sut fran Union Exchequer in
a future year or years may be cachei except by nans of a
Union law.
Article 135
¶Z1 final aunts of the financial acininistration of the
Union for the cciiçleted financial year shall be referred to the
Union National Assembly within the four naths follcMing the end
of the said year, for its coments thereon, before their
sulinission to the Supreme Ccuncil for approval, in the light of
the Aaxlitor-General' s report.
Article 136
An independent tJn.ton departnnt headed by an kkittorGeneral
w shall be appointed by decree, shall be established to ait
the accaints of the Union and its organs and agencies, and to
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axlit any other acnts assigned to the said departmant for that
irixse in accordance with the law.
The law shall regulate this deparrent and shall define its
jurisdiction and the cxiupetence of t1se rking therein, and the
guarantees to be given to it, its head and the ployees rkir
in it in order that they may carry xit their duties in the nost
efficient manner.
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Article 137
Every attack upon any member Enirate of the Union shall be
considered an attack upon all the flnirates and ui the existence
of the Union itself, which all Union and local forces will co-
operate to repel by all nans possible.
Article 138
Cily (5) the Union shall have army, navy and air forces with
unified training and carinand. The Cannander in thief of these
forces and the thief of the General Staff shall be appointed and
dimtssed by neans of a Union decree.
The Union may have a Union Security Forces.
!I1 Union Caincil of Ministers shall be responsible directly
to the President of the Union and the Supr Coincil of the
Union for the affairs of all these forces.
Article 139
The law shall regulate military service, general or partial
mobilisation, the rights and duties of members of the Armed
Forces, their disciplinary proures and similarly the special
regulations of the Union Security Forces.
Article 140
The declaration of defensive war shall be declared by a
Union decree issued by the President of the Union after its
approval by the Supreme Council. Offensive war shall be
prohibited in accordar with the provisions of. international
charters.
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Article 141
A Supreme Defence Council shall be set up under the
chairmanship of the President of the Union. Mong its rrnbers
shall be the Vice President of the Union, the thairman of the
Council of Ministers of the Union, the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, Defence, Finance, Interior, the Carmamder in thief and
the thief of the General Staff. It shall advise and offer views
on all matters pertaining to defence, maintenance of the peace
and security of the Union, forming of the ar1 forces, their
equiçrrent and developnent and the determination of their posts
and camps.
The Ccuncil may invite any military adviser or expert or
other persons it wishes to attend its meetings ixit they shall
have no decisive say in its deliberations. All matters
pertaining to this Cc*incil shall be regulated by means of a law.
Article 142 (6)
Th member flid.rates shall, have the right to set up local
security forces ready and equipped to join the defensive
machinery of the Union to defend, if need arises, the Union
against any external aggression.
Article 143
Any flnirate shall have the right to request the assistance
of the Armed Forces or the Security Forces of the Union in order
to maintain security and order within its territories whever it
is exposed to danger. Such a request shall be submitted
inimediately to the Supreme Ccincil of the Union for decision.
The Supreme Cc*nil may call upon the aid of the local armed
forces be1aing to any fluirate for this pirpose provided that
the Thdrate requesting assistance and the flnirate to wham the
forces belong agree.
The President of the Union and the Camncil of Ministers of
the Union collectively, may, if the Supreme Oxincil is not in
session, take any iniiiate measure wh1ch cannct be delayed and
considered necessary and may call the Supreme Council into
iirrneiiate session.
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Article 144
1. Subject to the provisions of tbe folliiing paragraphs, the
provisions of this Constitution shall apply for a
transitional period of five Gregorian years beginning fran
the date of its entry into force in accordance with
provisions of Article 152 (7).
2. a) If the Supreme Council considers that the topmost
interests of the Union require the amendment of this
Constitution, it shall submit a draft constitutional
amendment to the Union National Assembly.
(b) The procedure for approving the cxnstitutional aneix1ment
shall be the same as the procedure for approving laws.
(c) The approval of the Union National Assembly for a draft
constitutional airiient shall require the agrent of t-.
thirds of the votes of members present.
President of the Union shall sign the x*stituticnal
amerzent in the name of the Supreme Cauil and as its
representative and shall praiul'te the ameixitient.
3. ring the transitional period, the Supreme Cc*mcil shall
aiopt the nacessary measures to prepare a draft permanent
Constitution to take the place of this temporary
constitution. It shall submit the draft permanent
Constitution to the Union National Assembly for debate
before prcxmilgatirig it.
4. The Supreme Ccuril shall call the Union National Assembly
into extraordinary session at a time not more than six
nths before the end of the period of validity of this
taiçorary Constitution. The permanent Constitution shall be
presented at this session. It shall be promulgated
according to the procedure laid dcMn in p3ragraph 2 of this
Article.
Article 145
Under r cirmstances, may any of the provisions of this
Constitution be suspended, except when Martial Law is in force
and within the limits specified by this law.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, sessions of .
 the National
Assembly of the Union may rt be suspended during that period nor
may the inirninity of its nnbers be violated.
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Prticle 146
In case of necessity defined by law, Martial law shall be
declared by a decree prciulgated with the approval of the Supreme
Council on the basis of a proposal made by the President of the
Un.ic*i with the consent of the Council of Ministers of the Union.
Such decree shall be rtified to the Union National Assembly at
its next meeting.
Martial law shall be similarly lifted by decree issued with
the approval of the Supre Council wben the need, for which it
was imposed, no longer exists.
Article 147
Nothing in the application of this Constitution shall affect
treaties or agrernts ccnchxed by member Eknirates with states
or international organisations unless such treaties or agreements
are amended or abrogated by agreement between the parties
Article 148
All matters established by laws, regulations, decrees,
Drders and decisions in the various member flnirates of the Union
in effect urxri the axning into force of this Qxtstitution, shall
continue to be applicable unless amended or replaced in
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.
Similarly, the measures and organisations existing in the
neinber fluirates shall continue to be effective until the
promulgation of laws amending them in accordance with the
provisions of the Ccmstitut.ion.
Article 149
As an exception to the provisions of Article 121 of this
Cc*istitution, the flnirates may prarulgate legislations necessary
for the regulation of the matters set cut in the said Article
without violation of the provisions of Article 151 of thisQxistituticn.
Article 150
heThe Union authorities shall strive to issue the laws
referred to in this Constitution as quickly as possible so as to
i repiace the existing legislations and systems, particularly those
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which are not consistent with the provisions of the Constitution.
Article 151
The provisions of this Constitution shall prevail over the
Constitutions of the mnber Emtrates of the Union ar the Union
laws which are issued in accordance with the provisions of this
Constitution shall have priority over the legislations,
regulations and decisions issued by the authorities of the
Fmirates.
In case of conflict, that part of the inferior legislation
which is inconsistent with the superior legislation shall be
reixiered null and void to the extent that raves the iricorisist-
ency. In case of disxite, the matter shall be referred to the
Union Suprne Court for its riiling.
Article 152
1 Qnstitution shall take effect fran the date to be fixed
in a declaration to be issued by the Rulers signatories to this
Constitution.
Signed in Dubai on this day the 18th of July, 1971,
correspaxUrq to this day the 25th of the ntzith of Jamad Awwal
1391.
(Signatures of the Rulers of Abu Dhabi, Dubal, Sharjah,
Ajman, thin Al	 in, Fujairah) • (8)
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This constitution is based, to a large extent, on the nczel
set by the Egyptian Constitution. A principal reason for the
heavy influence of the Egyptian Constitution is the general
place which the Egyptian legal system occupies as a rrolel
for other Arab countries.
A second reason for the Egyptian influence was the
participation of a number of Egyptian legal advisers anl
scholars in the process of drafting the tJ.A.E. Constitution.
Dr • Wahid Ha 'fat, the Egyptian scholar, was the main drafter
of the final version of this constitution.
The U.A.E. Constitution is also affected by British
influences in sate of its major characteristics. The federal
system adopted by this constitution is a system favcured by
the British for adoption by their former colonies and
protectorates.
2 Has Al Ithaimah joined the Union on the 10th of February,
1972.
3 The original signatories of the Constitution did rt thc1te
Has Al Ithalzteh. which ared to the Union cm 10 February,
1972. A new paragraph was added by a Declaration of
Constitutional Amendment No. 1 (1972) which reads as
foll,s:-
"In the event of the acceptare of a r rinber joinir
the Union, the Supreme Council of the Union shall
determine the number of seats which will be allocated
to that member in the National Assembly of the Union,
beir in M{ticn to the mither stip.ilated in Article
68 of this Qxstituticn."
4 Decision of the Suprie Oril of the Union No. 3, 1972.
5	 Added by Constitutional Amerx3rrerit No. 1 (1 976).
6	 Depleted by Qstitutic*al ternent No. 1 (1976).
7 This paragraph has been ameaied three consecutive times, the
last of which was in 1981 • 1e effect of the last ainen±rent
is to make the term of this Constitution expire on 1 st of
December 1991.
8 Has Al Khaimah joined the Union on the 10th February, 1972.
Source: Hadif Rashid Al-Owais, The role of the Supreme Court in the
Constitutional System of the United Arab Emirates. A Comparative
Study.
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Translatoi oJ an Arrement dated 24th Sha'ban 1357 equhatens to the 19th Ocioba 13$ betsee.
Sbaikh Sa'Id bIn Maktum, OLE., Ruler of Dubal and notables of the Aibu Falasah. (Ta IOR
RuSh/I I)
AR TICLEL
A 4ajlis shall be founded at once in the State of Dubai to be formed of members of the Albu
Falasah and other tribes subjects of Dubai. This Majils shall consist of IS members who shall now and
in the future be seleted by the notables of Dubal.
ARTICLE 2.
The Majlis shall bold its meetings from time to time to deal with all maflers concerning the
affairs of the State under the presidentship of the Ruler of Dubai. Should he be, for any accidental
reason, unable to attend one of the members of the Mauls shall preside.
ARTICLE I
The Ruler of Dubal shall enforce all the decisions arrived at by the majority of the Majlis
ARTICLE 4.
The Ruler of Dubal shall refer to the Majlis all matters concerning the State of Dubal and take
no action in any matter without the previous approval of the majority of the Majils.
ARTICLE1
No decision whatsoever sbafl be considered operative unless it has been approved by the
majority of the Majlis.
ARTICLE 6.
All the incomes and expenditure (of the state) shall be done in the name of the State of Dubai.
No expenditure shall be incurred without the previous approval of the majority of the Majils.
ARTICLE 7
The MajIls shall not interfere in the private affairs and personal property of the Ruler of Dubal.
ARTICLE &
Should the Ruler, as president of the Majhs, refrain from attending any of its meetings without
a reasonable cause, the Majlis shall bold its meeting and in his (Ruler's) ibsence pass such decisions as
may be considered suitable. Sudi decisions shall be operative. But matters connected with His Majests
Go'ernment shall not be discussed in the absence of the Shfrh
ARTICLE 9
The Rukr shall receive an allowance of one eighth of the total income of the State. This
allowance is toy for his household expenditure and that of his sons. He shall not receive any other
allowance beside what is mentioned above.
Dated 24th Sha'ban 1357 equivalent to the 19th October 1938.
Signed-
Sa'id bin Maktum
Man? bin Rashid, on behalf of the Albu Falasah.
Witnessed-
Sbakhbut bin Sultan bin Zaid, Ruler of Abu Dhabi
Muhammad bin 'Abdullab bin Huraix (Dubai)
Rashid bin Muhammad bin Dalmuk (Dubal)
Source: Anwar M. Gargash, Political Participation in Kuwait an&the
UnitedArab Emirates p.
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